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Abstract 
The thesis is rooted in the study of the complicated 
relationships between the body and territory - and by 
extension, the body and the nation - in Palestine and Israel. 
This framework allows me to elaborate a more detailed study 
of the Palestinian suicide bomber, considered in relation to 
the occupation of Palestinian-inhabited territory in the West 
Bank and Gaza. I draw on examples from visual culture in
which the deceased suicide bomber is commemorated as a 
martyr, in this way presenting an idealized image of the 
Palestinian nation. I argue that there is a relationship 
between territory, the "body" of the nation, and the body of 
the suicide bomber/martyr, and one in which ideals of self­
sacrifice and resistance are performed by the martyr. In so 
doing I theorize the performance of martyrdom, the staging of 
the self as a martyr by the suicide bomber to be, as a type 
of subject formation under occupation, and as the enactment 
of a resistant subjectivity. This study asserts that the 
actions of the Palestinian suicide bomber are intentional and 
linked to territorial encroachment on Palestinian lands. In 
so doing it positions itself in opposition to a majority of 
the research literature on the subject. This research makes 
an innovative contribution to the study of Palestinian 
martyrdom by removing the suicide bomber from its primary 
field of study in the West, terrorism and security studies, 
and situating it within the realm 
performance studies. It proposes new understandings of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber, considered in terms of 
corporeality, performance, intentionality and subjectivity. 
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Additionally the thesis considers performance as a research 
methodology. The elaboration of my theoretical propositions 
emerged in part through performance, the staging of myself in 
a mimetic attempt to put myself in the place of the 
Palestinian martyr. Through performance I "act out" material 
under consideration in the thesis while also positioning 
myself in relation to it. In this way I insert myself into 
the thesis as a critical and positioned subject. 
The notion of the positioned subject is also central to the 
practice el"ement, where I use performance to position myself 
outside of mainstream North American Jewish identity. I 
perform various Others of my own Jewish identity, in this way 
asserting a resistant subjectivity. 
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Introduction 
This research is centrally concerned with relationships 
between the body and territory - and by extension, the body 
and the nation - in Palestine and Israel. It is also 
centrally concerned with the phenomenon of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber, and it uses a study of the relationships 
between the body and territory in Palestine and Israel as a 
larger theoretical framework of analysis within which to 
consider the Palestinian suicide bomber. 
In the case of the latter nation, Israel, "The national 
territory becomes equivalent to the personal body" (Weiss 
2002-b p.38). The Jewish national territory - the state of 
Israel - and the Jewish personal body evolved and continue to 
evolve in a mutually constitutive relationship: the Zionist 
settlers to Palestine reconfigured the body of the European 
Diaspora Jew as a rooted, healthy, strong and powerful body, 
in Palestine. And they simultaneously reconfigured "empty" 
land (Troen 2003, Alon 1971, Shulman 1979, Avneri 1984) in 
Palestine into Jewish land - land that in 1948 became the 
state of Israel. 
The former nation, Palestine, has not yet succeeded in 
creating a national territory in internationally recognized 
terms, that is, of the nation state. What's more, much of the 
land that might constitute a Palestinian state now belongs to 
or is occupied by another nation, Israel. Consequently, the 
Palestinian national territory cannot be said to be 
equivalent to the personal body. Nonetheless, relationships 
between the Palestinian body and territory may be 
established. Notably, the Palestinian body has been invoked 
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as a metaphor, in cultural representations and political 
discourse, for the Palestinian nationi for the Palestinian 
homeland lost in 1948 with the creation of Israeli and for a 
desired Palestinian state. The body has also been central to 
Palestinian resistance to Jewish territorial encroachment 
(that is, by Jews onto Palestinian lands) and occupationl. 
This study considers the Palestinian body in a relationship 
to Jewish encroachment onto Palestinian territory, and as a 
locus of resistance in the struggle to reclaim this land as 
national territory for a sovereign Palestinian state. 
Because territory in historic Palestine lies at the center of 
two competing claims to it as national territory, it may be 
considered contested territory. Since the turn of the 20th 
century, and since 1948 in particular, only one nation 
Israel - has succeeded in asserting control over this 
territory. Accordingly, this research pays particular 
attention to the spatial practices - notably settlement 
construction - used by the Zionist settlers to Palestine, and 
after 1948 by Israelis, to assert control over land in 
palestine and to wrest it away from Palestinians. The thesis 
also considers Palestinian resistance to these practices, 
from the early part of the 20th century to the present. In 
particular, it connects Israeli spatial practices in the West 
Bank and Gaza to the exploding body of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber, deployed as a weapon of resistance since 
1993. 
1 The problematics of the term "Jewish" in this context are 
discussed on page 50. 
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The latter half of the thesis focuses on the Palestinian 
suicide bomber or istishhadi, one who sacrifices her or his 
life in an act of suicide bombing or martyrdom operation. I 
do not in any way condone Palestinian acts of suicide 
bombing. However I do seek to theorize them differently than 
a majority of the research literature consulted. The present 
study proposes new understandings of the istishhadi, 
considered in terms of corporeality, performance, 
intentionality and SUbjectivity - and in a relationship to a 
history of Jewish control asserted over Palestinian inhabited 
territory extending back to the arrival of the first Zionist 
settlers to Palestine in the 1880s. 
Chapter 1 explores relationships - some metaphorical and some 
not - between the Palestinian body and territory in historic 
Palestine between approximately 1920 and 1993. It examines 
the body as a metaphor for the loss of the homeland after 
1948. It also considers the body as a locus of Palestinian 
resistance going back to the 1920s. This chapter examines 
male bodies associated with Palestinian resistance but also, 
self-sacrifice for the land and for the nation of Palestine: 
the martyr of the 1920s and 1930s, the fida'i (guerilla 
fighter) of the 1960s and 1970s, and the shab (young man) of 
the first intifada from 1987 to 1993. This chapter sets the 
stage for my analysis of the istishhadi in the latter half of 
the thesis, for it locates the Palestinian suicide bomber 
within a larger historical trajectory of Palestinian 
resistance and self-sacrifice in response to Jewish 
encroachment onto Palestinian lands. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the reinvention of the European Jewish 
body in historic Palestine and by extension, in a 
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relationship to control asserted by Jews over territory 
there. This chapter weaves together scholarship from two 
separate but highly theorized fields: investigations into the 
Jewish body, and the study of Jewish spatial practices in 
historic Palestine - later Israel and the occupied West Bank 
and Gaza. It examines notions of the ideal (strong and 
powerful) Jewish body together with notions of the ideal 
(uniquely Jewish) Jewish land at various points since the 
1880s. It connects both of these ideals to spatial practices, 
notably the construction of separate and exclusively Jewish 
settlements, used to assert Jewish control over territory -
practices that have also resulted in the deterritorialization 
and spatial containment of Palestinians (Weizman 2007, Massad 
2006, Pappe 2002-a, 2002-b, Masalha 1992). 
In Chapter 3, I turn my attention to the Palestinian suicide 
bomber, considered in terms of corporeality and 
representation in visual culture. This chapter identifies 
some of the effects of the Israeli occupation on the 
Palestinian body - what I term corporeal effects. Notably, 
Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement across territory 
serve to spatially confine and contain the Palestinian body, 
and in so doing they subject the body to a lack of adequate 
health care and sustenance, to violence, and increasingly, to 
death. This chapter considers the body of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber as a weapon of resistance deployed against the 
Israeli occupation and against Israel. It examines 
commemorative visual imagery of the istishhadi created and 
disseminated by the deploying organizations, images that 
serve as a reminder of the body's destructive potential. In 
the absence and ongoing deferral of Palestinian statehood, 
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these images also provide an idealized image of the 
Palestinian nation as a strong and powerful one, the same as 
Israel. 
The focus of Chapter 4 is on performance, intentionality, and 
sUbjectivity. Contra much of the research literature, this 
chapter asserts that istishhadi's act of self-sacrifice is 
intentional and inextricably linked to Israel's occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza. And, following the work of Farhad 
Khosrokhavar (2005), it considers the istishhadi's self-
sacrifice as being linked to subject formation. First, 
Palestinian subjectivity in the West Bank and Gaza is 
considered in a relationship to the harsh restrictions on 
Palestinian movement imposed by Israel since the start of the 
second intifada in 2000. These are so severe that they wrest 
control over daily life away from Palestinians under 
occupation, subjecting them to Israeli sovereign power 
(Mbembe 2003), the power over life and death. This impacts 
Palestinian subjectivity to such an extent that it produces 
Palestinians as non-subjects (Butler 1993, Collin 2004). This 
chapter theorizes the performance of Palestinian martyrdom 
the martyr's staging of self as a martyr prior to being 
deployed and with a view to creating commemorative visual 
imagery - as a response to Israeli constraints on Palestinian 
SUbjectivity in the Occupied Territories. The istishhadi's 
performance constitutes a type of subject formation: through 
performance the martyr enacts a SUbjectivity denied by the 
brutality of the Occupation, the status of the subject 
itself. Through performance, the martyr also enacts a 
resistant SUbjectivity, and one that refuses the status of 
the non-subject. 
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Methodology 
The complexities of naming underscore the contested nature of 
the subject matter under study: to decide what to call the 
individual who dies while exploding her or his own body, 
involves an act of authorial positioning. To use the term 
suicide bomber rather than suicide terrorist, to use the term 
istishhadi rather than homicide killer, to use the term 
martyrdom rather than suicide, reveals something about the 
author's position not only in relation to the subject matter 
but also, to the research literature on the subject. 
Much of the literature about Palestinian suicide bombers is 
generated within the field of security and terrorism studies 
(Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center and 2006, 
Israel Information Center 2004, Bukay 2008, Berko 2007, Shay 
2004, Bloom 2003, 2004 and 2005, Kimhi and Even 2003, Davis 
2002, Esposito 2002, Ganor 2000, and Paz 2000), and it seeks 
to explain the actions of the Palestinian suicide bomber 
within the context of global terrorism and the prevention 
thereof. This material proposes various religious, 
organizational, personal and psychological motivations for 
Palestinian acts of suicide bombing, often focusing on 
religious motivations as the primary impetus for such acts. 
In so doing the literature downplays or outright denies much 
in the way of intentionality on the part of the istishhadi. 
Much of this literature fails to adequately - if at all 
consider the Israeli occupation as a primary motivating 
factor for Palestinian suicide bombers. Nor does it 
acknowledge the profound attachment of Palestinians to the 
land of Palestine. 
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What's more, this literature generally fails to understand 
the suicide bomber's actions as being linked to a history of 
increasing Jewish control asserted over Palestinian land 
since the late 19th century, and particularly so since 1967 
(Abufarha 2009, Slater 2009, Whitehead and Abufarha 2008, 
Asad 2007, Allen 2006-c, Hasso 2005, Hage 2003, Mbembe 2003). 
In line with the work of these scholars, the present study 
considers the istishhadi's actions to be intentional acts of 
resistance primarily and inextricably linked to a history of 
Jewish encroachment on, and occupation of, Palestinian lands. 
In focusing on territorial control in Palestine and Israel, 
the thesis cites investigations by Palestinian and Israeli 
historians and scholars and in particular, those who are 
unflinchingly critical of the spatial objectives and 
practices of the Zionist movement in historic Palestine, and 
of subsequent Israeli governments after 1948. In addition to 
those cited in the paragraph above, scholarly studies by 
historians Nur Masalha, Ilan Pappe, Samih Farsoun and Naseer 
Hasan Aruri, Rashid Khalidi, Walid Khalidi, Sami Hadawi, and 
Idith Zertel and Akiva Eldar have informed this research, as 
have those of political theorist Joseph Massad, architect 
Eyal Weizman and geographer Oren Yiftachel. 
The primary objective of this study is to generate a new 
understanding of the Palestinian suicide bomber. A secondary 
goal of this research is to engage in a substantial critique 
of Jewish spatial practices in historic Palestine, later the 
state of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. It is my long-
held belief that the spatial reconfiguration and occupation 
of Palestinian land, by Jews, was one of the cruelest 
travesties of the 20th century and now, the 21st. However it 
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was not until I was completing the very final revisions to 
the thesis that I realized that the thesis is motivated in 
part by a personal desire to engage a different history of 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over contested territory 
than the one I had been taught growing up, and this history 
is discussed in Chapter 2: the arrival of the Zionist 
settlers to an empty land awaiting their return from galut or 
exile, and the miraculous transformation of a backward and 
barren land into a lush and modern Jewish homeland. This 
account elides Palestinians and it fails to acknowledge the 
impact of the Jewish nation building project on the 
Palestinian nation. 
The thesis seeks to foreground a connection between acts of 
Palestinian suicide bombing and Jewish spatial practices in 
Palestine. It also seeks to theorize acts of suicide bombing 
using a framework that considers corporeality, performance, 
intentionality and SUbjectivity. In so doing this study 
removes the Palestinian suicide bomber from its primary field 
of investigation in the West, terrorism and security studies 
- and situates it within the realms of performance studies 
and contemporary philosophy. Accordingly it draws importantly 
upon scholarship in these two disciplines, and in particular, 
on the work of Marvin Carlson, Amelia Jones, Judith Butler, 
Michel Foucault, and Elizabeth Grosz. Attempting to theorize 
the Palestinian suicide bomber outside of conventional 
scholarship on the subject necessitated an interdisciplinary 
approach. As such, this research also draws upon scholarship 
in sociology and anthropology, visual cultures, literary 
criticism, and art history. It draws importantly on scholarly 
investigations by theorists Nasser Abufarha, Farhad 
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Khosrokhavar, Amal Amireh, Tina Sherwell, and Mahmoud Abu 
Hashhash. 
Attempting to arrive at a new understanding of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber also required the elaboration of 
an innovative research framework. My methodology fuses 
academic research with studio investigations in the form of 
performance. The path through the material that comprises the 
thesis emerged through a rigorous yet open-ended process 
guided by the demands and findings of my own performance 
practice. 
Accordingly, this research uses performance as a research 
methodology. For a period of over two years, from June 2004 
to June 2006, I staged myself in response to some of the 
material under study, and the commemorative posters of the 
istishhadi in particular, as described in the final chapter, 
dealing with my performance practice. I turned to performance 
early on in my doctoral project, at a time when there were 
few scholarly alternatives to the research literature in the 
field of terrorism studies, and when I was profoundly 
uncertain as to how to decipher material under study in the 
thesis. The focus of my investigations at the time was 
motive, and I turned to performance in the hopes that I could 
gain new insight into why someone would possibly blow 
themselves up. I turned to performance in a mimetic attempt 
to act out material in the written element, and in an effort 
to put myself in the place of the Palestinian suicide bomber. 
Performance required me to physically position myself in 
relation to my subject matter. The act of deliberate and 
intentional corporeal positioning required by performance 
15 
unexpectedly led me to consider the istishhadi's actions to 
be deliberate and intentional, and this was later 
substantiated by scholarly investigations (Khosrokhavar 2005, 
Abufarha 2009, Hafez 2006-a, Pedahzur 2005, Juergensmeyer 
2003, Bloom 2003 and 2005), as explored in Chapter 4. 
As well, it was through this process of performance that I 
came to understand the istishhadi's staging of her/his self, 
prior to deployment, as performance. This development led me 
to elaborate a theory of the performance of Palestinian 
martyrdom, and to use performance and performance theory as a 
theoretical framework in the thesis. 
As well, the act of corporeal positioning required by my 
performance spurred me to focus my investigations more 
closely on the body. Together with theoretical readings that 
examined a relationship between the body and territory more 
globally (Foucault 1977, 1978, Grosz 1998, 1995), and in 
Palestine and Israel more specifically (Amireh 2003, Sherwell 
2001, 2003, Weiss 2002-a and 2002-b), performance spurred me 
to focus my framework of investigation in the written element 
on the relationship between the body and territory. 
Performance unexpectedly prompted me to position myself more 
assertively in relation to the material under consideration 
in the thesis. It also helped me to position myself more 
critically in relation to the research literature consulted 
for the thesis. Performance inspired me to insert myself into 
the thesis as a positioned subject, to loosely invoke 
Lorraine Code (1991). 
Performance is also central to my studio practice. There, I 
use performance to position myself outside of mainstream 
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North American Jewish identity. I perform Others of my own 
Jewish identity: an Islamic suicide bomber/martyr, a 
Christian fundamentalist cheerleader, neo-Nazis. I perform 
these Others to position myself in opposition to the modes of 
Jewish identity formation I experienced growing up. In so 
doing I assert my stance as a positioned subject with respect 
to my own Jewish identity, and I also assert a resistant type 
of subjectivity. 
My performance functions as a sort of bridge, between 
personal experience, and the subject matter of the thesis. 
Performance can provide a means of asserting oneself in 
response to forces that contour or impact one's subjectivity. 
This observation applies to my own performance, and it 
applies to the istishhadi's performance as I understand it. 
Performance provides a point of connection to the subject 
matter of the thesis, and it enabled me to come to a new 
understanding of the subject matter of the thesis, the 
Palestinian suicide bomber. The thesis could not have been 
written as it was, if not for my own performance practice. 
17 
Chapter 1 
The Palestinian body and Palestinian land: resistance and 
self-sacrifice, for Palestine - the istisbbadi in context 
This chapter sets the stage for my analysis, in Chapters 3 
and 4, of the Palestinian suicide bomber - the istishhadi -
one who sacrifices her/himself in an act of suicide bombingl. 
As explored in greater detail in the latter half of the 
thesis, the suicide bomber's actions are linked not only to 
martyrdom and self-sacrifice, but also, to Palestinian 
resistance and to national liberation objectives. 
Also in Chapters 3 and 4, the body of the Palestinian suicide 
bomber is considered a weapon of resistance deployed against 
the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza and against 
Israel. This chapter seeks to situate the actions of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber within a larger trajectory of 
Palestinian resistance to Jewish colonial expansion in 
Palestine: to Zionist (prior to 1948) and Israeli state 
(after 1948) encroachment onto Palestinian lands2 • 
The present chapter locates the Palestinian suicide bomber or 
istishhadi within a larger trajectory of Palestinian 
resistance and self-sacrifice prior to 1993 - the date when 
the first Palestinian suicide bomber was deployed - going 
back to the 1920s. In so doing this chapter considers prior 
1 While I use the terms Palestinian suicide bomber and istishhadi 
more or less interchangeably in this chapter, there are differences 
between them, that I explain in Chapter 3. The term istishhadi is 
used to distinguish the Palestinian suicide bomber from earlier 
instances of the Palestinian martyr considered in this chapter. 
2 Abufarha (2009) refers to the latter as Israeli state 
expansionism. 
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instances of Palestinian resistance and self-sacrifice, as 
embodied by the martyr of the 1920s and 1930s, the guerilla 
fighter or fida'i of the 1960s and 1970s, and the young man 
or shab of the first intifada (1987 to 1993). 
Chapter 2 explores a mutually constitutive relationship 
between the Jewish body and control asserted by Jews, over 
territory in historic Palestine. In contrast, the 
relationship between the Palestinian body and territory is 
not a mutually constitutive one. Rather, relationships 
between the Palestinian body and territory have been 
contoured by Jewish control asserted over Palestinian lands 
in historic Palestine. 
The present chapter considers relationships between the 
Palestinian body and territory in Palestine, from the turn of 
the 20th century until approximately 1993. At times these 
relationships are metaphorical, and at times they are not. 
For example, the Palestinian body has been used as a metaphor 
for the Palestinian homeland, as well as for territorial 
dispossession and the loss of the homeland following the 
creation of the state of Israel in 1948 3 • The Palestinian body 
- and the male body in particular - has also been associated 
with Palestinian resistance. And while women have 
participated in Palestinian national resistance, the martyr, 
the fida'i and the shab discussed in this chapter are all 
3 Whereas I outline my understanding of the body in detail in the 
following chapter, it would be useful to cite Elizabeth Grosz, who 
defines the body as "a concrete, material, animate organization of 
flesh, organs, nerves, muscles and skeletal structure which are 
given a unity, cohesiveness, and organization only through their 
psychical and social inscription" (1998 p.43). 
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male4 • Accordingly this chapter focuses on the Palestinian 
male body. 
This research cites examples from Palestinian literature and 
material produced by Palestinian political organizations, 
notably the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), as 
observed primarily in the investigations of key scholars 
Sheila Katz (1996-a and 1996-b), Amal Amireh (2003), Tina 
Sherwell (2001 and 2003), Joseph Massad (2006), and Laleh 
Khalili (2007)5. 
Before proceeding, it is important to define key terminology 
as central to this writing. 
4 For a concise overview of women's participation in the Palestinian 
national movement dating from 1919 through to the early part of the 
first intifada, see Jad 1999. For a study of the birth of a 
Palestinian women's movement prior to 1948, see Fleischmann 2003. 
5 Ami Elad-Bouskila defines modern Palestinian literature (that 
written from 1870 onward), as "a literature written by 
Palestinians" (1999 p.9) regardless of their geographical location. 
For a comprehensive overview of modern Palestinian literature, see 
in particular Jayyusi 1992. An earlier version of this chapter also 
included examples from Palestinian painting, however, with a shift 
in focus to the male Palestinian body, these examples became less 
relevant. For a comprehensive study of Palestinian art, see in 
particular Boullata 2009; see also Sherwell 2001, 2003, and 2006, 
and Ben Zvi 2006. It is somewhat disappointing to me that this 
thesis devotes so little attention to Palestinian art and to 
contemporary Palestinian art in particular. The demanding nature of 
the focus of my investigation - the Palestinian suicide bomber read 
in large part through histories of territorial occupation and 
domination - left little room for an in-depth engagement with 
Palestinian art. Instead I hope to take up this subject at a 
postdoctoral level, where I wish to investigate relationships 
between the body, territory and subjectivity in Palestinian and 
Israeli performance art, respectively. 
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Land in Palestine and Palestinian land 
Whereas the term territory is used in much of the thesis, the 
term land used in this chapter derives from its citation in 
the research literature consulted. The very term "land" in 
the context of Palestine is a polyvalent one. 
The term land can refer to the land of historic Palestine. 
Palestinian historian Sami Hadawi (1989) observes that 
historic Palestine comprised 10,163 square miles, and was 
made up of four main areas: The coastal plains, the hill 
region, the Jordan Valley, and the Southern Desert or Negev. 
Historic Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire until the 
end of World War I, at which time the League of Nations 
provided Great Britain with a mandate to administer what then 
became known as Mandatory Palestine, a territory that in 1948 
became the State of Israel, the Kingdom of Jordan (including 
the Jordanian West Bank), the Gaza Strip, and a part of the 
Golan Heights 6 • 
As well, the term land or Palestinian land is used to 
describe land upon which Palestinians once lived, in what is 
now the state of Israel. It may also refer to land upon which 
Palestinians continue to live, in the Occupied West Bank and 
Gaza. Because Palestinians do not actually control land, 
either in the state of Israel or the Occupied Territories, 
"land" in this chapter is often associated with being 
reclaimed or redeemed from foreign occupation. In using the 
6 This research cannot adequately consider the events leading to the 
granting of the Mandate; see in particular pp.9-18 in Hadawi 1989; 
see also Khalidi 2006. I discuss some of the events surrounding 
1948 in the following chapter. 
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term control in relation to territory, I refer to Israeli 
sociologist Baruch Kimmerling's study (1983) in which he 
defines control of territory as being contingent on 
establishing a presence on, ownership of, and sovereignty 
over the territory in question. While Palestinians may have a 
presence on land, they do not otherwise control it. 
As well, the term Palestinian homeland is also used, to 
describe the land of historic Palestine as the Palestinian 
homeland, lost in 1948. It is the homeland to which 
Palestinians hope to return to, and so the Palestinian 
homeland is be associated with the creation of a future 
national homeland or nation-state. 
The modern nation and the Palestinian nation 
The modern nation emerged in the mid-nineteenth century in 
Europe, as explored in detail in Gellner (1983) and Hobsbawm 
(1990)7. Yet as Zubaida (1978) observes, there is no 
systematic or scientific way of designating what a nation is. 
The nation is often conflated with the sovereign nation-state 
and with having fixed territorial boundaries and 
delimitations8 • However, Ernst Renan, writing in 1882, 
conceived of the modern nation as a psychic and not 
7 Etienne Balibar (1991) observes that the emergence of a system of 
sovereign nation-states corresponded to the development of market 
structures and modern capitalism at this time. 
8 Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis define the nation-state as Ua 
body of institutions which are centrally organized around the 
intentionality of control with a given apparatus of enforcement 
(juridical and repressive) at its command" (1989, p.S). It is this 
definition which informs my understanding of the nation-state. 
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exclusively a geographical or territorial formation. The 
nation, for Renan, is "a large-scale solidarity" (1882 p.19). 
From this derives the idea of a nation as a people: a 
community that fosters a sense of belonging, self-
identification and membership (Layoun 1992). Thus it may also 
be said that a nation exists when a significant number of 
people consider themselves to form a nation (Anderson 1991). 
Benedict Anderson's seminal treatise (1991) considers the 
nation to be an imagined political community. The nation is 
imagined because "the members of even the smallest nation 
will never know most of their fellow-members" (Anderson 1991 
p.6). It is imagined as a community because "the nation is 
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship" (Anderson 
1991 p.7). It is this conception of the nation, as a 
community whose members understand themselves as belonging to 
the nation, that frames my understanding of the Palestinian 
nation. 
Nonetheless, concepts of sovereignty and the nation-state 
cannot be ignored in a discussion of the Palestinian nation. 
In Anderson's conception of nation as an imagined community, 
the nation is also imagined as sovereign, for "nations dream 
of being free ••• The gauge and emblem of this freedom is the 
sovereign state" (1991 p.7). The Palestinian nation has no 
fixed territorial borders and none of the internationally 
recognized markers of the nation in terms that would 
constitute a sovereign nation-state. This is because parts of 
the very territory that could constitute a sovereign 
Palestinian nation-state now belong to, or (in the West Bank 
and Gaza) are occupied by another nation, Israel. 
Palestinians not only conceive of themselves as a nation 
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considered in terms of a community (as in Layoun 1992, or a 
"comradeship" as in Anderson 1991), but they also share a 
desire to become a sovereign nation considered in terms of 
the nation-state. 
The nation is also linked to concepts of the homeland. As 
scholars Alison Blunt and Robyn Dowling observe, "Home and 
homeland are powerful spatial imaginaries that also 
articulate contemporary ideas about the nation" (2006 p.167). 
Further, the homeland, "whether remembered from the past, 
existing in the present, or yet to be created - is mapped 
onto national space" (Blunt and Dowling 2006 p.159). This 
relationship is particularly relevant to an understanding of 
the Palestinian nation, because the homeland of the past, and 
the national space of the future are one and the same: it is 
on at least part of the territory that once constituted the 
Palestinian homeland (historic Palestine) that a future 
Palestinian national space will occupy. 
Nationalism and Palestinian nationalism 
For Calhoun (1997), nationalism has three dimensions, two of 
which are relevant to my understanding of Palestinian 
nationalism. For Calhoun (1997), nationalism is a discourse 
through which national identities are established and 
reinforced. As a discourse, nationalism can be considered as 
"a cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people 
throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in 
terms of the idea of nation and national identity" (1997 
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p.6)9. Nationalism is also defined as a project through which 
people attempt to advance the interests of the nation, by 
"pursuing in some combination (or in a historical 
progression) increased participation in an existing nation-
state, national autonomy, independence and self-
determination ••. " (Calhoun 1997 p. 6 ) 10 • 
This study is especially interested in Palestinian 
nationalism as a project (Calhoun 1997), understood as the 
pursuit of national self-determination or sovereignty, and 
culminating in the creation of a Palestinian nation-state. 
As Palestinian scholar Rashid Khalidi (1997) asserts, 
Palestinian nationalism was documented as early as 1701. It 
first manifested as a profound attachment to Palestine as a 
sacred if not yet a national space, by the local Muslim 
population (Khalidi 1997). Under Ottoman rule beginning 
around 1850, an attachment to Palestine as a territorial 
entity began to develop as a result of the Ottoman empire's 
creation of administrative entities, of which Palestine or 
filistin was oneIl. 
9 An extended discussion of Palestinian identity lies outside the 
scope of this research; see in particular Rashid Khalidi's 
important study (1997) on Palestinian national identity. 
10 Calhoun's third dimension of nationalism is evaluation, a claim 
to superiority for a specific nation; this aspect is not relevant 
to my study of Palestinian nationalism. 
11 For Khalidi (1997), Palestinian nationalism first manifested as a 
connection to Palestine as a sacred space, the "al-ard al-muqudasi" 
in the Koran, and to holy sites such as Jerusalem, Jericho, Nablus, 
Safad, Acre and Gaza. It also manifested as a fear of external 
encroachment on the holy or sacred land. On Palestinian nationalism 
under Ottoman rule and up to 1920, see also Muslih 1988. 
25 
Palestinian nationalism has been contoured by many factors, 
not the least of which is Jewish nationalism and the arrival 
of the Zionist settlers to historic Palestine in the 1880s. 
Palestinian nationalism was profoundly affected by the loss 
of the homeland in 1948, a date that marked the successful 
culmination of Jewish nationalism - also considered as a 
project in Calhoun's terms - in historic Palestine. 
Importantly, Palestinian nationalism differs significantly 
from many other kinds of nationalism because it is 
fundamentally informed by the desire for the lost 
object: the homeland. This desire is compounded by the 
fact that the particular nationalist landscape is not 
simply a space of longing, but that it once in recent 
history was a space in which Palestinians lived, which 
is now inhabited by another people (Sherwell, 2003, 
p.131). 
The Palestinian nation and Palestinian self-representation 
George Mosse (1985) observes that when the modern nation 
emerged at the beginning of the 19th century, nations sought 
to provide symbols with which its people could identify. 
These included national flags, anthems, and national 
monuments. These were central to fostering a sense of 
collective identification with the nation. 
In addition to national symbols, representational practices 
also perform a central role in fostering a sense of 
identification with the nation, "the representation of the 
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homeland and the people of the nation is central to national 
formations" (Sherwell 2003 p.130). The nation may therefore 
be linked to representational practices such as art and 
literature. For Sherwell (2003), these representational 
practices serve to foster a sense of membership in the 
nation, and they also enable individuals to imagine 
themselves as part of the nation. liThe representations that 
individuals and communities create of themselves, their past 
and their homeland are contoured by numerous factors, in 
particular by the desire of how they wish to see themselves" 
(Sherwell, 2003 p.125-126). However, Sherwell draws our 
attention to the fact that, "representational practices of 
Palestinian nationalist discourse have not grown out of the 
stability of a nation, but emerge from the desire for a 
nation state" (Sherwell, 2003, p.131)12. In the absence of a 
nation-state, art and literature playa central role in 
fostering a connection to the Palestinian homeland, and this 
connection is often articulated using men's and women's 
bodies as central tropes in Palestinian cultural production 
and political discourse. For example, the Palestinian 
homeland is metaphorized as a woman, and the Palestinian man 
as her lover. The wedding is a prominent theme, with the 
groom being wed to his bride, the land of Palestine. The 
groom is often a martyr who sacrifices himself to his bride, 
Palestine. These metaphors in are explored beginning with the 
section below. 
12 While my concern is not with Palestinian identity, it is worth 
mentioning that Palestinian national identity has also been forged 
not by the stability of the nation, but out of a collective longing 
for a nation-state (Sherwell 2003). 
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The Palestinian body as a metaphor for land before 1948 
Sheila Katz (1996-a, 1996-b) observes that men's and women's 
bodies were used as metaphors for the land that was the 
object of both early Zionist and Palestinian nationalisms, 
respectively, prior to the year 195013. Katz (1996-a, 1996-b) 
notes that both nationalisms were preoccupied with ideals of 
manliness and with the achievement of manhood: these were 
contingent on the possession and defense of land in 
Palestine. Ideals of manhood were not unique to Jewish and 
Palestinian nationalism: they emerged in Europe at the turn 
of the 19th century when, as Mosse (1985) observes, ideals of 
manliness came to symbolize the health and strength of the 
nation14 • 
In both early Zionist and Palestinian nationalist discourses, 
the land was represented as weak, feminine and barren. And in 
both early Zionist and Palestinian nationalist discourses, 
men played a prominent role in rescuing, reviving, and 
fertilizing the female land, and in so doing they also 
asserted their manhood. Thus the female land would be rescued 
and defended by "real men" (Katz 1996-a p.89). Katz (1996-a 
and 1996-b) observes that in Zionist nationalist discourse, 
the new man of Zionism would return to the biblical homeland 
where he would revive the land and make it fertile again. In 
13 Katz's observations are based on a study of political tracts, 
literary writings, biographies, newspaper articles and interviews. 
14 Mosse's study (1985) focuses on Germany and England in 
particular. He further observes that ideals of manliness drew upon 
the ideal of courage in knighthood, as well as on Greek revivalist 
ideals of male beauty. Manliness was also linked to manners and 
morals. 
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so doing he would reverse 2000 years of Jewish exile and 
landlessness, fertilizing the land with the sweat of his 
labor and producing a new nation, and I discuss the Jewish 
body in greater detail in the following chapter. 
In contrast in Palestinian nationalist discourse, the land is 
depicted as a woman weakened by foreign (Ottoman and later 
British) rule and by Zionist settlement, and is revived and 
nursed back to health by Palestinian men (Katz, 1996-a, 1996-
b). Care of the land by Palestinian men would infuse her 
(Palestine) with strength and health. 
Jewish and Palestinian ideals of manhood were also linked to 
exile and dispossession: limen could not live a normal life if 
they were not sovereign over their own land ... exile was a 
weapon aimed at peoplehood and manhood ll (Katz 1996-b p.8S). 
The Jewish man sought to end his exile by possessing land in 
Palestine. The Palestinian man sought to prevent 
dispossession and exile, increasingly so in response to the 
arrival of Zionist settlers in Palestine (Katz 1996-b). The 
Palestinian man would even die fighting to preserve his land 
from encroachment by the Zionist settlers. 
Katz (1996-b) notes that themes of martyrdom and self-
sacrifice became prevalent in Palestinian nationalism during 
the 1920s and 1930S15 • In Palestinian poetry in particular, 
the Palestinian man is described as a martyr who sacrifices 
himself to his land, Palestine. For example, the poem titled 
15 Interestingly, Katz uses the term "culture of martyrdom" (1996-a 
p.88); so too do many Israeli writers writing about Palestinian 
martyrdom today. I deal with the problematics of this and similar 
terms in Chapter 3. 
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Kul Shabab by Ajaj Nuwiyhid, uses the metaphor of a wedding 
between the martyr and his bride, Palestine, "We have asked 
to become engaged to a girl/Her bride price is very 
expensive / But she deserves it / Here is our answer: / We 
will fight for the sake of your eyes / Death is our aim" (in 
Katz 1996-a p.90). The land is metaphorized as the bride, for 
whom the groom - the martyr - makes the ultimate sacrifice, 
his life. The martyr's sacrifice is the result of a struggle, 
described in the poem above as "we will fight". The martyr 
sacrifices his life - and by extension, his mortal body - to 
the land, to Palestine. 
Katz also cites a poem titled Al-Shahid (the martyr), by Abd 
aI-Rahim Mahmud in 1936. He writes, "A man should live with 
honor and dignity / otherwise he should die gloriously ••• The 
only desire I have is to fall defending my usurped rights, 
and my country" (in Katz 1996-b p.87) [italics added]16. Here 
too, there are direct references to sacrifice ("to die 
gloriously" ), for Palestine ("my country"), as well as to 
Palestinian struggle ("to fall defending"). This poem was 
written during the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine. 
While Katz notes that aI-Rahim Mahmud was active in the 
Revolt, she does not discuss these events any further. 
The Palestinian martyr in the examples from Palestinian 
literature of the 1930s may be linked to real-life 
Palestinian martyrs who lost their lives in the struggle to 
defend their lands from increasing land acquisitions by the 
Zionist settlers. The martyr in literature also reflects a 
16 Jayyusi (1992) informs us that the poet went on to become a 
martyr: he was killed in battle in 1948. 
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turn toward Palestinian resistance and self-sacrifice in 
response to events on the ground in Palestine, so to speak. 
Historians Ilan Pappe (2006-a) and Samih Farsoun and Naseer 
Hasan Aruri (2006) note outbreaks of Palestinian violence 
that followed periods of increased Zionist land acquisition 
and the expulsion of Palestinian farmers from their lands 
during the 1920s and 1930s, and culminating in the Arab 
Revolt of 1936-1939, a series of organized strikes and armed 
insurrection directed against the British authorities in 
Palestine17 • 
The Arab Revolt was preceded by increased Palestinian 
activism and the formation of Palestinian resistance groups 
during the early 1930s. For example, Sheik 'Izz ed-Din al-
Qassam organized a group of armed guerillas in the 
Palestinian countryside. In 1935 al-Qassam was killed by 
British troops. Following his death large numbers of 
Palestinian youth organized themselves under the name Ikhwan 
17 I deal with the matter of Zionist land acquisitions and the 
expulsion of Palestinians in the following chapter. The Revolt was 
predated by violent outbreaks in Jerusalem and Jaffa in 1920 and 
1921, precipitated by the expulsion of Palestinian farmers from 
their lands by Zionist settlers. As well, in 1929, riots erupted in 
response to an incident involving prayer arrangements at the 
wailing Wall (pappe 2006-a) and spread to several cities, 
culminating in clashes between Palestinian and Jewish mobs that 
left 133 Jews and 116 Arabs dead (Farsoun and Aruri 2006). It is 
interesting to note that the current al-Aqsa intifada was also 
sparked by a conflict at the same site. On the Arab Revolt see 
Kayyali 1978. Muslih (1988) traces Palestinian resistance to 
Zionist territorial encroachment back to 1886. He notes that the 
first instances of Palestinian violence occurred when Jewish 
settlers at Petah Tikvah denied grazing access to farmers of a 
nearby Muslim village. He also notes Palestinian violence as the 
result of dispossession by the Zionist settlers to Palestine prior 
to the 1920s. 
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al-Qassam, or Brothers of al-Qassam (Farsoun and Aruri 2006). 
These and other groups were at the forefront of armed 
Palestinian resistance during the Arab Revolt, which sought 
to pressure the British authorities to halt the expulsions of 
Palestinians from their lands purchased by the Zionist 
settlers (Farsoun and Aruri 2006). On the one hand, the Arab 
Revolt was characterized by a new and organized type of 
Palestinian resistance: armed insurrection and guerilla 
warfare. On the other hand, al-Qassam's death provided a 
model for a new type of Palestinian resistance: martyrdom 
(Pappe 2006-a), "His martyrdom, self-sacrifice, and 
commitment to the national cause offered Palestinian Arabs a 
more honorable and popular model of struggle" (Farsoun and 
Arur i 2006 p. 91 ) 18 • 
Armed resistance brought with it the very real possibility of 
loss of life: the Arab Revolt left 5,000 Palestinians dead, 
and 10,000 wounded (Massad 2006, Khalidi 2001). Losing one's 
life in defense of the land constituted an act of self-
sacrifice. The martyr in Palestinian literature sacrifices 
his life for his bride, Palestine. Similarly, historical 
martyrs such as al-Qassam and those who died in the Arab 
Revolt, also sacrificed their lives in defense of Palestinian 
land. In both instances, self-sacrifice occurs for Palestine. 
The istishhadi or suicide bomber in Palestine today may be 
connected back to Palestinian resistance and self-sacrifice 
in defense of the land during the 1920s and 1930s. Like the 
18 Al-Qassam's legacy as a martyr is also evident in the name chosen 
by Hamas for its military wing responsible for deploying suicide 
bombers, the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades. 
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martyr, the istishhadi sacrifices her/himself for Palestine 
in an act of resistance. After 1948 however, the martyr would 
temporarily disappear. 
1948: the Palestinian catastrophe 
The state of Israel proclaimed its independence on May 15th, 
1948. By the time the Israeli government signed its final 
armistice agreement, with Syria in July 1949, over 18 million 
dunams of a total of 26 million dunams of land in what had 
been Mandate Palestine shifted from Palestinian Arab to 
Jewish-Israeli control (Khalidi 2001). Under armistice 
agreements signed in 1949 between the Israeli government and 
those of Jordan and Egypt, respectively, Jordan assumed 
control of those areas of Palestine located west of the 
Jordan River, and Egypt took control of the Gaza strip. As 
Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi asserts, Arab Palestine 
ceased to exist (2006). 
By January 1949, approximately 750,000 Palestinians - over 
half of the 1.4 million Palestinian Arabs in Mandatory 
Palestine - had fled or were driven from their lands19 • Most 
fled to the Gaza Strip and the Jordanian west Bank, both of 
which, as Farsoun and Aruri (2006) observe, comprised part of 
historic Palestine. By 1949, a majority of Palestinians found 
themselves displaced from their land, dispossessed of most of 
their property, and living under foreign rule. The loss of 
19 This is detailed in several sources and in Pappe 2006-b, Masalha 
1992 and Farsoun and Aruri 2006 in particular. I deal with these 
expulsions in greater detail in the following chapter. 
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the Palestinian homeland is described using the Arabic term 
al-Nakba, the disaster or catastrophe20 • 
As Heidi Nast and Steve Pile observe, "Bodies and places are 
woven together through intricate webs of social and spatial 
relations" (1998 p.4). The events of 1948 forever altered the 
spatial relationship between Palestinian bodies and the land 
of Palestine21 • Al-Nakba resulted in the massive uprooting of 
Palestinian bodies from the land of Palestine, and this 
transformed the rooted Palestinian body into a displaced 
body, a refugee body. 
The Palestinian body as a metaphor the for loss of the 
Palestinian homeland 
In the aftermath of al-Nakba, the infertile Palestinian body 
is used as a metaphor for the loss of the homeland and for 
Palestinian exile and deterritorialization. The infertile 
20 Said (1974) and Khalidi (1993) note the term's use in Syrian 
scholar Constantine Zurayk's 1948 book titled Ma'na al-nakba (the 
meaning of the disaster), later published in its English 
translation under that title. Writing about the impact of 1948 on 
the Middle East more generally, Rogan and Shlaim (2001) observe 
that no other event has marked Arab politics in the twentieth 
century as profoundly as the establishment of the state of Israel. 
The authors note that the war of 1948 between Israel and Egypt, 
Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan and Iraq resulted in major military 
defeats for all of these nations, with the exception of Iraqi and 
that within three years following the 1949 Armistice agreements 
signed between Israel and the Arab states, the prime ministers of 
Egypt and Lebanon were assassinated, as was the king of Jordan, and 
the president of Syria and the king of Egypt overthrown by military 
coups. 
21 As well, thousands of Palestinians who remained within Israel and 
became citizens of Israel were forced off of their lands after 
1948; see the collected essays in Masalha 2005. 
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bodies of both men and women became metaphors for the loss of 
the land, and for displacement and exile22 • This research 
focuses specifically on the infertile Palestinian male body 
as a metaphor for the loss of the Palestinian homeland, as 
depicted in literature of the time. 
Katz observes that Palestinian manhood was defined by a man's 
ability to provide for his family, to protect his land, and 
to rule himself on his own land rather than be ruled by 
others (1996-b). Exile and displacement from one's land were 
signs of diminished manhood. After 1948, the Palestinian man 
faced a crisis. As a refugee displaced from his land and 
therefore from his source of sustenance, he could no longer 
provide for his family nor offer them protection from foreign 
rule. 
Amireh (2003) observes that no one has expressed the loss of 
male virility as a metaphor for the loss of the homeland more 
forcefully than Ghassan Kanafani did, in his novella Men in 
the Sun (Rijal fil-shams). Therefore I focus my investigation 
into the depiction of the infertile male body as a metaphor 
for the loss of the Palestinian homeland in 1948, on Men in 
the Sun. Published in 1963 but set ten years after AI-Nakba, 
in 1958, Men in the Sun is the story of three Palestinian 
refugees who make a desperate attempt to cross the Iraqi 
border into Kuwait in an effort to find work, having lost 
22 Rape is also used as a metaphor for the lost Palestinian 
homeland. Palestine is metaphorized as a woman, and the female land 
is possessed by another. The loss of the Palestinian homeland is 
expressed metaphorically on the one hand as the loss of female 
virginity or honor, and as the loss of male virility on the other. 
Massad (2006) observes that the rape of Palestine is also included 
in the introduction to the 1968 Palestinian Nationalist Charter. 
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their ability to work their own land in Palestine. The fourth 
Palestinian protagonist, Abu-Khaizuran, drives a truck for a 
rich Kuwaiti businessman. He offers to smuggle the three 
refugees across the border into Kuwait. However he is delayed 
by Kuwaiti border officials on the crossing from Basra, and 
the three refugees suffocate to death in his truck. Exile is 
equated with death: there can be no future for the 
Palestinian refugees - not in the novella, nor in reality 
without a national homeland. 
In the novella, the ultimate symbol of the loss of the 
Palestinian homeland is the castrated male body. Abu-
Khaizuran was castrated after stepping on a landmine in 1948. 
The castrated male body is a metaphor for the lost 
Palestinian homeland under foreign control. As Amireh 
observes, "national defeat is experienced as castration" 
(2003, p.753)23. Yet Cleary cautions against a simplistic 
reading of the castrated body as a metaphor for the loss of 
the homeland. Rather, castration "implies that without a 
territory there can be no real future for Palestinians as a 
nation" (Cleary 2002 p.218) [italics added]. 
Further, the novella confronts the reader with the 
possibility of the complete erasure of the Palestinian nation 
(Cleary 2002). Men in the Sun can be read as a story of 
Palestinian hopelessness and despair: written at a time when 
there was no official Palestinian resistance movement, and 
when the pan-Arabist project was on the brink of failure, it 
23 For a more general discussion of the emasculated or castrated 
male as a trope for powerlessness in nationalist discourses, see 
Cleary's reading of Kaja Silverman (2002 pp.212-216). 
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points to the possibility that no one, not the Palestinians 
themselves nor the Arab states, was able to rescue or reclaim 
the Palestinian homeland (Cleary 2002)24. 
Massad (2006) observes that for over a decade following al-
Nakba, the Palestinian people remained without a national 
leadership, and Palestinians looked to Arab governments to 
help them free their land from Zionist occupation and to 
return them from exile. However, no such development 
occurred. For him, Men in the Sun serves as a warning to 
Palestinians that they will continue to face a bleak future 
much like the characters in the novella - should they choose 
to rely on others for national redemption. 
But Men in the Sun may also be read as a call to arms. For 
Kanafani, who later became a prominent leader in the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, only armed resistance 
would enable Palestinians to reclaim their land (Amireh 
2003). As such, Kanafani's Men in the Sun is not so much a 
pessimistic premonition of the disappearance of the 
Palestinian nation altogether, but rather, a call to arms for 
Palestinian self-reliance and resistance. 
While the infertile body - and the infertile male body in 
particular - was invoked as a metaphor for the loss of the 
Palestinian homeland in the decade following al-Nakba, this 
relationship should not in any way be interpreted as 
representing the relinquishment of a connection to the 
homeland. As Palestinian writer Salma Khandra Jayyusi (1992) 
24 Cleary (2002) further notes that when the novella was published 
its bleakness generated a great deal of outrage among Arab readers. 
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observes, it might have been thought that Palestinians in 
exile would gradually relinquish their claim to the land of 
Palestine over time. To the contrary, Palestinians displaced 
from their lands in historic Palestine, and even their 
descendants born in exile, continue to maintain a strong 
connection to the land (Jayyusi 1992). Writing about 
Palestinian identity, Khalidi (1997) asserts that if not for 
a very strong sense of connection to the land of Palestine 
forged well before 1948, exiled Palestinians may well have 
been fully absorbed into the Arab countries where they found 
themselves Ii ving25 • 
The Palestinian resistance movement, guerilla warfare and the 
male body 
The emergence of a Palestinian resistance movement in the 
1960s brought with it the possibility of liberating 
Palestinian lands from foreign (Israeli) control. The 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was created in 1964, 
25 Tina Sherwell (2001, 2003) observes that after 1948, women's 
bodies and the figure of the peasant woman in particular are used 
as metaphors for an ongoing Palestinian connection to the land, and 
she explores this relationship in Palestinian painting. Figuration 
that uses the peasant woman and the traditional rural landscape is 
not unique to Palestinian art, but has recurred in different 
national contexts over time, because "these are some of the most 
effective representations used in cultivating a sense of belonging 
to a designated terrain" (2003 p.131). Jayyusi (1992) notes the 
nostalgic figure of the woman who often appears in Palestinian 
poetry at this time. Palestinian art historian Kamal Boullata 
(2009) observes that for two decades after 1948, art created by 
Palestinians living inside what had been historic Palestine was 
largely figurative and often featured landscape scenes, while art 
produced by Palestinian artists living further away tended to be 
more abstract. 
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and it marked the emergence of a Palestinian resistance 
movement dedicated to Palestinian national liberation26 . with 
the rise of the PLO, the male guerilla fighter or fida'i 
emerged as a symbol of Palestinian national resistance and 
Palestinian national liberation (Khalili 2007 )27. 
Palestinian national liberation would be achieved by way of 
armed struggle, and this objective is outlined in Article 9 
of the 1968 Palestinian National Charter, which asserts that, 
"Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine"28. 
Fida'i means redeemer (Khalili 2007). Through guerilla 
warfare, the fida'i would redeem the land of Palestine from 
foreign occupation and return it to its rightful owners, the 
Palestinian people. 
26 The PLO was officially created in January 1964 during the First 
Arab Summit, organized by Egyptian president Gamal Nasser and 
attended by 13 Arab heads of state. It was created as an 
organization for Palestinian national liberation under the auspices 
of Arab governments. However in 1968 Yasser Arafat won a struggle 
for the leadership of the PLO, and brought it under Palestinian 
control. By 1970, the PLO united all of the various Palestinian 
resistance groups and served as an umbrella organization for the 
Palestinian national liberation movement. In 1974 the Arab League 
recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian 
people. For a detailed history of the PLO see Cobban 1984. The 
group's relationship to other Palestinian groups and to Arab 
governments, lie outside the scope of this study. For a concise 
analysis of the PLO's successes and failures to approximately 2005, 
see Khalidi 2006 pp.140-181. 
27 Amireh (2003) notes that while women participated in the national 
struggle, their involvement was limited and the fida'i as a 
national symbol was male and masculine. 
28 See 
<http://electronicintifada.net/bytopic/historicaldocuments/44.shtml 
>[ACcessed November 12, 2009]. This Charter was one of two 
documents issued by the PLO in 1968. The other was the Palestinian 
Nationalist Charter. Together "they functioned as a sort of 
constitution defining Palestinian political goals, Palestinian 
rights, indeed Palestinianness itself" (Massad 2006 p.43). 
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The emergence of the fida'i as a symbol of Palestinian 
national resistance represents a substantial shift after 
1948, from the use of the Palestinian male body as a 
metaphor, in literature, for deterritorialization and exile, 
to the male body as a locus of Palestinian resistance. 
The creation of the PLO brought with it not only the promise 
of territorial reclamation but also, a renewed emphasis on 
manhood and masculini t y 29. Khalili (2007) observes that, II The 
celebration of violent struggle contains within it not only 
the promise of liberation, but also the making of the new 
man" (2007 p.18). Khalili (2007) further notes that the theme 
of a new and masculine man was characteristic of national 
liberationist discourses more generally during the 1960s and 
1970s, and she situates the Palestinian movement for national 
liberation within a larger global context of similar 
movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. 
Armed struggle would redeem the land of Palestine, and it 
would also, as Amireh (2003) observes, allow Palestinian men 
to reclaim their manhood lost as the result of al-Nakba. For 
Khalili (2007), armed struggle would produce the new 
Palestinian man as a masculine man, characterized by his 
29 In situating my understanding of the term masculinity I cite 
George Mosse's definition thereof as lithe way men assert what they 
believe to be their manhood" (1996 p.3). Massad (2006) notes that 
notions of masculinity were central to modern European nationalist 
discourse. Despite constituting themselves in opposition to 
European nationalism, Palestinian nationalism and other anti-
colonial nationalisms have nonetheless been influenced by European 
nationalist discourses and their emphasis on masculinity. For 
Massad, "the masculine still reigns supreme in Palestinian 
nationalist thought" (2006 p.53). For a study of manhood and 
nationalism in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries see Mosse 
1985. 
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courage, his ability to deploy political violence, and his 
willingness to sacrifice himself for the Palestinian nation, 
and I return to this point very shortly. 
These developments in Palestinian politics were also 
reflected in Palestinian literature. Amireh notes a focus on 
the remasculinization of the Palestinian man in literary 
works in the 1960s, which came to emphasize male virility, 
"The Palestinian male is now virile and as a result of his 
remasculinization, the land of Palestine is fertile again" 
(2003 p.755)30. For example, in his poem Days in the Life of a 
Palestinian Boy, Waleed al Halees writes, "Hoping for 
continuance, my father joyfully cast his seed / into my 
mother's womb •.. / dreaming he'd have a boy, / ••. chanting 
even in his sleep / 'I'll beget a male child. / The future 
ongoing, a boy! '" (cited in Amireh 2003 p.755)31. 
Amireh also notes the re-appearance of the martyr in 
Palestinian poetry written during the 1960s and 1970s. As in 
the poetry of the 1930s, the martyr is a groom. Here, 
30 with the rise of the Palestinian resistance movement in the 
1960s, the metaphor of the impotence and infertility was used to 
describe those Palestinians who do not participate in the national 
struggle (Amireh 2003). More generally, Palestinian literature 
written during the 1960s and 70s was a Illiterature of resistance" 
(adab al-muqawama) , a term first used by the author Ghassan 
Kanafani (Elad-Bouskila 2002 p.11). Jayyusi (1992) observes that 
during the 1970s, resistance became the major theme in Palestinian 
poetry. 
31 Amireh (2003) further observes that male virility is written into 
the 1964 PLO Charter. Its Article 4 states that "the Palestinian 
character is an essential and undying feature that is passed from 
fathers to sons" (2003 p.754). Article 5 defines Palestinians as 
"everyone who is born to an Arab Palestinian father after this date 
[1947] inside Palestine or outside it" (2003 p.754)i also cited in 
Massad 2006 p.44. For an interesting discussion of fathers as 
reproducers of the nation, see Massad 2006. 
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however, in addition to dying for his bride, Palestine, the 
martyr also fertilizes her. The martyr's sacrifice produces 
the next generation of Palestinians: his fertility "engenders 
a whole nation" (Amireh 2003 p.755). 
The fida'i and self-sacrifice for Palestine 
The fida'i is not a martyr per se: he is a guerilla fighter, 
a resistance fighter. However, guerilla warfare and armed 
resistance carry with them the very real possibility of death 
(Khalili 2007), and I remind the reader of the connection 
between Palestinian resistance and the risk of losing one's 
life, discussed in the context of the Arab Revolt and the 
martyr of the 1920s and 1930s. Similarly, the fida'i had to 
be prepared to lose his life in undertaking acts of 
resistance. 
The fida'i of the 1960s and 1970s may be connected back to 
the Palestinian martyr of the 1920s and 1930s32 • The martyr of 
the 1920s and 1930s sacrificed his life in the struggle to 
defend his land against foreign encroachment; the fida'i 
risks sacrificing his life in the struggle to redeem the land 
from foreign occupation. Similarly, the istishhadi is also 
linked to resistance and self-sacrifice, for Palestine, and 
to the struggle to redeem the land from foreign occupation. 
More generally, self-sacrifice is a feature of the modern 
nation. For Anderson (1991), the nation inspires patriotism 
32 Khalili (2007) connects the fida'i of the 1960s to the martyr of 
the 1930s, however she notes that some scholars do not, instead 
considering the fida'i as a new identity rather than a continuation 
of a historic one. 
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love for the fatherland - and this love has, in the last two 
centuries, made it possible for millions to be willing to die 
for their nations. Dying for one's country is considered an 
honorable death in the service of the nation. Self-sacrifice 
for the nation, what Zerubavel terms "patriotic sacrifice" 
(2006 p. 73) is generally considered to be a positive act33 . 
Self-sacrifice for the nation normally occurs in the context 
of soldiering and defense of the nation, yet, as Khalili 
(2007) observes, self-sacrifice for the nation also occurs in 
the context of resistance in anti-colonial and national 
liberation struggles. The guerilla fighter, like the soldier, 
is prepared to sacrifice his life for the nation, and like 
the soldier's, his death is transformed into an honorable 
death for the nation. 
Self-sacrifice is written into the 1968 Palestinian National 
Charter, "He must be prepared for the armed struggle and 
ready to sacrifice his wealth and his life in order to win 
back his homeland and bring about its liberation" (in Massad 
2006 p.49)34. Self-sacrifice occurs for Palestine. 
33 Self-sacrifice for the nation may also be traced back to ancient 
religious notions of sacrifice. Juergensmeyer (2003) notes that the 
term sacrifice hails from the Latin sacrificium, to make holy, and 
that religious concepts of sacrifice can found in all major 
religions: ancient religious sacrifice (for example the killing of 
an animal or other human being) was transformed into something 
positive by virtue of the fact that it was undertaken in the name 
of religion. Contemporary notions of self-sacrifice have been 
influenced by this trans formative conception of giving up one's 
life as a positive act if performed for a sacred or higher cause, 
such as one's religious beliefs, or one's nation. 
34 "He" in the Charter, refers to the Palestinian individual, also 
defined in the same document. 
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The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon in 1982 led to the 
demise of the fida'i as the symbol of Palestinian resistance 
(Khalili 2007)35. However a new symbol of Palestinian 
resistance would emerge a few years later during the first 
intifada: that of the shab or young man. 
The shab of the first intifada, the male body, resistance and 
self-sacrifice 
The shab or young man was at the forefront of Palestinian 
resistance to the Israeli occupation during the first 
intifada, which began in 1987 and ended in 199336 • Intifada is 
the Arabic word for shaking off, in this instance, the 
shaking off of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza. Julie Peteet (2000) notes that the intifada also 
represented a massive generational shake-up in Palestinian 
society, putting young men (shabab) at the center of the 
Palestinian national struggle, in leadership roles previously 
reserved for older men37 • During the intifada the shabab -
35 The years between 1982 and 1987 represented a short period of 
defeat for the Palestinian resistance movement, owing to the PLO's 
expulsion from Lebanon in 1982 by the Israeli army and its Lebanese 
allies; see Khalili 2007. 
36 The intifada ended with the signing of the Declaration of 
Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements, also known as 
Oslo peace agreement, in 1993. Khalili (2007) notes a decisive 
shift during the intifada, away from the PLO's strategy of armed 
resistance, to an emphasis on mass mobilization as the primary 
strategy of Palestinian resistance. 
37 For a study of the young man in Palestinian literature during the 
early part of the first intifada, see Elad-Bouskila 1999. As the 
intifada progressed, women and girls took a more active role in 
confrontations with Israeli soldiers, participating in 
demonstrations, throwing stones, and intervening to prevent the 
arrest and harassment of the shabab. On women's involvement in the 
first intifada see Strum 1992 and Holt 1996. 
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their heads wrapped in the white and black keffiyeh, 
defiantly throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and tanks 
became the primary symbol of Palestinian resistance to the 
occupation. 
Peteet (2000) observes that during the intifada the body 
and the male body of the shab in particular - came to 
symbolize Palestinian resistance. Violence was directed 
against the Palestinian male body by the Israeli security 
forces, in an effort to subdue the shabab (plural for shab) 
and quash the uprising. As Peteet (2002) observes, Israeli 
soldiers would attempt to subjugate the shabab through 
beatings, torture and imprisonment38 . However the opposite 
occurred: Israeli violence inflicted on the Palestinian male 
body was transformed into a symbol of resistance and 
endurance, masculinity and heroism. The battered male body 
was recast as defiant and powerful, and became a symbol of 
Palestinian resistance. The male body also served to 
symbolize Palestinian manhood and masculinity, played out as 
bravery and fearlessness from the Israeli army39. For Peteet, 
Israeli violence inflicted on individual male bodies also 
resonates collectively, for the Israeli state's use of 
violence against the Palestinian body is a testament to 
Palestinian endurance and steadfastness, 
38 Peteet cites these beatings and periods of imprisonment as 
masculine rites of passage into adulthood for Palestinian males. 
Kaplan (2000) cites military duty as the Israeli equivalent to a 
masculine rite of passage for Israeli men. 
39 Peteet (2000) and Amireh (2003) also describe Palestinian 
masculinity in terms of body control to which control of one's 
sexuality is central. This lies outside my area of focus. 
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The pre-given defining power of the collective 
Palestinian body, which requires a violently negating 
intervention [Israeli violence], lies precisely in its 
assertive national identity (Peteet, 2000 p.l06)[My 
addition to the text]. 
Further, Massad (2006) asserts that during the intifada the 
Palestinian male body became the crucial instrument in 
confronting the Israeli occupation40 • The shab's body is a 
locus of Palestinian resistance. 
Because the shabab were active in clashes with the Israeli 
security forces, they were likely to suffer injury and even 
death at the hands of the Israeli army. Here too, Palestinian 
resistance is linked to the possibility of self-sacrifice. As 
well, because they risked losing their lives in 
confrontations with the Israeli army, the shabab are often 
referred to as shahids or martyrs41 • Like the martyr and the 
fida'i before him, the shab risks losing his life in the 
context of Palestinian resistance. And like the martyr and 
the fida'i before him, the shab's self-sacrifice also occurs 
for Palestine. So too, the does the istishhadi's. 
40 He also notes that references to women's bodies during the 
intifada tended to focus on their reproductive capacities and their 
roles as mothers (2006). 
41 During the intifada all those killed by the Israeli army whether 
shabab or innocent civilians came to be referred to as martyrs or 
shahids. I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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A trajectory of Palestinian resistance and self-sacrifice 
The martyr of the 1920s and 1930s, the fida'i and the shab 
are all associated with Palestinian resistance and the 
struggle to defend or redeem land in Palestine from foreign 
occupation. So too, is the Palestinian istishhadi. These 
three figures are also associated with self-sacrifice, for 
Palestine. So too, is the Palestinian istishhadi. While it is 
not until Chapter 3 that I discuss notions of self-sacrifice 
and martyrdom in Palestine today, the istishhadi's self-
sacrifice may be linked to these earlier instances of self-
sacrifice, for Palestine. As Abufarha (2009) asserts, the 
object of the istishhadi's self-sacrifice is the land and the 
nation of Palestine. 
This chapter considered relationships between the male 
Palestinian body and Palestinian land, from the 1920s through 
the end of the first intifada in 1993. It explored a 
metaphorical relationship between the Palestinian male body 
and the loss of the homeland in 1948. The Palestinian male 
body, in the wake of al-Nakba, was depicted in literature as 
castrated, infertile and lacking virility, as a metaphor for 
the loss of the homeland and for Palestinian 
deterritorialization and exile. With the rise of the 
Palestinian resistance movement in the 1960s, the male body 
became a locus of Palestinian resistance and the redemption 
of the homeland. This represents a shift, from the use of 
men's bodies as metaphors for loss and exile, to the male 
body itself as a locus of Palestinian resistance42 • with the 
42 Women's bodies, to the contrary, were used primarily to 
metaphorize an idealized and at times nostalgic connection to the 
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emergence of the Palestinian suicide bomber at the end of the 
first intifada, the Palestinian body becomes a weapon of 
resistance, and I return to this point in Chapter 3. 
By considering historical notions of resistance and self-
sacrifice, this writing locates the Palestinian istishhadi 
within a larger trajectory of Palestinian resistance and 
self-sacrifice prior to 1993. And by considering 
relationships between the body and territory in Palestine, 
this chapter sets the stage for Chapters 3 and 4, which focus 
even more closely on the Palestinian body in a relationship 
to Israeli occupied, Palestinian-inhabited territory in the 
West Bank and Gaza, and on the body of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber or istishhadi in a relationship to occupied 
territory there. 
homeland. Women's depictions in literature and painting continued 
to be cast in more traditional gender roles such as lovers, 
virgins, mothers, and nurturers (Sherwell 2003). 
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Chapter Two 
The ideal Jewish body and the ideal Jewish land: Jewish 
spatial practices and territorial control in Palestine and 
Israel 
As noted in the thesis introduction, Israeli sociologist 
Meira Weiss asserts that in Israel, "The national territory 
becomes equivalent to the personal body" (2002-b p.38). This 
chapter uses her observation as a point of departure from 
which to consider mutually constitutive relationships between 
the Jewish body and territory in historic Palestine and later 
the state of Israel, from the late 19th century to today. 
The Zionist movement sought to create a Jewish national 
homeland in historic Palestine. It also sought to reinvent 
the European-Jewish body there. As such, the Zionist movement 
aimed to simultaneously transform both the land and the body, 
in Palestine: Palestinian inhabited land would be transformed 
into Jewish land, and the European Jewish body would be 
transformed into a strong and healthy body rooted to the land 
in Palestine. This chapter considers relationships between 
the body and land during precise moments in the Jewish 
nationalist/national1 project, from the late 19th century to 
the present. The pursuit of a Jewish national homeland in 
historic Palestine falls within Calhoun's definition of 
nationalism (1997), outlined on page 25, as a project, the 
pursuit of independence and self-determination. 
1 This distinction is in keeping with Roshwald's assertion (2004) 
that Zionism was a nationalist movement until the state of Israel 
was founded in 1948, at which point Zionism became a national 
movement. 
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This chapter proposes the notion of the ideal Jewish body, as 
embodied at various points in history by the chalutz (Zionist 
pioneer), the Sabra (native-born Israeli) and the Israeli 
soldier, to be discussed in detail beginning on pages 62, 80, 
and 88, respectively2. It also proposes the notion of the 
ideal Jewish land in Palestine (later the state of Israel), 
as land settled and controlled exclusively by Jews. 
Consequently this chapter examines the spatial practices used 
by Jews to assert control over territory in Palestine, 
notably the construction of Jewish settlements, from the 
arrival of the first Zionist settlers in the 1880s, until 
2 In using the term "Jewish body" I do not wish to imply a 
monolithic or archetypal notion of the Jewish body that refers to 
all Jewish bodies. Rather, I use this term with some hesitation and 
for a lack of a better one, to describe the Jewish body in historic 
Palestine and after 1948, in the state of Israel. I use the term 
"Zionist body" to refer to the Jewish body in Palestine prior to 
the year 1948. And I use the term "Israeli body" (or Jewish-Israeli 
body) to refer to the Jewish body in the state of Israel after its 
creation in 1948. On the Jewish body more broadly considered, see 
in particular Gilman 1991; see also Konner 2009. Similarly, the 
terms "Jewish", "Zionist" and "Israeli" with reference to spatial 
practices also pose problems. I use the term "Zionist" to refer to 
the period that preceded the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948, and beginning in the 1880s. I use the term "Israeli" to refer 
to the period after 1948. I use the term "Jewish" to refer to and 
include both of the previous periods. Similarly, I use the term 
"Zionist spatial practices" when referring to spatial practices 
used by the Zionist settlers to Palestine prior to 1948, and I use 
the term "Israeli spatial practices" to refer to Israeli spatial 
practices after 1948. I also use the term "Jewish spatial 
practices" to reference practices used by Jews in historic 
Palestine that span both, the period of Zionist settlement in 
historic Palestine prior to the creation of the state of Israel in 
1948, and the period following its creation. None of the terms 
above are ideal, and I use them primarily to make temporal (before 
and after 1948) and geographical (historic Palestine or the state 
of Israel) distinctions in the text, and to firmly locate the body 
and land ideals discussed as being specifically Jewish ones, that 
is, as being created and implemented by Jews. 
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today. I refer again to Kimmerling's study (1983) in which he 
defines control of territory as being contingent on 
establishing a presence on, ownership of, and sovereignty 
over the territory in question. 
The spatial practices discussed in this chapter resulted in 
the displacement and deterritorialization of Palestinians 
from their lands. As such Jewish spatial practices are also 
connected to the production of Palestinians as inferior 
Others to Jews, beginning in the late 19th century with the 
arrival of the first European Zionist settlers to Palestine 
and continuing today in the Occupied Territories. 
The ideal body explained 
For Meira Weiss, Israeli national identity is linked to what 
she terms the chosen body, "an ideal type by which concrete 
Israeli bodies are screened and molded from their birth to 
their death" (2002-a pp.4-5). Weiss explores how notions of 
the chosen body shape Israeli national identity. For her, 
Israeli identity is embodied. 
The chosen body in Israeli society, for Weiss (2002-a), is 
that of the T'zahal or Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) soldier3 • 
This chosen body is healthy, able-bodied, strong and fit for 
military service in the IDF. Weiss asserts that Israelis are 
not only socialized from a young age to prepare for military 
service, but that Israeli bodies are conceived, screened, and 
3 Tzahal is the Hebrew acronym for Tzva Hagana Leyisrael, the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 
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raised to be fit for soldiering. As such, Weiss contends, 
Israelis aim to conceive, produce and raise healthy bodies 
destined for military service4 • 
Weiss (2002-a) also links the chosen Israeli body to 
territory. For her, body boundaries in Israel are linked to 
territorial boundaries, and by extension, to concepts of 
inclusion and exclusion, to who belongs to the nation and who 
does not. The chosen body of the IDF soldier may be linked to 
notions of inclusion and exclusion because it includes Jewish 
Israelis, but excludes non-Jewish Israelis, and especially 
Palestinian Arabs (Weiss 2002-a). Thus for Weiss, the chosen 
body of the IDF soldier is also an exclusionary body, a point 
I return to when discussing the IDF soldier later on in the 
chapter. 
Weiss' study of the chosen body in Israel (2002-a) prompted 
me to explore the notion of Jewish body ideals at various 
points in the Jewish nation-building project. By Jewish body 
ideals, I mean, first, a healthy, strong and powerful body as 
the ideal corporeality to which the Zionist settlers to 
Palestine and later Israeli Jews should aspire: the chalutz, 
the Sabra and the IDF soldier are all strong, healthy and 
powerful bodies. By body ideals I also refer to the 
embodiment of certain traits and characteristics by the 
4 weiss (2002-a) examines the various ways in which Israelis attempt 
to ensure the birth of a healthy child fit for military service, 
such as fertility treatments and genetic testing that promote the 
conception and development of healthy fetuses, and screening for 
factors that may impede the birth of a healthy baby. According to 
Weiss, Israel has the highest rate of prenatal practices in the 
world. She also discusses the stigma and exclusion experienced by 
physically disabled Israelis, owing to the fact that they are not 
able to serve in the IDF. 
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chalutz, the Sabra and the IDF soldier - notably, a desire to 
settle and defend territory. 
My assertions in this chapter follow on from Weiss' 
investigations into the chosen body (2002-a). I explore 
notions of the ideal Jewish body, and I elaborate 
relationships between the ideal Jewish body, and the ideal 
Jewish land in Palestine, that is, land settled and 
controlled exclusively by Jews. First I outline a 
relationship between the body and territory more generally. 
The body and the produced body 
My understanding of the body relies on its definition by 
cultural theorist Elizabeth Grosz, as a biologically 
incomplete, socially and culturally constituted entity, and 
as the product of the interaction of the natural and the 
cultural: 
By body I understand a concrete, material, animate 
organization of flesh, organs, nerves, muscles and 
skeletal structure which are given a unity, 
cohesiveness, and organization only through their 
psychical and social inscription as the surface and raw 
materials of an integrated and cohesive totality (1998 
p.43) [Italics in the original]. 
Further, my understanding of the body in the context of this 
research is informed by theoretical propositions by Grosz 
(1998 and 1994) and Michel Foucault (1977 and 1978), who 
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consider the body to be produce~. For Grosz, the body is 
produced by the social, cultural, socio-economic, spatial, 
and discursive contexts in which it exists, and as such it is 
always produced as a body of a particular type, notably, as a 
raced, classed, sexed and/or gendered body (1998, 1994). 
For Foucault, the body is produced by power, which manifests 
as an omnipresent network, lias the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate" (1978 
p.92)6. I am particularly concerned with Foucault's theory of 
spatial discipline (1977) as constituting a specific type of 
power that produces the body, and discussed in the following 
section. 
5 Other theoretical approaches considered in the context of this 
research include: Alfonso Lingis' notion of the body as a surface 
of inscription, see Lingis 1984; Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of 
flesh, see Merleau-Ponty 1968 and Leder 1999; and Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari's notion of the body without organs, see Deleuze 
and Guattari 1987 and Olkowski 1999. While relevant to my overall 
understanding of the body these theoretical frameworks did not 
adequately address my specific interests in the relationship 
between the body and territory. 
6 Foucault provides an extended definition of power in Foucault 1978 
pp.92-95. The impact of power on the individual and social body 
alike is one of the central themes in Foucault's extensive ouevre, 
an analysis of which lies outside the scope of this research, which 
is specifically concerned with the concept of discipline as a type 
of power that targets the body, and as theorized in Foucault 1977. 
On power in Foucault see Foucault 1972 and 1978; Foucault in 
Burchell, Gordon and Miller 1991; and in Faubion 1994 pp.201-222. 
Some scholars have criticized Foucault's conception of power as a 
passive one in which the body is theorized as the object of power 
with no power of its own; see for example Lash 1991, Butler 1999, 
and Dudrick 2005. 
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The produced body and territory/space 
For Grosz, the body and territory are mutually produced. The 
built environment produces the bodies of its inhabitants as 
particular types, llas bodies with particular physiologies, 
affective lives, and concrete behaviors" (1998 p.48). The 
body, in turn, produces its surrounding environment according 
to its own demographic, economic, and psychological needs 
(Grosz 1998). 
For Foucault (1977) the body is produced by power in the form 
of spatial discipline, the arrangement of bodies in space7 • 
The spatial segregation of bodies separates healthy or 
productive bodies from unhealthy or unproductive ones, 
creating what Foucault terms llfunctional sites" (1977 p.143) 
or lluseful space" (1977 p.144). Healthy bodies are spatially 
segregated and distributed within these useful spaces - army 
barracks, schools and factories for example - and this 
spatial arrangement serves to maximize the body's 
productivity, for example, economic productivity (the factory 
worker) or military might (the soldier). 
The body and territory in Israel and Palestine 
Foucault's investigations, above, informed this research into 
the relationship between the Jewish body and territory in 
Palestine and in Israel. I define my understanding of 
territory by turning again to Foucault, who notes that, 
7 For Foucault, discipline also consists in the regulation and 
organization of time; regulation of the body'S activities; 
training; and surveillance. For a discussion of temporal and 
physical discipline see pp.141-169, and of surveillance see pp.195-
228, in Foucault 1977. 
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llTerritory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it's first 
of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a 
certain kind of power" (in Gordon 1980 p.68) [Italics in 
original]. Foucault's conception of territory and control 
complements that cited earlier by Kimmerling (1983), for both 
scholars cite the importance of control wielded over 
territory. In Israel and Palestine, territory lies at the 
center of two competing claims for control, therefore, it is 
also contestedB • 
Foucault's notion of the spatial segregation of productive 
and unproductive bodies (1977) provides a framework within 
which to consider the relationship between the Jewish body 
and Jewish spatial practices in Palestine and Israel. The 
Jewish nation-building project, from the time of the arrival 
of the first Zionist settlers to Palestine in 1882, and 
continuing today, has been characterized by a desire to 
assert control over territory there, notably by building 
settlements on it. 
Early Zionist spatial practices in Palestine from the turn of 
the 20th century consisted in building uniquely Jewish 
settlements, separate from the native Palestinian population. 
As Troen (2003) notes, the Zionist settlers perceived 
themselves to be separate from the surrounding Palestinian 
population, and they established their communities 
accordingly, as separate ones. Returning to Foucault's 
theories of spatial arrangement (1977), the deliberate 
spatial separation of Jews from Palestinians (and by 
B Peleg (1994) notes that the conflict over territory has also been 
characterized by a tendency by both Israelis and Palestinians to 
negate the other's claims to territory. 
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extension, of Jewish and Palestinian bodies) by the Zionist 
settlers constitutes the arrangement of territory into useful 
(Jewish) and less useful (Palestinian) spaces - functional 
sites - practices that continue to this day in the west Bank 
and Gaza. 
Jewish spatial practices and Palestinian otherness 
Further, one of the primary objectives of settlement 
construction has been to assert Jewish control over as much 
Palestinian inhabited territory as possible. Because 
territory in Palestine was already inhabited by Palestinian 
Arabs in the early 1880s when the first Jewish settlers 
arrived from Europe, attempts by the Zionist settlers to 
control larger amounts of territory became increasingly 
contingent on displacing Palestinians from their lands. The 
loss of Palestinian control over territory and the 
displacement of Palestinians from their lands, by Jews in 
Palestine, produced them as Others to the Zionist settlers, 
and, after 1948, to Jewish Israelis. 
For the purposes of this writing I am interested in the Other 
as the product of imperialism and colonialism, of lithe 
exclusionary imperialist ideologies of self and other" 
(Bhabha 1994 p.29). Colonial subjects, constructed as Other 
by the West, are perceived to be inferior by and to the 
dominant colonial power (Hall 1990). Through this process of 
othering, individuals or groups are treated as irreconcilable 
from the dominant group and negative qualities are projected 
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onto them (Peleg 1994)9. Following the observations of 
scholars Joseph Massad (2006) and Ilan Pappe (2006-a) in 
particular, I consider the Zionist nation-building project in 
Palestine to be a colonial one, and more specifically, a 
settler-colonial one10 , 
Peleg observes that, IIMost often, those who are seen as 
Others in society occupy a low status" (1994 p.265). For him, 
Palestinians are considered to be inferior Others by Israeli 
Jews, and this has provided the justification for Israel to 
occupy and seize Palestinian inhabited territory in the West 
Bank and Gaza after 1967. However Peleg's remarks are also 
relevant to Jewish attitudes toward Palestinians prior to 
1967. The Zionist settlers to Palestine considered the 
indigenous Palestinians to be Others of a low or inferior 
status (Pappe 2006-a), and this facilitated the encroachment 
of Zionist settlers on Palestinian territory, often resulting 
in the dislocation of Palestinians from their lands. Further, 
since the 1880s, Palestinians have been produced as inferior 
9 My understanding of alterity in colonial situations has also been 
influenced by the work of Fanon 1963, Trinh 1989, and Bannerji 
2002. 
10 The question of whether the Zionist project in Palestine was a 
colonial one or not is a matter of much disagreement in the 
research literature consulted. Many Jewish and Israeli scholars 
bristle at the suggestion that the Jewish nation-building project 
was a colonial one, preferring to see it exclusively as a response 
to anti-Semitism and Jewish persecution in Europe; see in 
particular Dershowitz 2003 and Laquer 1972. For Troen, the Zionist 
project in historic Palestine differed from other colonial projects 
because it involved a return to an "ancient homeland" (2003 p.xiv). 
In contrast, for Israeli historian Ilan Pappe, llZionism began as a 
European national movement but turned into a colonialist one once 
its leaders decided to implement their vision of national revival 
in the land of Palestine" (2006-a p.35), because it was home to a 
substantial Palestinian population. On Zionist colonialism see also 
Khalidi 1992 and Kimmerling 1983. 
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Others owing to their displacement from and loss of control 
over territory, and this in contrast to Jews who 
progressively succeeded in asserting more and more control 
over increasing amounts of territory in Palestine ll • 
The new Jewish body: the Zionist body 
Modern political Zionism emerged in Europe during the late 
19th century as a nationalist movement that sought to 
establish a Jewish national homeland (Laquer 1972)12. However, 
the emergence of Zionism may be linked not only to 
territorial ideals, but also, corporeal ones, for Zionism 
also aimed to transform the European Jewish body 13. 
Early on, the Zionist leaders believed that life in the 
Diaspora in Europe had produced the Jewish body as weak and 
11 Without wanting to conflate the terms territory and place, I find 
it useful to cite Grundberg (2007) who notes that displacement is 
the Other of emplacement, defined as the connection to and sense of 
belonging associated with place. 
12 Laquer (1972) observes that modern, political zionism emerged 
with the publication of Theodor Herzl's Judenstaat in 1896. Jewish 
settlement to Palestine by European-Zionist pioneers predated 
Herzl's essay by approximately 15 years. While European Zionists 
began sporadically arriving in Palestine during the 1870s, the 
first official, organized aliya to Palestine (literally, "going 
up") took place in 1882. Avnieri (1981) notes that modern Zionism 
was distinct from religious manifestations of Zionism that had 
existed since the destruction of the second Temple in 70 AD, that 
established a connection between the Jewish people and the Land of 
Israel, as well as their return there, predicated on the arrival of 
the Messiah. For a comprehensive overview of modern Zionism see 
Laquer 1972. 
13 Eilberg-Schwartz (1992) and Konner (2009) both cite a long 
history of Jewish preoccupation with the body, expressed primarily 
in religious texts. These texts were concerned with a range of 
corporeal matters and bodily processes, notably, sexual intercourse 
and procreation, menstruation, circumcision, urination and 
defecation, and caring for the bodies of the dead. 
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unheal thy14. For them, only a heal thy national life in a 
Jewish homeland would restore the health and strength the 
Jewish body, thereby linking territory to strong, healthy 
bodies15 . Central to early Zionist thinking about the body, 
were the writings of physician Max Nordau who called for a 
new Jewish body for Muskeljuden, Jews with muscles - as the 
antidote to the weak and unhealthy body of the Diaspora Jew16 . 
14 By early on, I am referring to Zionism in Europe during the late 
19th and early 20th centuries. For Stratton (2000) the notion of 
Diaspora underwent a massive transformation with the rise of the 
modern Zionism, from a religious conception of exile and return to 
the Land of Israel predicated on the arrival of the Messiah, to a 
spatial or geographical one predicated on one's location outside 
the Land of Israel. 
15 The Zionist preoccupation with the health and strength of the 
Jewish body may be understood as the product of European gentile 
stereotypes of the Jew's body as a weak and unhealthy one; but 
also, to ideas internalized by European Jews themselves about the 
Jewish body being different and inferior, weak and unhealthy. In 
his seminal work, cultural and literary historian Sander Gilman 
(1991, 1996) observes that the body of the Jew - the Jew's nose, 
feet, voice, circumcised penis and darker skin, for example - had 
all been invoked by European gentiles as markers of Jewish 
otherness and difference. Further, for Gilman (1991), the Jew's 
body was considered by European gentiles as an inferior body: as 
weak, diseased and unhealthy; as a savage body; as too dark, too 
loud, or too pungent. European gentiles often depicted the Jewish 
male body as effeminate or feminized, weak and unmanly - as a sort 
of woman (Boyarin 1997). Yet as Gilman also observes (1991), 
negative stereotypes of the Jewish body were also internalized by 
Jews themselves. On the Jewish nose as a marker of Jewish otherness 
see also Geller 1992. 
16 Nordau's observations were originally published in German as 
"Muskeljuden" in Juedische Turnzeitung in June 1903; I rely on 
their translation into English by J. Hessing in Mendes-Flohr and 
Reinharz (1980). For a more detailed account of Nordau's 
philosophical thought and his contributions to the early Zionist 
movement see Avnieri 1981 pp.101-111. Nordau was a proponent of 
exercise and gymnastics and his writings were initially aimed at 
Jews in Europe and in Austria and Germany in particular. Nordau 
helped found gymnastics clubs for Jewish youth in Europe - named 
Bar Kochba clubs after the ancient Jewish warrior - and his 
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For Nordau and other early Zionist leaders the new Jewish 
body - what they also called the Zionist body - was 
specifically male and masculine. As such, modern Zionism 
sought to transform the Jewish male body in particular 
(Gilman 1991, Biale 1992, Eilberg-Schwartz 1992, Boyarin 
1997, Massad 2006)17. My interest is not in gender or 
masculinity per se, however, it is impossible to explore the 
notion of the new Jewish body without acknowledging that this 
body was male and masculine18 • 
Early Zionist thinkers emphasized the importance of physical 
labor, settling and working the land in Palestine, for these 
activities would develop the land and the body alike. In this 
way the new Jewish body and the new Jewish homeland would 
produce each other, in reference to Grosz's observations 
about the mutual production of the body and space. As well, 
settling and cultivating land would produce the Jewish body 
in Palestine as a strong and healthy one, and this body in 
turn (and with reference to Foucault), would discipline 
territory by producing it as useful - Jewish - space. This 
new, strong and healthy Jewish body would be produced in a 
mutually constitutive relationship to territory, and so the 
writings inspired the creation of the Maccabiah Games in 1932 
(Konner 2009). 
17 Biale (1992) explores the ways in which leftist Zionists also 
sought to remake the Jewish sexual body in palestine, by attempting 
to liberalize attitudes to sex and increasing Jewish virility. 
18 I reiterate Mosse' s definition of masculinity as lithe way men 
assert what they believe to be their manhood" (1996 p.3). Massad 
(2006) provides an interesting reading of the transformation of the 
European Jew's body into a masculine and militarized Zionist body 
through a reading of the circumcised Jewish penis, kept hidden in 
Europe but proudly exposed in Palestine and later in Israel. 
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transformation of the Jewish body in Palestine was contingent 
on controlling land there. 
Early Zionist settlement in Palestine and the cbalutz/pioneer 
The new Jewish body - the Zionist body - provided an ideal 
that the Zionist settlers to Palestine could aspire to 
becoming. It was embodied in the ideal of the chalutz or 
pioneer, a healthy, strong, and muscular man who would settle 
and build the new Jewish homeland19 • The chalutz would 
emigrate to Palestine, where he would build and populate the 
newly established rural and agricultural Jewish settlements. 
Here I remind the reader of Katz's assertions (1996-a and 
1996-b) in the previous chapter, that the new man of Zionism 
would return to the ancient biblical homeland in Palestine 
where he would revive the land and build a new Jewish nation. 
The chalutz braved the harsh elements and dedicated himself 
to building the new Jewish homeland most notably by tilling 
and cultivating the land, llDuring the early years of the 
Zionist movement nationalistic aspirations revolved around a 
return to the soil, the creation of Hebrew villages and the 
19 Women were also pioneers, however the chalutz ideal was male. The 
chalutz ideal was promoted most notably in visual culture, produced 
primarily by European Zionist groups (and later, American ones) 
with a view to attracting Jewish settlers to Palestine, as well as 
financial support for their endeavors. Images of the chalutzim 
working the land were pr~duced and disseminated in the form of 
photographs, postcards and posters. As Scholar Michael Berkowitz 
observes, "Zionism was born into a highly visual age, when advances 
in graphic technology, coupled with the rise of the popular press, 
made possible a profusion of photographic and artistic 
representations" (1990 p.9). On early Zionist visual culture see 
Berkowitz 1990; on the Zionist postcards see Moors and Wachlin 
1995. A selection of Zionist posters and postcards can be found in 
Arbel c.1996. 
62 
molding of an archetypal rural Jew who sustains himself by 
tilling his own fields" (Ben-Artzi 1990 p.133 )20. The chalutz 
would transform Palestine into a fertile Jewish homeland, 
through physical labor, notably agriculture and farming. Here 
the ideal body of the chalutz, and the notion of the ideal 
land - a proliferation of autonomous and exclusively Jewish 
farming communities - are inextricably linked, and I 
reiterate yet again Grosz's framework of the body and 
territory producing each other. Meira Weiss observes that at 
this time, "nation-building practices such as the conquest of 
land ... became interwoven with pioneering and the making of a 
chosen body fit for a chosen people" (2002-a p.17)[Italics 
added]. The chalutzim were not only concerned with the notion 
of the chosen body - or the ideal body, in my terms - but 
also, with the notion of the chosen or ideal land fit for the 
chosen people, the Jewish people21 • 
In keeping with Zionist perceptions at the time, the chalutz 
was also modern and advanced, particularly in contrast to the 
local Palestinian Arab population, whom the Zionist settlers 
(and many Zionist leaders) considered to be backward and 
primitive, even dirty and uncivilized22 • Elon notes the 
pioneers' shock and disgust upon their arrival in Palestine, 
20 Ben-Artzi (1990) notes that ideals of rural settlement and labor 
held sway despite the fact that the majority of Jewish settlers to 
Palestine gravitated to urban areas. 
21 My use of the term "people" above is consistent with Layoun' s 
(1992) and Anderson's (1991) conception of the people as a nation. 
22 The Hebrew word chalutz means vanguard (Elon 1971), a term 
associated with being at the forefront or on the cutting edge, 
innovation and progress and therefore with being modern. In this 
section of writing I use the term Palestinian Arab(s) as well as 
the term Palestinians as this reflects the terminology used in the 
research literature; note that many Jewish and Israeli writers use 
the term "Arab" and not "Palestinian". 
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at "the Oriental confusion, the noise, the squalor of Jaffa, 
its filthy bazaars ..• its swarms of sore-eyed children, 
moneychangers, beggars, flies and lepers ... " (1971 p.83)23. 
The strong and modern chalutz, described in Zionist texts at 
the time in opposition to the backward Palestinian peasant, 
also served to distinguish Jews in Palestine from Palestinian 
Arabs there24 • 
Life in Palestine at the turn of the 20th century proved to 
be much more difficult than the European Zionist leaders had 
initially envisaged. Living conditions were extremely harsh 
and the settlers - many of whom eventually returned to Europe 
- had to cope with disease, heat, a lack of farming expertise 
and inadequate funding for their endeavors. Nonetheless the 
vision of a Jewish homeland comprised of Jewish agricultural 
settlements built by the chalutzim's hard labor continued to 
serve as early Zionism's ideal. 
The ideal land: Bretz Yisrael and the Palestinian terra 
nullus 
Despite the fact that Zionism emerged as a secular, political 
movement, the privileged site for Jewish settlement was 
determined on the basis of a longstanding spiritual and 
23 Similar descriptions can also be found in Shulman 1979 and Avneri 
1984. 
24 Biale (1992) observes that as clashes over land between Jewish 
settlers and the local Palestinian population became more heated, 
characteristics of the Diaspora Jew came to be projected onto 
Palestinians by the Zionist settlers, who perceived them to be 
effeminate - a quality that had previously been attributed to Jews 
by European gentiles. 
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religious connection to Eretz Yisrael (the Land of Israel)25. 
Early on, the Zionist movement adopted the Jewish biblical 
homeland - located in historic Palestine - as the target 
location for a modern Jewish national homeland, framing 
settlement in Palestine as a return, albeit not necessarily a 
messianic or religious one (Troen 2003)26. 
What's more, Zionist settlement in Palestine was conceived as 
"a people without a land returning to a land without a 
people" (Zangwill in Kimmerling 1983 p.9)[italics added]. 
Jews were not only returning to their homeland; they were 
returning to a land without a people, an uninhabited land, a 
"terra null us - an empty land awaiting its Jewish redemption 
after centuries of neglect" (Yiftachel 2006 p.54)27. 
In reality however, Palestine was not an uninhabited or empty 
terra nullus but was densely populated by Palestinian Arabs. 
Writing about the dispossession of aboriginal peoples from 
their lands in Australia and the Americas, Blunt and Dowling 
observe that, "dispossession often resulted from a fiction of 
25 Eretz Yisrael (also called Zion) is the biblical Jewish homeland 
to which Jews are destined to return following the arrival of the 
Messiah. 
26 Palestine was officially adopted as the privileged site for 
Jewish settlement at the Sixth Zionist Congress, in 1906. Other 
possible locations for the Jewish homeland considered by the 
Zionist movement included locations in South America and Africa. 
Kimmerling (1983) notes that while other territorial options such 
as Uganda or Argentina would have been easier to obtain and settle, 
they did not maintain as much interest, "Zionism without Palestine 
was evidently doomed to failure as a nationalist movement" (p.9). 
yiftachel (2006), Troen (2003) and Elon (1971) note a continuous 
albeit small Jewish presence in Palestine since biblical times. As 
well, Jews in the Diaspora maintained a spiritual connection to 
Eretz Yisrael notably through religious rituals (Shulman 1979). 
27 Shulman describes the arrival of the first Russian Jews to 
Palestine in 1882, They "didn't simply go to Palestine, but they 
returned to Zion"(1979 p.8)[Italics added]. 
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a 'terra nullus' (land unoccupied), whereby indigenous 
occupation and ownership was unrecognized in the face of 
settler repossession" (2006 p.178), and this is also true of 
Zionist settlement in Palestine, which resulted in the 
widespread dislocation of Palestinians from their lands, to 
be discussed. 
A proliferation of texts written at the turn of the century 
attest to an awareness by the Zionist leaders and chalutzim, 
of a substantial Palestinian Arab population in Palestine, as 
well as a range of debate about them (Elon 1971, Shulman 
1979, Avneri 1984, Troen 2003, yiftachel 2006, and Pappe 
2006-a). These views about the indigenous Palestinian 
population ranged from that of llindifference and disregard to 
patronizing superiority" (Masalha 1992 p.7); to perceiving 
Palestinian Arabs as potential allies; and to considering 
them a potential threat. While at times acknowledging that 
Jewish settlement might cause tensions with the native 
Palestinian population, Zionist leaders generally tended to 
downplay potential Palestinian Arab opposition to Jewish 
settlement in Palestine. Some believed that Palestinians 
would eventually accept a territorial transfer to other Arab 
territories outside Palestine; others felt that Palestinians 
would trade nationalism for an improvement in their standard 
brought about by Zionist settlement (Shulman 1979). 
Palestinian historian Nur Masalha (1992) observes that in so 
doing, the Zionist leaders downplayed or denied Palestinian 
nationalism, together with Palestinian claims to territory. 
As such, they also severely downplayed the indigenous 
Palestinian population's longstanding attachment to the land 
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of Palestine28 . For Masalha (1992) , it was not that the 
Zionist leaders or settlers to Palestine did not to see the 
indigenous Palestinians, rather, they considered them not 
worth seeing, and in so doing, they idealized Palestine as an 
empty land. Thus the Zionist ideal of Eretz Yisrael as an 
empty land also reflected a belief that the native 
Palestinian population would - or should - make way for the 
chalutzim. Further, the conviction that Palestinians would 
willingly cede territory to the Jewish nation-building 
project constitutes a form of othering whereby, as Pappe 
(2006-a) notes, the chalutzim set themselves above the native 
Palestinian population, perceiving them as inferior Others 
whose claims to territory would be superseded by the their 
own. 
Much as early Zionists often considered Palestinians to be 
non-modern (Alon 1971, Shulman 1979, Avneri 1984), they also 
considered the land in Palestine to be non-modern, backward 
and primitive (Pappe 2006-a, Troen 2003). Palestine was 
considered by the chalutzim to be uncivilized and 
undeveloped, in desperate need of improvement and 
modernization by the Jewish settlers, lithe land [Palestine] 
was also in need of experienced farmers who knew how to plow 
and plant; the wild stretches of land needed hands to cut 
roads; the country needed bricklayers, masons, locksmiths, 
and carpenters" (Shulman 1979 p.40) [my addition]29. In 
28 This attachment is discussed in detail in Khalidi 1997. 
29 Elon (1971) notes that many early Zionists regarded Jewish 
settlement in Palestine as a sort of civilizing mission that would 
benefit the local Arab population; in reality, however, few 
technological or agricultural advances were ever shared with them 
by the chalutzim. Pappe (2006-a) observes that the chalutzim also 
sought to reform the indigenous Jewish population, whom they 
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contrast to these perceptions, Palestine at the turn of the 
20th century had a burgeoning economy driven by agricultural 
production and industry (the manufacture of soap, tobacco and 
dry goods, among others), and was experiencing modernization 
as the result of growing trade relations with Europe30 • 
Despite this reality, the perceived backwardness of Palestine 
and its indigenous Palestinian Arab population helped justify 
Zionist encroachment on Palestinian-inhabited territory. Here 
I reiterate Peleg's earlier point (1994) about how 
conceptions of Palestinians as inferior Others may provide a 
rationale for taking their lands away from them. 
The chalutz ideal and exclusively Jewish land in Palestine 
The chalutz ideal may also be linked to Zionist ideals of 
separate and exclusively Jewish territory in Palestine. From 
1905 onward the chalutzim began to establish completely 
separate and uniquely Jewish settlements that were self-
sufficient and forbade the use of Arab labor. Beginning in 
regarded as backward, and this also led to tensions. Some 
historians write celebratory accounts of the glorious 
transformation of "backward" Palestine into modern Eretz Yisrael, 
describing the heroism of the chalutzim and their miraculous 
accomplishments in transforming a primitive land into a lush, 
modern nation; see in particular Shulman 1979 and Avneri 1984. 
30 For details see Khalidi 1984, Khalidi 2006, Pappe 2006-a, and 
Farsoun and Aruri 2006. Khalidi (1984) also describes a variety of 
cultural, educational, political, religious and athletic 
organizations and activities in Palestine at this time, and 
depicted in a vast range of photographs collected in his study. In 
contrast Zionist. visual culture at the time tended to depict 
exclusively rural scenes of Palestinians in peasant dress; many of 
these images are also reproduced in the historical research 
literature, for example, in Elon (1971). 
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the 1920s, these ideals of Jewish exclusivity and separation 
came to be implemented at a structural level: in addition to 
establishing separate and exclusively Jewish settlements, the 
chalutzim also began to create an entirely separate Jewish 
infrastructure (Pappe 2006-a, Troen 2003)31. They did so with 
a view to establishing a future Jewish state, inspired by the 
1917 Balfour Declaration that promised British support for 
the creation of a Jewish national homeland in Palestine32. 
This new infrastructure was comprised of separate and 
exclusively Jewish educational, health and legal systems, 
together with the foundations for a separate Jewish economy. 
It constituted what Yiftachel calls a "dual society" (2006 
p. 58) in Palestine33 . 
Zakim (2006) observes that at this time territory also came 
to be seen as being linked to the infrastructure that would 
eventually support a Jewish state. Most lands settled by the 
chalutzim prior to 1948 were legally purchased from Arab 
absentee landlords34 . Around this time, however, lands 
31 These authors both describe this process in detail, though from 
different perspectives: Troen praises, and Pappe harshly 
criticizes, these endeavors. 
32 In 1917, British Foreign Secretary James Balfour urged the 
British government to support the eventual creation of a Jewish 
national homeland in Palestine, in a letter that came to be known 
as the Balfour Declaration. As Palestinian historian Sami Hadawi 
observes (1989), in 1917, Palestinian Arabs constituted 92 per cent 
of the population in Mandate Palestine and Jews, less than 10 per 
cent. Nonetheless, Britain recognized the rights of another people 
to establish a homeland there. After the defeat of the Ottoman 
Empire in 1917, Great Britain was granted a Mandate to administer 
Palestine. The Mandate period lasted from 1917 to 1948. 
33 For a detailed discussion of the discrepancies between Jewish and 
Palestinian society during the Mandate period, see pp.9-21 in 
Khalidi 2006. 
34 A meticulously detailed account of Jewish land acquisitions from 
1878-1948 can be found in Avneri 1984. 
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purchased and owned by Jews came to be consolidated under the 
ownership of Jewish and Zionist organizations, notably the 
Jewish National Fund35 • Jewish lands in Palestine thus came to 
be owned not by individuals, but collectively, by Jewish 
organizations, and this in turn ensured that Jewish land in 
Palestine would be "reserved exclusively for Jewish use" 
(Farsoun and Aruri 2006 p.69). 
The 1920s also saw a dramatic increase in the numbers of 
Palestinian Arab farmers displaced from their lands by the 
chalutzim after their purchase by Jewish organizations. The 
Zionist strategy was to buy lands from absentee landlords, 
but also, to evict the Palestinian tenant farmers who worked 
and inhabited them. This resulted in widespread Arab poverty, 
as well as hostility and violence directed against the Jewish 
settlers and settlements (Pappe 2006-a, Farsoun and Aruri 
2006) 36. 
35 For a detailed study of the history of the Jewish National Fund 
up to 1948 see Lehn 1974. 
36 This reiterates the point about Palestinian resistance made on 
page 31 of the previous chapter, which linked resistance to 
territorial encroachment by the Zionist settlers to Palestine. Some 
writers tend to downplay or deny the displacement of Palestinian 
farmers; see in particular Avneri 1984. Farsoun and Aruri (2006) 
observe that Palestinian discontent and violence against Jewish 
settlers were highest after periods of intensive land transfers, 
periods that were also accompanied by increased Jewish immigration 
to Palestine. Many Jewish and Israeli writers in contrast, 
characterize Palestinian resistance as an unfounded and violent 
rejection of legitimate Zionist objectives, rather than as a 
response to Jewish encroachment on their lands; see for example 
Troen 2003, Avneri 1984, Gelber 2001, and Dershowitz 2003. Hadawi 
(1989) notes three major periods of violent Palestinian resistance: 
1920 and 1921; 1929; and the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt. 
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Toward the Jewish national body: the Homa umigdal settlements 
The 1930s marked a dramatic shift in Zionist settlement and 
spatial practices in Palestine. This shift was characterized 
by a more strategic settlement approach, evidenced by the 
Homa Umigdal (Wall and Tower, also called Stockade and Tower) 
settlements, beginning in 1936. Conceived in the wake of 
escalating Palestinian Arab violence, each of these 
individual settlements could be assembled in a single day 
from prefabricated parts, contained an observation tower, and 
was surrounded by walls - hence the name wall and tower - to 
protect their inhabitants from potential Arab attacks. Eighty 
such settlements were established between 1936 and 1939, and 
another 80 between 1943 and 1948 (Troen 2003 )37. 
Conceived in part as defensive settlements, the Homa umigdal 
settlements also played a strategic role in occupying and 
controlling territory. Rotbard notes that the Homa Umigdal 
settlements constituted lla system of settlement seemingly 
defensive but essentially of offensive form" (2003 p.42) 
because they were used to strategically assert Jewish control 
over territory. Located primarily on hilltops, clusters of 
settlements were strategically built to occupy a large, N-
shaped swath of land across Palestine; see Figure 1 on page 
74. As Troen (2003) observes, it was no longer enough for 
Jews in Palestine to purchase and own land; they had to 
populate it in order to fully control it. As Kimmerling 
37 For a detailed analysis of Homa Umigdal see pp.62-84 in Troen 
2003; see also Rotbard 2003. Troen's is a more celebratory account 
that links the settlements to the progress of the Jewish nation-
building project, whereas Rotbard's critical analysis situates the 
Homa Umigdal settlements within the larger context of Zionist and 
later Israeli spatial practices that use settlement construction to 
assert Jewish control over Palestinian lands. 
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(1983) has noted, control of territory requires a physical 
presence on it. The strategic location of the Homa Umigdal 
settlements enabled the chalutzim to control a substantial 
amount of territory, with a small number of inhabitants. 
The Homa Umigdal project was also influenced by the 1937 Peel 
Commission report that recommended the abolition of the 
British Mandate in Palestine, and which set the stage for the 
creation of a Jewish state there38 • The settlements were used 
to control territory that could be incorporated into a future 
Jewish state. Here again, Homa Umigdal represented a profound 
shift in Zionist spatial practices, from establishing 
individual settlements, to building strategic groupings of 
settlements that might begin to delineate the borders of a 
future Jewish state. As Moshe Shertok (later Sharett), one of 
the leaders of the Zionist community in Palestine (Yishuv) 
observed, "From the political point of view, I know of no 
more pressing tasks, no more effective weapon, than founding 
settlements in [border] areas, and therefore creating facts" 
38 The report recommended the annexation of most of Palestine to 
Transjordan, with a small area of land set aside for a Jewish state 
(Pappe 2006-a). The report was rejected by Palestinian leaders. A 
British White Paper adopted in 1939 tried to accommodate 
Palestinian demands by placing limits on Zionist immigration to 
Palestine as well as on land purchases there; it was unanimously 
rejected by Zionist leaders (Pappe 2002-a, Hadawi 1989). For 
Palestinian historian Rashid Khalidi (2006), these concessions came 
far too late. He asserts most importantly that Great Britain and 
the international community (the League of Nations and later the 
United Nations) had since 1917 consistently privileged the 
interests of the Zionist settlers over those of the indigenous 
Palestinian population, showing virtually no commitment to 
Palestinian self-determination while embracing the Zionist vision 
of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. For a detailed study of the 
political dynamics between Palestinians and the British authorities 
during the Mandate period, see Khalidi 2006. 
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(in Troen 2003 p.69)39. The Homa Umigdal settlements may be 
linked to the borders of a future Jewish state - borders that 
would serve to include Jews but to exclude Palestinians. As 
such they may also be linked to a more definitive territorial 
separation between Jews and Palestinians. 
39 The strategy of creating facts has also been a feature of Israeli 
settlement policy in the Occupied Territories, a point I return to 
later in this chapter. As Rotbard notes, lilt [HOma Umigdal] is the 
metaphor of the Israeli practice of fait accompli" (2003 p.46). 
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Figure 1 The Homa Umigda/ settlements and their locations 
The graphic on the left shows the "N" of Jewish settlement; the shaded areas represent 
land purchased or settled by Jews prior to 1948 (Treen 2003). The graphic on the right 
shows 60 new Homa Umigda/ settlements established between 1936 and 1939. Note 
the location of the settlements in an "N" shape across territory, as well as their location 
along what would later become the borders of the state of Israel. 
Source: Treen 2003 p.71 and p.72. 
Toward the ideal Jewish land: the deterritorialization of 
Palestinians from historic Palestine 
The Zionist movement, from early on in its inception, 
envisaged a Jewish national homeland in Palestine. All of its 
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activities there - the purchase and settlement of land and 
later the creation of a Jewish socio-economic infrastructure, 
what Pappe (2006-b p.17) calls the IIZionization" of Palestine 
- were carried with in the goal of eventually creating a 
Jewish state there. Jewish spatial practices prior to 1947 
consisted primarily in legally purchasing land and 
establishing separate and exclusively Jewish settlements. 
However by 1947 only a small portion of territory in 
Palestine - approximately six percent of its total area and 
less than ten percent of cultivable land was controlled by 
Jews. In November 1947, the united Nations adopted Resolution 
181 recommending the end of the British Mandate in Palestine 
and the partitioning of Mandatory Palestine into two 
independent states, one Jewish and one Palestinian. The 
Zionist movement's dream of a Jewish state in historic 
Palestine was on the verge of being realized. 
When the British Mandate for Palestine expired on May 14 
1948, the Jewish Agency (which administered the Jewish 
community in Palestine and served as its unofficial 
government) declared the creation of the state of Israel. 
However the events surrounding Israel's creation, from the 
passing of Resolution 181 in November 1947, to the signing of 
Israel's final armistice-agreement, with Syria, in July 1949, 
are highly contested. These events are known in the Arab 
world as the War for P:ales-tine or the 1948 War, and in 
Israel, the War of Independence (Rogon and Shlaim 2001, 
Masalha 1992). 
Of particular relevance to this research are the expulsions, 
between December 1947 and January 1949, of approximately 
750,000 Palestinians - 80 per cent of the Arab inhabitants of 
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what became the state of Israel - from their lands by Zionist 
forces in Palestine and, after 1948, the Israeli Defense 
Forces (Masalha 1992, Pappe 2006-b, Farsoun and Aruri 2006, 
Morris 2004). These expulsions were the result of attempts by 
these groups to ensure the creation of a Jewish majority 
state with the smallest possible Palestinian population 
(Hadawi 1989, Masalha 1992, Khalidi 1988 and 1992, Pappe 
2006-b) • 
The circumstances surrounding the 1948 War - and the range of 
disagreement about them - a cannot be adequately explored in 
the context of this writing, which is primarily concerned 
with the deterritorialization of Palestinians in 1947-1949. 
What may be agreed on, is that UN Resolution 181 provoked new 
levels of violence between the chalutzim and Palestinians; 
that the state of Israel was created in 1948, and a 
Palestinian Arab one was not; and that the Arab armies that 
went to war against the new state of Israel experienced a 
resounding defeat40. 
40 The official Israeli government account of the events following 
Israel's declaration of independence, is of the invasion of the new 
state of Israel less than 24 hours after it declared its 
independence, by Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, followed 
by a miraculous Jewish victory against these invading Arab armies 
in the War of Independence, which lasted for 15 months; see 
<www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/History/Modern+History/Centenary+of+zionism/The 
+Arab-Israeli+Wars.htm#1948>; see also Gelber 2001 and Kurzman 
1970. For a critical account of the 1948 War by Israeli historians, 
see in particular the essays in Rogon and Shlaim 2001, Pappe 2006-
a, Flapan 1987 and Shlaim 1999. Hadawi 1989, Farsoun and Aruri 
2006, and Pappe 2006-a emphasize escalating Zionist aggression 
against Palestinians beginning in 1947, with a total disregard for 
plans to establish an independent Palestinian state. Khalidi 
(2001), focusing on events in Arab Palestine itself, examines some 
of the reasons why Palestine was lost in 1948, citing for example, 
structural imbalances of the British Mandate which favored the 
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While acknowledging increased Palestinian Arab attacks on the 
chalutzim, my focus is on the deliberate and strategic 
expulsion of Palestinians from their lands by the Haganah, 
beginning in November 1947 in the wake of Resolution 181, and 
culminating in July 1949. 
By the time the state of Israel declared its independence on 
May 14, 1948, Zionist forces had already expelled 
approximately 250,000 Palestinians from Mandate Palestine 
(Pappe 2006-b). Khalidi (2001) observes that the creation of 
the state of Israel in May 1948 marked the halfway point in 
the expulsion of Palestinians from their lands. In the months 
following the creation of the state of Israel, hundreds of 
thousands of Palestinians continued to be systematically 
expelled by Israeli forces. By January 1949 a total of 
approximately 750,000 Palestinians - had fled Palestine, most 
of them forcibly41. Only 140,000 to 150,000 Palestinians 
remained inside the state of Israel, representing a 
Palestinian Arab minority of 17 percent (Pappe 2006-b). 
Further, the state of Israel controlled 77 percent of the 
territory of what had been Mandatory Palestine (Khalidi 
2001). For Farsoun and Aruri (2006) and for Khalidi (2006), 
Arab Palestine had ceased to exist. 
The question of what happened to the expelled Palestinians in 
1947-1949 is a matter of much contention and disagreement. As 
Avi Shlaim (1999) notes, the official Israeli government 
account is of the mass flight of Palestinians on the orders 
Zionists; a lack of Palestinian political cohesion and leadership, 
and the failure of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt. 
41 Masalha (1992) places this figure at 804,000; and Pappe (2006-b) 
at 800,000; Farsoun and Aruri (2006) at between 750-800,000; and 
Morris (2004) at approximately 700,000. 
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of Arab leaders. This view is echoed by many Israeli 
historians, notably Gelber (2001) and Kurzman (1970), as well 
as by many non-Israeli Jewish writers most notably Dershowitz 
(2003) 42. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, and following the 
declassification of documents in Israeli government archives, 
some Israeli historians began to publish research confirming 
that approximately 700,000 Palestinians had indeed been 
expelled by Zionist/Israeli forces in 1947-1949 (Flapan 1987, 
Pappe 1992, Shlaim 1999, Morris 1987 and 2004). However they 
argued that these expulsions were not the outcome of an 
official strategy or plan, but rather, the result of the 
circumstances of war43 • 
In contrast many (primarily) Palestinian scholars - working 
not only with declassified Israeli documents but also, 
Palestinian oral history - have concluded that the expulsions 
of Palestinians were deliberate and systematic (Khalidi 1988, 
Masalha 1992, Farsoun and Aruri 2006, Pappe 2006-b, Massad 
2006). These scholars assert that the expulsions were 
premeditated and deliberately and meticulously planned, in a 
series of four successive plans adopted by the Jewish High 
Command in Palestine between 1945 and 1947, Plans A (Aleph) 
through D (Dalet). They note that the final plan for the 
expulsions was elaborated in Plan D, adopted by the Jewish 
High Command in 1947 (Khalidi 1988, Masalha 1992, Farsoun and 
42 Khalidi's study (1959) of BBC and other Arab-language radio 
broadcasts at the time disproves the theory of Arab evacuation 
orders. 
43 Note a substantial shift in Morris' views in Morris (2004), to 
one that acknowledges the mass expulsions but that also justifies 
them as an apt response to Palestinian violence. 
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Aruri 2006, Pappe 2006-b, Massad 2006)44. Pappe's recent study 
(2006-b) supports the assertions about Plan D by other 
scholars, and he provides a meticulously researched, minutely 
detailed account of the systematic expulsion of almost 
800,000 Palestinians, first from urban centers and then from 
rural/village areas45 . Most importantly for the purposes of 
this research, he locates the expulsions as the outcome of a 
Zionist ideology that sought to create not only a Jewish 
state in Palestine, but an exclusively Jewish state. So too, 
do Hadawi (1989), Khalidi (1988), Masalha (1992), Farsoun and 
Aruri (2006) and Massad (2006), who all observe that the 
expulsions were the product of a Zionist ideology that had 
aggressively pursued the creation of a Jewish state in an 
area populated by another people46 . 
The massive uprooting of Palestinians in 1947-1949, marked a 
shift in Zionist spatial practices, from the methodical but 
gradual purchase and settlement of territory, to the mass 
deterritorialization of Palestinians. Strictly speaking these 
expulsions did not constitute a type of spatial practice. 
44 Khalidi (1988) provides a detailed analysis of Plan Dalet, its 
objectives and history. Khailidi (1988) also provides an English 
translation of the Plan from its original Hebrew version (in 
Slutsky, Y. Ed. 1972. Sefer Toldot Hahaganah [History of the 
Haganah] Vol. 3. Tel Aviv: Zionist Library, Appendix 39, pp.1939-
1943); see pp.24-33 in Khalidi 1988. Pappe (2006-b) and Khalidi 
(1988) criticize the British government and the UN for not doing 
enough to protect Palestinians after the British Mandate officially 
ended in May 1948. 
45 Pappe's analysis (2006-b) uses a framework of ethnic cleansing. 
Note a radical shift in his views from those published in 1992. 
46 Masalha (1992) examines the concept of transfer - the transfer of 
Palestinians out of Palestine - in Zionist thought, and studies the 
various strategies elaborated by the Zionist leaders to rid 
Palestine of its Palestinian Arab population, at various points 
between from 1882 through 1948. 
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However they are inextricably connected to previously 
discussed ideals that motivated Zionist spatial practices in 
Palestine prior to 1947: the creation of separate and 
exclusively Jewish space, and the assertion of exclusive 
Jewish control over as much territory as possible. 
The observations of the scholars cited on the previous link 
back to the notion of the Palestinian terra nullus or empty 
land, introduced on page 64. Despite its majority Arab 
population, Zionist leaders idealized Palestine as a terra 
nullus. Between 1947 and 1949 Palestine was largely emptied 
of its Palestinian Arab population and the Zionist ideal of 
an empty land - a land devoid of Palestinians - had become a 
reality. This laid the foundation for the official 
consolidation of land in the newly created state of Israel, 
under exclusively Jewish ownership and control. 
The Sabra ideal and exclusively Jewish land in Israel after 
1948 
This section explores the Sabra as the ideal Israeli body, 
supplanting the chalutz, beginning in 1948 with the creation 
of the state of Israel. My specific interest is in exploring 
a relationship between the Sabra ideal and spatial policy in 
the nascent Jewish state, specifically, the consolidation of 
land ownership under exclusively Jewish control during the 
state's early years, from 1948 through the 1950s. The 
observations in this section of writing owe a great deal to 
the investigations of Israeli scholar Oren Yiftachel (1998, 
2002, 2006). 
80 
The term Sabra is derived from tsabar, the prickly pear 
cactus which is native to the land. Like the plant after 
which it is named, the term Sabra is associated with being 
native to the land, and it came to designate the first 
generation of native-born Israelis47 • For Israeli sociologist 
Oz Almog (2000) the Sabra generation spans the years 1930 to 
1970, and coincided with the formative years of Israeli 
society. However, as Almog (2000) observes, while the number 
of actual Sabras born in Israel was at first relatively small 
- about 20,000 people - the influence of the Sabra as the 
model (or ideal, in terms used throughout this chapter) that 
an entire generation of Israelis should emulate and aspire 
to, was enormous 48 • 
Like the tsabar, the Sabra was said to be tough and prickly 
on the outside but soft on the inside. And as the ideal 
Israeli, the Sabra was male, muscular, fit and strong, tanned 
and often blonde; he was tough, a soldier, a farmer and 
kibbutznik; was confident and assertive; spoke Hebrew as a 
47 As a native Israeli, the Sabra is also linked to ideals of a 
continuous Jewish presence in Eretz Yisrael going back to biblical 
times, liThe Sabra, then, is not something new under the sun. In a 
sense, he is three thousand years old. He is the Hebrew in his own 
land, reborn" (Russcol and Banai 1970 p.13). The csabar cactus is 
called the sabr in Arabic, highlighting the irony of the term's 
appropriation, in Hebrew, to describe "native" Israelis, who became 
native only by virtue of expelling the indigenous Palestinians. 
48 Almog's excellent study of Sabra identity details the various 
social, cultural, and educational mechanisms through which Israelis 
were socialized into the Sabra ideal. Note that the scholars cited 
in this section on the Sabra (notably Almog and later Rubinstein) 
are concerned with the Sabra ideal shaping Israeli idencicy, 
whereas my concern is with the Sabra ideal and its relationship to 
territory. 
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first language and talked in a direct manner (Almog 2000 )49. 
As a soldier and kibbutznik, he embodied ideals of settlement 
and defense of his country; of self-sacrifice for the Jewish 
nation; and of re'ut - kinship and collectivity. The Sabra 
shared many of these traits with the chalutz, for both 
represented the new Zionist Jew as the antidote to the 
Diaspora Jew. But whereas the chalutz was European in his 
origins, the Sabra was native Israeli. Of particular concern 
is the fact that the Sabra was not only Israeli but also 
Jewish-Israeli. Like the IDF soldier (and with reference to 
Weiss 2002-a), the Sabra ideal is an exclusionary one, 
because it includes Jewish Israelis but excludes 
Palestinians. 
Yiftachel (2006) notes that in its Declaration of 
Independence, the state of Israel declared itself to be a 
specifically Jewish state, and in its early years it formally 
enshrined the specifically Jewish nature of the state in 
law5o • This process included the enactment of laws that would 
guarantee exclusive Jewish control over land in Israel. The 
49 Many women were Sabras, however the Sabra ideal was male and 
masculine (Almog 2000). 
50 Further, for Yiftachel (2006, 1998), the state of Israel is an 
ethnocratic one (what he also terms an ethnocracy) because it 
promotes the interests of the dominant ethnic group (Jews) over 
those of its Arab and ethnic minority citizens. This has resulted 
in profound inequalities between Israeli Jews and non-Jews, because 
rights (for example, citizenship rights and the right to own land) 
are granted based on one's being Jewish, and not necessarily, 
Israeli. See Yiftachel 2006 pp.11-47 for a discussion of political 
ethnocracYi and chapters 4, 5 and 6 in Yiftachel 2006 for an 
analysis of ethnocracy in Israel considered in terms of political 
democracy and unequal voting rights, unequal citizenship rights, 
and unequal land rights. On unequal citizenship rights in Israel 
see also Yiftachel 2002. As Massad importantly observes, "Israel 
was designated the state of Jews worldwide and not of its citizens" 
(2006 p.19). 
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Sabra's specifically Jewish-Israeliness may be linked to the 
ideal of Israeli land as being exclusively Jewish land, that 
is, land owned and controlled exclusively by Jewish Israelis. 
The deracination of the majority of Palestinians from their 
lands in 1947-1949 produced land in the new state of Israel 
as a sort of territorial tabula rasa, a clean slate upon 
which exclusive Jewish control over territory - what 
Yiftachel (1998, 2002, 2006) calls spatial Judaization 
could be asserted51 • He observes that policies of spatial 
Judaization served to "legally and institutionally" (2006 
p.136) consolidate land ownership in Jewish hands and Jewish 
hands alone. 
Spatial Judaization was contingent first and foremost on 
preventing the displaced Palestinian refugees from returning 
to their lands, and this was accomplished through the 
adoption of legal measures that forbade their return to lands 
located inside the state of Israel (Yiftachel 2006)52. As 
well, after 1948 over 400 Palestinian villages and towns 
inside Israel were systematically destroyed, and Jewish 
settlements and development towns built in their place 
(Massad 2006, Khalidi 1992); see Figure 2, on the following 
page53 . What's more, thousands of Palestinian citizens of the 
51 yiftachel (2006) further notes that while most of the legal 
measures to Judaize territory were enacted during the early years 
of the Israeli state, they served to shape the character of the 
Israeli lands system through the 1990s. 
52 Even Israeli scholars who deny the mass expulsions of 
Palestinians (Reichman 1990, Gelber 2001) or who justify them on 
the basis of self-defense (Morris 2004) agree that blocking the 
refugees' return constituted official Israeli policy. 
53 The destruction of 418 Palestinian villages in 1948 is 
meticulously detailed in Khalidi (1992). The villages were also 
renamed in Hebrew; see Massad 2006 and Pappe 2006-b. The Israeli 
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new state of Israel were internally - and often forcibly -
displaced from their towns and villages after 1948 in order 
to make way for the new Israeli settlements and towns 
(Farsoun and Aruri 2006, Yiftachel 2006, Masalha 1992). 
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Figure 2 Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel and priority areas for new 
Jewish settlements 
The map on the left shows the location of Palestinian villages destroyed by Israel in 1948. 
The map on the right shows the priority areas where new Jewish settlements were to be 
built. Note the substantial overlap of new Jewish settlements over areas that had previously 
been inhabited by Palestinians. 
Source: Pappe 2006-b p.294 (left); Reichmann 1990 p.329 (right). 
organization zochrot (remembrance) raises awareness about the 
villages and offers an extensive database of information about them 
(in Hebrew and Arabic) on its website, <www.zochrot.org>. 
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yiftachel (2006) observes that in May 1948, the Israeli 
government controlled approximately 78 per cent of the 
territory in what had been Mandate Palestine, however, only 
8.5 per cent of Israel's land was actually owned by Jews. 
During the early 1950s, the Israeli government enacted a 
series of legal measures that would consolidate land 
ownership in Israel under exclusive Jewish control. Having 
already denied the expelled Palestinian refugees the right to 
return to their lands, the Israeli government moved to 
expropriate the lands that had been forcibly abandoned by the 
refugees, and to transfer them to Israeli state ownership. 
Next, it passed measures to confiscate private lands from 
Palestinian citizens of Israel, also transferring these to 
state ownership. 
All told, the Israeli government transferred approximately 80 
percent of the country's lands, including those seized from 
Palestinians, to state ownership, officially categorizing 
them as state lands. Next, it granted exclusive 
responsibility and control of state lands to Jewish 
institutions such as the Jewish National Fund and later the 
Israeli Lands Authority, thus ensuring that only Jews could 
own or control the great majority of territory in Israel. 
what's more, the new laws prohibited the sale, leasing and 
sub-leasing of state lands to non-Jews, effectively 
restricting not only the ownership, but also the use of state 
lands exclusively to Jewish Israelis 54 • 
54 A detailed account of all of these measures can be found in 
yiftachel 2006 and in Chapter 6 in particular, pp.131-156. Writing 
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with the enactment of these legal measures, control of the 
majority of territory in Israel was consolidated under 
exclusively Jewish ownership and control. As Weiss (2002-a) 
has noted, body boundaries in Israel are linked to 
territorial boundaries by virtue of the fact that they serve 
to include Jews but to exclude non-Jews. The Sabra ideal, 
like that of the IDF soldier cited by Weiss, may also be 
linked to the inclusion of Jews and the exclusion of non-
Jews, for the Sabra was specifically Jewish-Israeli. 
The Sabra is also specifically Ashkenazi Jewish (Almog 2000), 
that is, of eastern or northern European ancestry. As such 
the Sabra ideal may also be linked to the spatial segregation 
of non-Ashkenazi Jewish Israelis. 
Policies of spatial Judaization also involved efforts to fill 
the country's newly Judaized lands with Jewish immigrants and 
refugees from Europe, Africa and the Arab world (Yiftachel 
1998). The Israeli government promoted and facilitated Jewish 
immigration to Israel. Between 1948 and 1951 over 550,000 
Jewish immigrants came to Israel (Segev 1998)55. Israeli 
immigration policy also had a spatial dimension: the spatial 
settlement and distribution of the country's new immigrants 
was dictated by centralized state planning policies that 
specified where the new immigrants mayor may not settle. 
in 1998, he observed that Palestinian Arabs comprised 16 per cent 
of Israel's population but owned only three per cent of the 
country's land (Yiftachel 1998). 
55 See Segev (1998) for a detailed analysis of Israeli immigration 
policy at this time. The 1950 Law of Return granted Israeli 
citizenship to any Jew. This connects back to Yiftachel's analysis 
(2006, 1998) of unequal citizenship rights for non-Jews. 
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Of note, was the 1950 Sharon Plan, a master plan adopted by 
the government that outlined the types and locations of 
Israel's new settlements, as well as the spatial distribution 
of the country's population56 . According to this Plan, new 
immigrants to Israel were to be settled primarily in newly 
created development towns and in areas with the most 
dangerous locations and the least arable land. During the 
1950s for example, the majority of Oriental and African 
Jewish immigrants were settled, often forcibly, in border 
areas most vulnerable to attack by Arabs (Yiftachel 1998, 
Segev 1998)57. These planning policies created hierarchies 
among Jewish Israelis, with Ashkenazi Jews settling in the 
most arable and desirable areas, and non-Ashkenazi Jews 
relegated to less desirable and more dangerous locations58 • 
And while the new Jewish immigrants to Israel were socialized 
into the Sabra ideal, the Sabra himself, as noted by Almog 
(2000), was Ashkenazi. Therefore, the Sabra may also be 
linked to the ideal of specifically Ashkenazi Jewish land in 
Israel, that is, of territory controlled by Israeli Jews of 
56 For a detailed account of the Plan see Chapter 9 in Troen 2003; 
for a critical analysis of the Plan see Efrat 2003. 
57 Yiftachel (2001) provides a detailed analysis of Mizrachi 
settlement. He further notes that massive settlement construction 
to accommodate the new immigrants resulted in the surrounding and 
containment of Arab villages by the new Jewish settlements 
(Yiftachel 2006), a practice later undertaken in the West Bank. 
Massad (2006) notes that the majority of Mizrachi immigrants who 
settled in urban centers resided in slum areas. 
58 See Chapters 5 and 6 in Segev 1998 for a comprehensive analysis 
of the negative perceptions and racism directed at Jewish 
immigrants by Ashkenazi Israeli Jews. See also Massad 2006 pp.55-
76. Rubinstein (2000) observes that the contradictions inherent in 
the Sabra ideal - a veneer of inclusivity that masked the exclusion 
of large numbers of Israeli Jews - were the primary reason for its 
demise in the 1970s. 
87 
European ancestry, and organized according to spatial 
hierarchies for Israeli Jews and non-Jews alike. Land in 
Israel was consolidated not only under Jewish ownership and 
control, but under Ashkenazi Jewish control, because the 
Israeli government and its land institutions were controlled 
primarily by Ashkenazi Jews, many of whom had been leaders in 
the pre-state Zionist movement. 
Accordingly, the vast majority of territory in Israel would 
be controlled exclusively by Ashkenazi Jews. Palestinian 
refugees, having been deracinated from the Jewish state, were 
forbidden from returning there. Non-Jewish citizens of Israel 
were forbidden from owning land in over 80 per cent of the 
country. Finally, Oriental and African Israeli Jews were 
spatially segregated from Ashkenazi Israeli Jews 59 • Because 
Ashkenazi Jews constituted Israel's ruling elite, they 
controlled the state's legal and planning mechanisms. 
Consequently, they also directed the country's settlement 
practices, as well as the spatial distribution of all 
Israelis, be they Jewish or not. 
Military occupation of territory and the soldier ideal 
The Tzahal or IDF soldier emerged as the ideal Israeli body, 
replacing that of the Sabra beginning in 1967 with Israel's 
conquest of the West Bank and Gaza60 • Like the chalutz and the 
Sabra, the IDF soldier is male, Ashkenazi, fit and strong; he 
59 Despite their status as inferior Others to Ashkenazi Jews, 
Oriental and African Israeli Jews were of a higher status than 
Palestinian citizens of Israel. 
60 Israel also conquered East Jerusalem, the Sinai Peninsula and the 
Golan Heights; see Pappe 2006-a. It immediately annexed East 
Jerusalem (Weizman 2007). 
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is non-disabled (Weiss 2002-a)i and in keeping with an ideal 
that privileges normative masculinity, he is heterosexual 
(Kaplan 2002). The Tzahal soldier also embodies ideals of 
self-sacrifice, for he is willing to give up his life to 
defend his country61. 
Like the Sabra before him, the soldier may also be linked to 
the exclusion of Palestinians as well as to hierarchies among 
Israeli Jews. Returning again to weiss's comments (2002-a) 
about the body's links to inclusion and exclusion in Israel, 
the soldier, as the chosen or ideal Israeli body, may be 
linked to the inclusion of Jewish Israelis and to the 
exclusion of non-Jewish Israelis, because non-Jews generally 
do not serve in the IDF. The only non-Jewish Israelis to be 
conscripted into the Israeli army are Druze men (Klein 2000). 
Bedouin men may serve voluntarily, and Muslims are exempted 
from service (Klein 2000). Non-Jews who do choose to serve in 
the IDF are segregated into specific units (Kaplan 2002)H. 
More than anything, the IDF soldier may be associated with 
the exclusion of Palestinian Arabs 63 • As Kanaaneh notes, 
61 For a study soldiering and self-sacrifice in Israel and in the 
years preceding its creation, see Zerubavel 2008. While women are 
conscripted and serve in the IDF, the soldier ideal is male. 
62 Kanaaneh (2003) asserts that these divisions, deliberately 
outlined and institutionalized as early as 1949, were adopted in 
order to prevent the Arab minorities from coalescing into one 
group. 
63 Very few Palestinian citizens of Israel serve in the IDF. 
Kanaaneh's investigations (2003) focus on the approximately 5,000 
Palestinian citizens of Israel who have chosen to serve in the IDF. 
He notes that while they serve out of a sense of belonging to the 
nation of Israel, these Palestinian soldiers are often accused of 
not being trustworthy by (predominantly right wing) Israeli Jews 
and soldiers on the one hand; and of being "traitors" by 
Palestinians. For details see Kanaaneh (2003). Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories tend not to serve in the IDF. 
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"Military service has enormous symbolic significance as well 
as social and material benefits in Israel, and has been a key 
institution in the production both of Jewish belonging and 
Palestinian marginalization" (2003 p.6) [italics added]. 
Weiss (2002-a) notes that the IDF soldier serves as an 
equalizing force in Jewish-Israeli society, because all 
Jewish-Israelis serve in the IDF64. However she also notes the 
dominance of Ashkenazi Jews in the IDF leadership and in its 
elite units (2002-b). Thus the soldier ideal, too, may be 
associated with hierarchies and inequalities in Israeli 
society, owing, among other things, to the disproportionate 
number of Ashkenazis in leadership positions, the exclusion 
of non-Jews, the marginalization of homosexual soldiers, and 
the confinement of women to specific roles65 . 
With the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, the IDF 
soldier has been associated not only with defending the 
nation but also with military occupation66 • While I argue that 
the IDF soldier constitutes the Israeli body ideal after 
1967, my interest is less with the solider ideal in and of 
itself, and more with its links to the military occupation of 
territory upon which Israeli spatial practices - notably the 
64 Ultra-Orthodox Jews are exempt from military service while 
studying and they tend to serve in religious, non-combat units 
during their military service. 
65 For a detailed study of gender roles in the IDF see Yuval-Davis 
1987. On military service and gender relations in Israel see Klein 
2000. On homosexuals in the IDF see Kaplan 2002. 
66 Unlike East Jerusalem, Israel did not formally annex the West 
Bank and Gaza, for in doing so it would have to grant citizenship 
rights to the almost one million Palestinians who resided there. 
Instead, 590,000 Palestinians in the West Bank and 380,000 in Gaza, 
fell under Israeli military rule in 1967 (Pappe 2006-a). 
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construction of Jewish settlements - are contingent67 • I focus 
on the West Bank because by the time I began writing this 
chapter, Israel had already dismantled its Jewish settlements 
in Gaza68 • 
In the West Bank, distinctions between spatial objectives and 
military ones have become increasingly blurred over time, 
characterized for example by the active role played by the 
IDF and the Israeli Ministry of Defense (MOD) in planning the 
locations and layouts of the Jewish settlements and blocks of 
settlements. Military orders are used to seize Palestinian 
inhabited territory on which Jewish settlements, roads and 
67 While the IDF soldier remains an ideal, it has also become 
increasingly contested. Many Israelis oppose the occupation and a 
growing number of IDF soldiers refuse to serve in the Occupied 
Territories; see www.yeshgvul.org. Some Israelis are fighting to 
end compulsory conscription and institute a legal basis for 
conscientious objectors to refuse to serve altogether; see 
www.newprofile.org. Those who refuse to serve in the IDF and/or in 
the Occupied Territories are reviled and attacked by many in 
Israeli society and may even be accused of being anti-Semites; see 
Kanaaneh 2003. Despite this, I use the Tzahal soldier as an ideal 
because Israeli government policy has since 1967 sanctioned the 
military occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 
68 On Israeli settlement practices in Gaza see Falah 2005, Roy 2007 
and Zertel and Eldar 2007. On Israel's dismantling of the 
settlements and its unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005 
see Chapter 4 in Efrat 2006, pp.166-195. Despite having dismantled 
the settlements in Gaza, the territory remains under Israeli 
military control. I deal with Gaza in more detail in the following 
two chapters. Since 1967, Israel has also pursued an aggressive 
policy of settlement construction in and around East Jerusalem. A 
series of master plans has completely reconfigured the territory in 
and around Jerusalem into Greater Jerusalem, a sprawling area that 
reaches deep into the West Bank, cutting it in half and while also 
cutting Palestinians there off from their cultural center (Weizman 
2007). Israeli settlement practices in East Jerusalem involve the 
expulsion of Palestinians from their homes and the seizure of 
Palestinian territory for construction purposes. A detailed study 
of Israeli settlement practices in East Jerusalem lies outside the 
scope of this research; see in particular Chapter 1 in weizman 2007 
pp.25-56, Sorkin and Vovk 2002, and Cheshin and Butman 1999. 
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most recently, the Separation Barrier are built69. IDF 
soldiers protect and defend Jewish settlers, the settlements 
and the road systems that connect them. As well the MOD is 
charged with directing and overseeing the planning, routing 
and construction of the Separation Barrier. 
One especially glaring connection between the military 
occupation of territory and settlement construction in the 
West Bank, is the pretext of seizing private Palestinian 
lands for "temporary military necessity" (Weizman 2007 
p.105). Many Jewish civilian settlements were originally 
built as military outposts, using a rationale of temporary 
military necessity as a pretext for their construction 
(Weizman 2007, Zertel and Eldar 2007). This measure was used 
between 1967 and 1979 to seize Palestinian lands for 
settlement construction purposes, and to circumvent 
principles of international law (such as the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Hague Regulations) that forbid the 
construction of permanent facts and the transfer of 
populations into occupied territory, but which permit the 
temporary seizure of lands for military or security needs 7o • 
69 On the military seizure of Palestinian territory see Lein and 
Weizman 2002, Weizman 2007 pp.95-115, and Etkes and Of ran 2006. 
70 Following a Palestinian legal challenge in 1979 the Israeli High 
Court ruled that temporary military necessity could no longer be 
used to seize Palestinian lands; for details see Weizman 2007. 
However this measure has been reintroduced in recent years, to 
seize Palestinian lands on which the roads network and the 
Separation Barrier are being built, see Lein 2004 and Lein and 
Cohen-Lifshitz 2005. Israel is a signatory to the Geneva Convention 
but considers the West Bank and Gaza to be disputed and not 
occupied territory, and therefore not subject to international 
humanitarian law. On Israel's obligations under international 
humanitarian law, and its refusal to honor them, see in particular 
Falk 2002 pp.22-24, Falk and Weston 1991, Etkes and Of ran 2006 and 
Lein and weizman 2002. 
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More than 40 years after the measure of temporary military 
seizure was first used, the Jewish settlements built on 
Palestinian lands seized ostensibly for temporary military 
use remain populated by Jewish settlers, prompting questions, 
as Weizman (2007) rightly notes, about the very meaning of 
the term temporary in the context of the settlement 
enterprise. 
After 1979, Jewish settlements were instead built primarily 
on private Palestinian lands seized by the Israeli government 
and designated as Israeli state land71 • This practice 
resembled measures that designated land in Israel as state 
land during the 1950s, as discussed. However, the seizure and 
transfer of Palestinian territory in the West Bank was 
facilitated by military occupation. 
The IDF soldier and the military occupation of Palestinian 
inhabited territory may be linked to the Israeli land ideal 
that emerged in 1967 with the conquest of the Occupied 
Territories: wholeness, the assertion of exclusive Israeli 
control over the whole of the territory there. On the one 
hand, wholeness is linked to the geo-political notion of 
71 One of the key strategies used by successive Israeli governments 
was to seize vast amounts of Palestinian public land, and to 
designate it as Israeli state land; this land was then used for 
settlement construction purposes; see Weizman 2007. Pappe (2006-a) 
notes that by the year 2000, Israel had confiscated approximately 
42 per cent of the territory in the west Bank for settlement 
construction. A comprehensive account of the various mechanisms 
used to seize Palestinian territory can be found in Lein and 
Weizman 2002, and in Etkes and Of ran 2006. These include the use of 
restrictions on movement to prevent Palestinians from registering 
or laying claim to their lands, and the expansion of settlements 
beyond their legal boundaries onto private Palestinian lands, as 
detailed in various human rights reports including most notably 
Etkes and Of ran 2006 and 2007, Lein and Weizman 2002, and Lein and 
Cohen-Lifshitz 2005. 
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whole land in Israel - the belief that the West Bank and Gaza 
comprise part of Greater Israel (Aronson 1990, Gorenberg 
2006). On the other hand, the ideal of territorial wholeness 
is a religious one promoted by right wing politicians and 
religious settlers, who believe that God gave the whole land 
of Eretz Yisrael - Israel together with the Occupied 
Territories - to the J ews72. Notions of wholeness have been 
promulgated by secular and religious, and leftist and 
rightist Israelis and their leaders alike, at various points 
since 1967. 
My interest lies specifically with the ideal of wholeness as 
it operates in the West Bank, where the assertion of control 
over all of the territory there could only be achieved by 
building Jewish settlements. By constructing settlements, 
Israel sought to "guarantee control over the whole conquered 
area, and create 'irreversible' faits accompli" (Kimmerling 
1993 p.218)[italics in original]. As was already discussed, 
Jewish attempts to control territory prior to 1948 had also 
been asserted by building settlements and establishing a 
Jewish presence on Palestinian inhabited territory. Like the 
earlier pre-state project of Homa Umigdal, settlements built 
in the West Bank after 1967 were used to control territory by 
creating permanent facts on the ground (Rotbard 2003). Unlike 
prior settlement initiatives in historic Palestine or inside 
the state of Israel prior to 1967 however, the ideal of 
wholeness in the West Bank would be realized in the context 
of the military occupation of Palestinian inhabited 
territory. 
72 This belief is reflected in the use of the biblical terms "Judea" 
and "Samaria" to refer to the Occupied Territories. 
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Jewish settlements built in the West Bank during the first 
decade of the occupation were conceived as defensive ones73 • 
Like Homa Umigdal these settlements were built ostensibly to 
protect border areas; and like Homa Umigdal, they were 
conceived as defensive but were also of a strategic, 
offensive nature (Rotbard 2003). Settlement construction in 
the West Bank between 1967 and 1977 served not only to 
delineate or fortify borders, but also to expand frontiers. 
Weizman (2007) notes that unlike borders, frontiers are 
elastic and allow for the constant transformation and 
reconfiguration of the built environment. Settlements in the 
West Bank were built on the other side of the Green Line 
(Israel's armistice border with Jordan, created in 1949), 
thus breaching - not defending - an internationally 
recognized border74. As such the settlements served not to 
defend an Israeli border but rather to create facts and to 
assert control over territory located outside of one of 
Israel's internationally recognized borders. By virtue of 
their location on the other side of the Green Line the 
settlements can be considered to be extra-territorial. Yet 
the Israeli government did not recognize the Green Line as a 
definitive national border75 • As then Israeli Minister of 
Labor Yigal Allon stated in 1968, liThe armistice lines ••• had 
73 For a detailed account of the first decade of Israeli settlement 
in the west Bank see Gorenberg 2006; see also Chapters 1 through 3 
in Aronson 1990, pp.9-56. For a comprehensive analysis of the 
entire Israeli settlement project in both the West Bank and Gaza 
from 1967 through 2006, see Zertel and Eldar 2007. 
74 For a detailed study of frontiers and Jewish territorial control 
see Kimmerling 1983. 
75 In December 1967, the Israeli government decided to erase the 
Green Line from all of the maps, atlases and textbooks it published 
(Weizman 2007). 
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never been secure borders, and it would be unthinkable to 
return to them" (in Aronson 1990 p.13). 
West Bank settlements built during the first decade of the 
occupation were concentrated in the Jordan Valley and tended 
to avoid proximity to Palestinian built-up areas. However in 
1977 the right wing Likud government, in collaboration with 
religious settler groups, initiated a policy of settlement 
construction throughout the whole of the West Bank76 • The 
Likud government began to deliberately and strategically 
locate settlements on hilltops and adjacent to Palestinian 
cities and towns, a practice that has continued ever since77 • 
Weizman (2007) further notes that it was under Likud rule 
that the Israeli government began to formalize the settlement 
project under state control. The new settlement strategy 
adopted by the Likud government would enable Israel to assert 
de facto control over the whole of the West Bank via the 
strategic placement of settlements there. The strategic 
placement of the settlements to control territory is 
reminiscent of the Homa Umigdal settlements used to delineate 
the borders of a future Jewish state, indicated in Figure 1 
on page 74. And while government policies and priorities for 
76 Yiftachel (2006) notes that from the 1980s onward the settlers 
have been the most over-represented group in successive Israeli 
governments. Weizman (2007) observes that the proliferation of 
settlements from 1977 onward was as much the result of centralized 
planning as it was the result of what he terms "deliberate chaos" 
(2007 p. 94), the lack of clear processes and structures that 
enabled various governments to impose their settlement ideologies 
(often in collaboration with settler groups) without having to take 
responsibility for them. See Yaniv and Yishai 1981 for a detailed 
overview of the roles of state and non-state actors in influencing 
Israeli settlement policy from 1967 to approximately 1980. 
77 For an analysis of the hilltop settlements see Segal and Weizman 
2003 pp.79-99; see also weizman 2007 pp.87-100. 
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settlement construction have varied, "All Israeli governments 
have contributed to the strengthening, development and 
expansion of the settlements" (Lein and Weizman 2002 p.ll). 
Figure 3 (below) shows the rates of settlement construction 
by the various Israeli governments between 1967 and 2008 78 • 
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Figure 3 Settlement construction under successive Israeli governments, 
1967-2008 
Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace 
The settlements have enabled the state of Israel to assert 
control over the whole of the territory of the West Bank, not 
78 For additional data on settlement construction by the various 
Israeli governments see Reuveni 2003. As of the end of 2008 (the 
most recent date for which Israeli census data is available), there 
were 289,800 Jewish settlers residing in 121 legal settlements in 
the West Bank. Data from the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, 
cited by B'Tselem <www.btselem.org>. Settlers residing in the 
approximately 100 illegal settlements (called outposts) in the West 
Bank are not included in the census data. 
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only because of their strategic location, but also, because 
the settlements control vast amounts of territory within 
their municipal and regional boundaries, as demonstrated in 
Figure 4, on the following page79 • 
79 More recent maps of the Jewish settlements in the West Bank now 
include the roads network, the route of the Separation Barrier, and 
the location of checkpoints and barriers. I use this 2002 map in 
order to focus on the strategic location of the settlements and the 
territory included within their boundaries. Several online 
resources enable users to not only to locate the settlements on 
maps but also to access more and more information about them. See 
in particular Philip weiss' Google map of the Israeli settlements 
(in progress), available at <http://mondoweiss.net/2009/02/spiegel-
database-of-west-bank-settlements-and-outposts-view-larger-
map.html>. 
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Previous page: 
Figure 4 Jewish settlements in the West Bank, 2002 
Source: B'Tselem. 
Israeli wholeness, Palestinian fragmentation 
The Israeli ideal of wholeness in the West Bank is not only 
contingent on asserting control over all of the territory 
there, but also, on the fragmentation of Palestinian 
inhabited territory. As Figure 4 on the previous page also 
demonstrates, the settlements and the territory they control 
have fragmented Palestinian built up areas into a series of 
territorial islands or enclaves surrounded by Israeli-
controlled territory. In addition to asserting Israeli 
control over territory in the West Bank, the settlements have 
also served to disrupt Palestinian territorial contiguity 
there, "The result would be several isolated Palestinian 
cantons, each around a major city, with the connections 
controlled by Israel" (Weizman 2007 p.81). 
Using the settlements, together with the road networks that 
connect them to each other and to Israel to prevent 
Palestinian territorial contiguity was first proposed in 1977 
by then Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, who developed a 
strategy of deliberate and strategic settlement location in 
order to penetrate and disrupt contiguous Palestinian 
inhabited areas in the West Bank. He also advocated the 
arrangement of individual settlements into larger blocs 
adjacent to Palestinian built-up areas80 • This approach was 
80 Weizman devotes all of Chapter 2 in his book to a study of Ariel 
Sharon's settlement strategies and the impact of their 
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detailed in a number of plans for settlement construction in 
the Occupied Territories, including the 1977 Sharon Plan, and 
in the 1978 World Zionist Organization (WZO) Plan for 
settlement in the Occupied Territories (Weizman 2007, Lein 
and Weizman 2002, Zertal and Eldar 2006). The impact of 
Sharon's settlement strategies can be observed in the 
previous Figure 4 on page 99, which shows not only the 
fragmentation of Palestinian built-up areas, but also, the 
organization of clusters of Jewish settlements adjacent to 
Palestinian built-up areas: see in particular the dark blue 
areas on the map, together with the medium and light blue 
areas of land they control. 
Oslo and the formalization of fragmentation 
Ironically perhaps, the fragmentation of Palestinian 
inhabited areas in the west Bank was formalized with the Oslo 
Accords (Rabbani 2006), a series of agreements signed between 
the Israel and the PLO between 1993 and 199981 • With the 
signing of the Declaration of principles, Israel and the 
Palestine Liberation Organization agreed to recognize each 
other's legitimacy and negotiate a permanent peace. During 
these negotiations Israel would gradually transfer 
implementation, which is still felt today, see pp.57-85 in weizman 
2007. 
81 These agreements were comprised of the September 1993 Declaration 
of Principles ("Oslo"), the September 1995 Interim Agreement ("Oslo 
II"), the January 1997 Hebron Protocol, the October 1998 Wye 
Memorandum, and the September 1999 Sharm al-Shaykh Agreement 
(Rabbani 2001). The Accords were denounced by many Palestinians who 
perceived them as a means of formalizing Palestinian subordination 
to Israeli national interests (Cleary, 2002). For a detailed and 
critical analysis of the Oslo Accords, see Roy 2007, Falah 2005, 
Rabbani 2001 and 2006, Sontag 2001, and Zriek 2003. 
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responsibility for Palestinian self-governance in parts of 
the Occupied Territories to the newly created Palestinian 
Authority (Sontag 2001 p.78). The Declaration of Principles 
also stipulated a five-year framework for negotiating the 
territorial borders of a future Palestinian state. 
The Accords, and especially the Oslo II agreement signed in 
1995, spatially reconfigured the West Bank into three zones: 
Area A, to be under full control of the Palestinian 
Authority; Area B, to be under shared Palestinian (civil) and 
Israeli (military) control; and Area C, which would remain 
under full Israeli control. These Areas are indicated in 
Figure 5, on the following page. 
However, instead of providing Palestinians with control over 
contiguous areas of land, the Accords' territorial 
stipulations served to formalize the fragmentation of 
Palestinian-inhabited areas of the West Bank. Area A, over 
which the Palestinian Authority (PA) was to have full 
control, consisted of no less than 13 separate areas 
scattered across the West Bank, and separated from each other 
by distances in miles, by Israeli settlements and by bypass 
roads. What's more, Palestinian controlled Areas A and B were 
completely surrounded by Israeli-controlled territory (Area 
C), and the entry and exit points to all Palestinian-
controlled areas would remain under Israeli military control. 
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Figure 5 Territorial divisions as per the Oslo II Agreement signed in 1995 
Area A would fall under full Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B under jOint 
Palestinian (civilian) and Israeli (security) control; and Area C, full Israeli security and 
civilian control. 
Source: Motro 2005. 
Israeli settlement construction continued at an accelerated 
pace during the Oslo negotiation process between 1993 and 
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2000. I refer the reader back to Figure 3 on page 97, which 
shows that some of the highest construction rates for new 
settlements built in the West Bank took place during the 
period of 1994 to 2000, and between 1996 and 2000 in 
particular82 • Thirty new settlements were built in the West 
Bank during the Oslo negotiation period (Roy 2007, Falah 
2005). As well, the number of houses built within existing 
settlements grew dramatically, and the settler population in 
the West Bank more than doubled (Falah 2005)83. 
Perhaps most ironically, "The peace process between Israel 
and the Palestinians did not lead to the dismantling of even 
one settlement, and the settlements even grew substantially 
in area and population during this period" (Lein and Weizman 
2002 p.8). Nor did the Oslo process bring any real 
territorial gains for Palestinians. According to Palestinian 
82 Note that the period under Ehud Barak extends to 2001, the year 
following the collapse of the negotiation framework. In 1996, the 
Israeli government agreed not to establish any new settlements but 
insisted on its right to continue construction within existing 
settlements. The Israeli human rights groups B'Tselem and Peace Now 
have reported substantial violations of this commitment, including 
most notably, the construction of over 100 illegal settlements 
(known as outposts) by mainly right wing religious settlers; the 
building of infrastructure such as roads and sewage treatment 
plants to support the settlements, and the routing of the 
Separation Barrier east of the Green Line to include a larger 
number of settlements within its path; see 
<www.btselem.org/english/settlements/20090227_settlement_expansion. 
asp> and 
<www.peacenow.org.il/site/en/peace.asp?pi=62&docid=3550&pos=4>. 
83 During this time Israel also substantially expanded its extensive 
roads system throughout the west Bank. Thousands of dunams of 
Palestinian lands were seized using military orders for the 
purposes of road construction. Like the settlements, the roads 
network that connect the settlements to each other and to Israel, 
also fragments Palestinian inhabited territory and prevents the 
contiguity of Palestinian controlled areas. For details on the 
roads system see Lein 2004. 
104 
legal scholar Raef Zriek (2003), the Oslo accords were 
inherently flawed, because they never granted any control 
over territory whatsoever to the Palestinian Authority (PA), 
"the PA has authority only over the people, not the land. 
Thus, under Oslo, Israel was able to build new settlements, 
to use water resources, and to build bypass roads allover 
the occupied territories, as if there were no PA at all" 
(Zriek 2003 p.42). And, as Rabbani (2006) observes, by the 
year 2000, seven years after the Declaration of Principles 
was signed, the Palestinian Authority controlled less than 
one fifth of the West Bank. 
From fragmentation to enclavization 
The Oslo process was abandoned by the government of Israel 
following the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada84 • While an 
analysis of Oslo's failure lies outside the scope of this 
research, it is worth citing Israeli architects Rafi Segal 
and Eyal Weizman (2003), who note that perhaps Oslo was 
doomed to fail because, despite comprising less that two 
percent of the total land in the West Bank, Israeli 
84 The al-Aqsa intifada (also called the second intifada) began in 
September 2000, when then-Likud party leader Ariel Sharon visited 
the Haram Al-Sharif (Noble Sanctuary) in Jerusalem, sparking 
outrage among Palestinians, many of whom perceived his visit to be 
antagonistic. While Sharon's visit was the catalyst for the 
outbreak of the intifada, it also represented a tipping point: it 
was a symptom of Palestinian frustration with the Oslo negotiation 
framework, which had failed to produce any real gains for 
Palestinians, and with worsening conditions in the Occupied 
Territories. 
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settlements have managed to impose complete control and 
fragmentation upon the entire territory there85 • 
Despite the abandonment of the Oslo negotiation process in 
2000, the spatial configuration of the West Bank created by 
Oslo II, notably its divisions into Areas A, Band C, still 
remains in place. What's more, Israel controls all movement 
in and out of these Areas, enforced by the IDF and the 
security forces. Thus in addition to formalizing Palestinian 
territorial fragmentation, the Accords also served to further 
consolidate Israeli control over the whole of the West Bank. 
Since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 2000, 
Palestinian inhabited areas of the West Bank have become 
fragmented to an even greater extent, by Israeli construction 
projects such as settlements and roads but also, the 
Separation Barrier. Israel has been consolidating smaller 
settlements into large blocs that jut deep into the West 
Bank, further interrupting Palestinian territorial 
contiguity. It has continued to expand the road system that 
crisscrosses and bisects the West Bank, fragmenting 
Palestinian areas even further while also separating many of 
85 Many scholars link settlement construction and the fragmentation 
of Palestinian areas to an Israeli strategy of preventing 
Palestinian sovereignty (Aronson 1990; Gorenberg 2006, Falah 2005, 
Roy 2007), or at least limiting it to a series of non-contiguous 
areas (Halper 2006, weizman 2007). Matityahu Drobless, author of 
the 1978 WZO Plan, stated in 1980 that, UBeing cut off by Jewish 
settlements the minority [Palestinian] population will find it 
difficult to form a territorial and political continuity" (in Cook 
and Hanieh 2006 p.342) [My addition to the text]. A strategy of 
fragmentation would not only disrupt Palestinian territorial 
contiguity; it would also serve to prevent the creation of a future 
viable Palestinian state, expressed in terms of a Upolitical 
continuity". On the failure of Oslo see also Said 2000, Roy 2007, 
Falah 2005, Rabbani 2001, Sontag 2001, and Zriek 2003. 
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them from each other. Barriers - most notably the Separation 
Barrier - but also checkpoints, roadblocks and gates have 
splintered the West Bank into approximately 200 areas or 
cells around Palestinian population centers (Weizman 2007)86. 
Together these projects have resulted in what Falah (2005) 
calls the enclavization of Palestinian space - the division 
of Palestinian inhabited areas into smaller, separate and 
disconnected enclaves. For Falah (2005) the creation of 
Palestinian territorial enclaves reduces interflow between 
them and serves to heighten Israeli control over them, 
because the Israeli security forces control all of the entry 
and exit points to these Palestinian enclaves, and therefore, 
all movement in and out of them. 
Palestinian enemy Others 
Palestinians in the West Bank have been living under Israeli 
military rule for over 40 years. Over the course of the 
occupation Palestinian control over territory has been 
drastically eroded, while Israeli control over the whole of 
the territory there has been consolidated. Israeli 
construction projects have grown almost exponentially, 
completely fragmenting Palestinian areas. 
Palestinians living in the West Bank are subject to Israeli 
military rule, in contrast to the Jewish settlers who are 
governed by Israeli civilian laws. Palestinians may only 
travel between the various territorial islands or enclaves at 
86 For a detailed discussion of the Separation Barrier see Weizman 
2007 pp.161-184, Cook and Hanieh 2006, and Lein and Cohen-Lifshitz 
2005. On checkpoints see Weizman 2007. 
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the discretion of the Israeli security forces, who wield 
ultimate control over these Palestinian inhabited areas, but 
also, over Palestinian movement across territory, to be 
discussed in the following chapter. Jewish Israelis travel on 
proprietary and exclusively Jewish roads, while Palestinians 
must use alternate routes, resulting in delays, when travel 
by road is permitted at all (Lein 2004). All of these 
measures have produced Palestinians in the West Bank as 
inferior Others to Jewish Israelis and to the Jewish settlers 
there in particular. As Hasso observes, 
For Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, their 
spatial-racial subordination expresses itself through a 
variety of mechanisms: Israeli checkpoints, special 
roads for Jews that avoid Palestinian villages and 
towns, segregated marketplaces and restaurants, Jewish 
settlements, Palestinian refugee camps, special 
identification cards, colour-coded license plates ... and 
most recently, the apartheid wall that has further 
segmented the west Bank and occupied Jerusalem" (2005 
p.25). 
Peleg (1994) observes that Israel's conquest of the West Bank 
and Gaza in 1967 led to a rise in the perception by many 
Israelis of Palestinians not only as inferior Others but as 
ultimate, enemy Others. These enemy Others are being 
spatially confined within the West Bank, by the Separation 
Barrier. with the construction of the Barrier, the spatial 
segregation and separation of Palestinian and Jewish 
territory - but also of Palestinian and Israeli Jewish bodies 
- is being implemented as never before. Here I remind the 
reader that the Barrier is being built under the auspices of 
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the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and much of it, on private 
Palestinian land seized ostensibly for "temporary" military 
necessity. 
The elusive ideal of Israeli wholeness 
Since 1967 Israeli control over territory in the West Bank 
has been inextricably linked to military rule and to the 
military occupation of Palestinian inhabited territory. While 
construction projects and the Jewish settlements in 
particular have enabled Israel to control the whole of the 
territory in the West Bank, Israeli control is only possible 
if combined with military occupation and military rule 
imposed on Palestinians residing there. 
Israel's construction projects, and the settlements in 
particular, have completely altered the spatial configuration 
of the West Bank, fragmenting a substantial amount of 
Palestinian inhabited territory in the process. But they have 
also created a series of Israeli territorial fragments, 
albeit ones that are better connected to Israel and to each 
other than Palestinian ones are (refer back to Area C in 
Figure 3 on page 97 and Figure 5 on page 103). What's more, 
the settlements, like the occupation itself, have created 
divisions among Jewish Israelis, many of whom believe that 
their government should dismantle all or at least some of the 
settlements. These internal divisions have resulted in a 
certain degree of fragmentation within Jewish Israeli society 
itself (Zertel and Eldar; Pappe 2006-b). The current spatial 
configuration in the West Bank allows Israel to assert 
control over the whole of the territory there, however it 
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also ultimately attests to the impossibility of the Israeli 
ideal of wholeness. 
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Chapter 3 
The Palestinian body, the corporeal effects of Occupation, 
and the body of the martyr 
This chapter focuses on the Palestinian body under occupation 
in the West Bank and Gaza, and it identifies some of the of 
effects of Israeli spatial practices on the Palestinian body 
there - what I term corporeal effects. Since the start of the 
second Palestinian intifada in September 2000, Israeli 
spatial practices in the Occupied Territories have 
increasingly sought to control and contain Palestinian 
bodies. They have done so primarily through the imposition of 
severe restrictions on Palestinian movement across territory. 
This chapter also examines the body of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber or martyr, as a weapon of resistance deployed 
against the occupation and against Israel. It considers the 
visual depiction of the whole body of the Palestinian martyr 
- the istishhadi - in commemorative posters produced and 
disseminated by the Palestinian groups that deploy theml. In 
these posters, the body of the martyr is visually depicted as 
an equal to the body of the IDF soldier. The body of the 
martyr in these posters presents an idealized image of the 
Palestinian nation as a whole, strong and powerful one, the 
same as Israel. 
1 The terms suicide bomber, martyr and istishhadi are elaborated on 
in detail beginning on page 131, page 144, and page 145. 
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Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement 
Since September 2000, Israel has imposed severe restrictions 
on movement on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. These 
measures have effectively halted all Palestinian passage 
between these two territorial entities, in and out of Gaza, 
and into Israel (Barsella 2007, Haas 2002), as well as 
between the various Palestinian inhabited enclaves in the 
West Bank. Measures used to restrict Palestinian movement 
include a network of permanent and "flying" checkpoints 
staffed by the IDF, gates, fences, and physical barriers 
including the Separation Barrier. These enable the Israeli 
security forces to control all Palestinian movement across 
territory in the West Bank and Gaza2 • In addition to these 
physical obstacles to freedom of movement, the Israeli 
security forces enforce a series of prohibitions and 
restrictions on movement. These include issuing - and more 
often, denying - permits for travel by vehicle between the 
various enclaves in the West Bank and into Israeli the 
prohibition of Palestinian travel on certain roadsi and the 
use of closure to halt all movement in and out of enclaves in 
2 As of the end of June 2009, the IDF had established 60 permanent 
checkpoints inside the West Bank, and 39 permanent checkpoints 
between the West Bank and Israel. In March 2009, there were 541 
physical obstructions in the West Bank. See 
<www.btselem.org/English/Freedom_of_Movement/Statistics.asp>[AcCeSS 
ed October 8, 2009]. For a detailed analysis of restrictions on 
Palestinian movement as the result of checkpoints see MachsomWatch 
2004. On the Separation Barrier, See Lein and Cohen-Lifshitz 2005, 
and Cook and Hanieh 2006. 
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the West Bank and in Gaza, trapping Palestinians in their 
towns and villages for prolonged periods of time3 • 
Restrictions on movement have resulted in the virtual 
confinement of Palestinians in the West Bank to enclaves 
there, while for all intents and purposes trapping 
Palestinian residents of Gaza within one single enclave. 
While many of these measures have been in effect since 1991, 
the scope and duration of restrictions on Palestinian freedom 
of movement since 2000 have been unprecedented (Barsella 
2007, Haas 2002)4. Barsella observes that since 2000, 
"Palestinian freedom of movement has turned from a 
fundamental human right into a privilege that Israel grants 
or withholds as it deems fit" (2007 p.S). Several Israeli and 
international human rights organizations consider these 
restrictions on Palestinian freedom of movement to be a form 
3 On the roads system and travel restrictions on vehicles see Lein 
2004, and Barsella 2007. On closures see Haas 2002. Details on all 
of the above restrictions and prohibitions can also be found in 
Barsella 2007. 
4 Barsella (2007) notes that from 1972 until 1991, a general permit 
system allowed most Palestinian residents of the Occupied 
Territories to travel freely between the west Bank and Gaza and 
into East Jerusalem and Israel. During the first Gulf War in 1991 
Israel changed its policy, from then on requiring Palestinians to 
obtain travel permits to enter East Jerusalem and Israel. It also 
instituted checkpoints at crossings into Israel. In March 1993, 
Israel declared a general closure on the Occupied Territories and 
enshrined its policy requiring Palestinians to obtain travel 
permits, in law. From that time onward it issued entry permits into 
Israel from the Occupied Territories only sparingly, gradually 
imposing more and more restrictions on Palestinian movement. These 
measures are also detailed in Hass 2002. Barsella (2007) further 
notes that since the outbreak of the second intifada in September 
2000 it has become almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain 
travel permits, even for travel between the various areas or 
enclaves in the west Bank, and that even those who do possess 
travel permits are often refused passage through checkpoints by the 
IDF. 
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of collective punishment that contravenes international 
humanitarian laws. In contrast, Jewish Israelis enjoy complete 
freedom of movement between Israel and the West Bank, and 
across the West Bank, on roads systems reserved exclusively 
for them (Lein 2004). 
Barsella (2007) observes that the various restrictions that 
Israel has imposed on Palestinians in the West Bank have 
served to fragment it into six larger enclaves, each of which 
has been further fragmented into smaller ones. Israel 
controls all movement in and out of these enclaves through 
the use of security perimeters and checkpoints. Figure 1 on 
the following page shows the division of the West Bank into 
enclaves ("cantons"). It also shows the security perimeters 
created around Palestinian built up areas by the Israeli 
security forces, that serve to restrict Palestinian movement 
in and out of these enclaves. Note in particular the blue 
security perimeters around Palestinian inhabited areas as 
indicated. 
5 See for example, Oxfam et. al. 2008, MachsomWatch 2004, Chapter 5 
in Lein 2005, and Chapter 4 in Barsella 2007. 
114 
The West Bank After Oslo: Control and Separation- June 2002 
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This graphic shows the Palestinian cantons and enclaves in the West Bank, 
together with the security perimeters and checkpoints used to restrict movement 
between them. 
11 5 
In 1995 Israel surrounded the Gaza Strip with a fence, making 
travel in and out of Gaza without Israeli permission 
impossible (Lein 2005). Israel asserts that its military 
occupation of Gaza ended in 2005 when it dismantled the 
Jewish settlements there and unilaterally removed its 
security forces from within Gaza. In reality, however, Israel 
continues to cont~ol the enti~e te~~ito~y, notably, 9Y 
controlling all movement in and out of Gaza. Israel controls 
all of the entry and exit points into and out of Gaza, 
including those that lead into Egypt, Gaza's ports and its 
only airport, its air space and territorial waters, and the 
movement of people and goods 6 • Gaza has been under closure 
since Barnas won a majority in the Jan~ary 2006 ~alestinian 
parliamentary elections, and for all intents and purposes 
been sealed off from the outside world? Since this time, 
harsh restrictions on movement have effectively halted nearly 
all Palestinian movement in and out of Gaza (Lein 2005, 
B'Tselem 2008)8. These measures have prompted Israeli human 
rights groups ~'Tselem and ij~oked Center for the Pefense of 
the Individual to categorize Gaza as one big prison (Lein 
2005)9. 
6 Even Palestinians travelling into Egypt through the Rafah crossing 
point require permission from Israel to do so (Lein 2005). The Gaza 
airport was closed by Israel in 2000 and its runways bombed in 
2001, rendering it useless. 
? On the Palestinian elections see Usher 2006. 
8 See also B'Tselem, The Gaza Strip After Disengagement. 
9 See also B'Tselem 2007. 
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Confinement to enclaves and Palestinian otherness 
The enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza to which Palestinians 
are confined, may be considered what philosopher Judith 
Butler defines as zones of abjection, "those 'unlivable' and 
'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless 
densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject" (1993 p.3)10. 
Butler asks, "Which bodies come to matter-and why?" (1993 
p.xii). She observes that some bodies matter less than 
others. For her, abject bodies are those that do not matter, 
or that matter less. Following Butler, the Palestinian body 
under Israeli occupation matters less than the Jewish Israeli 
body does, and it may therefore be considered an inferior, 
Other body to the Jewish Israeli bodyl1. Unlike the Jewish 
10 Notions of Palestinian subjectivity are examined more closely in 
the following chapter. Butler's concept of abjection (1993) emerges 
within a larger theoretical framework in which she examines the 
relationships between power, subjectivity and the sexed body. It 
would be impossible to write about abjection without making 
reference to the work of Julia Kristeva (1982) who explores 
abjection as a type of crisis in demarcating boundaries (notably 
between the self and the Other) that originates in the body's 
traumatic separation (exclusion) from the mother's body, at birth. 
For Kristeva abjection is linked to that which is expelled from the 
body. Butler's notion of zones of abjection is more relevant to the 
present writing, linked directly as it is to my interests in space 
and territory. Kristeva's writings about abjection have influenced 
numerous scholars, including Butler. Note that my understanding of 
Kristeva also owes much to Phelan (1998). 
11 I use the term inferior Other rather than abject because of the 
latter term's association with a psychoanalytic reading. As a 
counterpoint to the Other Palestinian body I refer the reader back 
to the Jewish body ideals discussed in the previous chapter as 
being those of health and strength, and embodied by the chalutz, 
the Sabra and the IDF soldier. That chapter also identified the 
normative Israeli Jewish body as Ashkenazi, male, able bodied and 
heterosexual. A discussion of Jewish Israeli bodies that may be 
considered Other (for example women, queers, Mizrachi and Sephardi 
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Israeli body, the Palestinian body is subject to Israeli-
imposed restrictions on movement that serve to contain and 
confine it within enclaves, and this in contrast to Israeli 
Jewish bodies - and those of the Jewish settlers in 
particular - who enjoy complete freedom of movement across 
territory. Here I also refer back to Stuart Hall's notion 
(1990) of the colonized subject as one who is created by, and 
is considered an inferior Other to, the colonizer. 
Following Butler's observations (1993), Palestinian corporeal 
otherness is spatially produced. The Palestinian body is 
produced as an inferior Other by virtue of its confinement to 
the zones of abjection - enclaves in the West Bank and Gaza 
and this in contrast to Jewish Israelis who move freely 
across territory. Further, within these zones of abjection, 
the Palestinian body suffers the corporeal effects of spatial 
containment and the lack of freedom of movement: the 
Palestinian body becomes weak, unhealthy, and unable to 
sustain itself; at the extreme, the body suffers death and 
demise. 
The corporeal effects of spatial containment and restrictions 
on Palestinian movement 
Much has been written about the ways in which Israeli 
restrictions on Palestinian movement violate Palestinian 
Jews) lies outside the scope of this research; see for example 
Massad 2006 pp.55-76. 
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human rights12. This research considers the impact of these 
practices on the Palestinian body, by focusing on three key 
effects - what I term corporeal effects - of spatial 
containment and a lack of freedom of movement on the 
Palestinian body in the Occupied Territories. First, those 
that result from inadequate living conditions in the enclaves 
or zones of abjection. Second, violence directed against the 
Palestinian body - including violence that occurs in the 
enclaves themselves as well as at the checkpoints and 
barriers designed to control and contain Palestinian movement 
between them. Third, the deadly or mortal effects that 
ultimately result in the body's death and demise. 
Confinement to uninhabitable zones 
The Israeli restrictions on movement that contain the 
Palestinian body within enclaves also subject it to a lack of 
adequate sustenance, notably the denial of food, fuel and 
electricity, potable water, heat, medical care and 
employment. In addition to restricting the movement of 
Palestinian bodies, Israeli spatial practices have since 2000 
(and especially so since Barnas' election victory in 2006) 
also restricted the movement of goods in and out of 
Palestinian enclaves13 • As a result, the confined Palestinian 
12 See for example Falah 2005, Halper 2006, Segal and Weizman 2003, 
Weizman 2007, Barsella 2007, Lein 2005, Lein 2004, and B'Tselem 
2008. 
13 These goods include food; raw materials required for agriculture, 
industry and infrastructure maintenance; fuel for heating and for 
generating electricity; money in the form of foreign aid destined 
to be administered by the Palestinian Authority as well as the 
salaries paid to its employees; and medical supplies. In addition 
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body experiences hunger and malnutrition, rendering it weak 
and vulnerable to disease. The lack of access to water, fuel 
and electricity also take their toll on the body: without 
them the body cannot adequately hydrate itself nor maintain a 
suitable level of hygiene; the body suffers the effects of 
the cold; without access to infrastructure such as sewage 
treatment facilities the body risks exposure to filth and 
therefore to illness and diseases. 
What's more, the lack of electricity and fuel makes it 
impossible for medical facilities to function smoothly, and 
impacting the health of the Palestinian body. Israeli 
restrictions on movement make it almost impossible for 
Palestinians to travel to obtain medical care. Consequently, 
the body experiences illness, pain and unnecessary suffering 
as the result of these restrictions. For example it is not 
unusual for pregnant women to have no choice but to give 
birth under difficult conditions at checkpoints after being 
refused passage to hospital; for patients suffering from 
chronic illnesses to become sicker as the result of being 
denied permission to travel so as to obtain medical 
treatments; for the wounded to be denied access to hospitals; 
to restricting the entry of fuel into the West Bank and Gaza, 
Israel destroyed Gaza's only electricity generating plant in June 
2006, resulting in chronic and severe electricity shortages that 
make it impossible to refrigerate food, sustain businesses, operate 
sewage treatments plants, and run hospital and health care 
facilities; for details see Li and Lein 2006. For details on 
restrictions on the movement of goods and their impact on the 
Palestinian economy see Roy 2006, Ajluni 2003, and Farsakh 2000. 
The situation is especially acute in Gaza where the economy has for 
all intents and purposes collapsed and over 80 per cent of the 
population is dependent on international humanitarian aid (Oxfam et 
a12008). 
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and for ambulances to be prevented from reaching the sick 
and/or medical facilities 14 • 
Thus the Palestinian body, confined to enclaves and deprived 
of that which is necessary to sustain, nurture and heal it, 
becomes a weak and vulnerable body, a sick and suffering body 
- and here again in contrast to the healthy and strong 
Jewish-Israeli body that enjoys complete freedom of movement 
as well as substantially more access to health care and other 
forms of sustenance. 
Violence 
The confined Palestinian body is also subject to physical 
violence and abuse, inflicted most often by the Israeli 
security forces in the Occupied Territories, but also by 
Jewish settlers 15 • In the West Bank and in Hebron in 
14 Physicians for Human Rights-Israel and B'Tselem estimate that 
ambulances are able to reach the sick only 30 per cent of the time. 
They also note that hospital births dropped from 95 per cent before 
the second intifada began in 2000 to less than 59 per cent in 2003; 
see Swisa 2003. For a detailed analysis of the impact of 
restrictions to Palestinian movement on Palestinian health care, 
see MachsomWatch 2004 pp.38-47. 
15 It must be also mentioned that since 2007, intra-Palestinian 
violence has come to target Palestinian bodies in the Occupied 
Territories. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group and 
B'Tselem have reported numerous incidents of intra-Palestinian 
violence as the result of an ongoing conflict between Hamas and 
Fatah. These include incidents of beatings, politically-motivated 
arrests and torture by Fatah security forces in the West Bank and 
by Hamas security forces in Gaza. For details see Freed 2008, and 
B'Tselem: Severe human rights violations in intra-Palestinian 
clashes (Undated). Human Rights Watch also notes an alarming rise 
in Palestinian violence against women and girls including assault, 
rape and murder; see Deif and Mair 2006. A more detailed 
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particular, the Palestinian body is vulnerable to assault by 
Jewish settlers who throw stones, fire weapons and beat 
Palestinians, often with impunity 16. The body may be bruised 
and broken by the impact of plastic bullets deployed by the 
Israeli security forces, notably during demonstrations. The 
Israeli security forces - despite a 2005 ruling to the 
contrary by the Israeli High Court of Justice continue to 
use Palestinians, and children especially, as human shields 
when entering areas they consider to be hostile and/or when 
attempting to arrest suspected militants; these actions often 
result in damage to the Palestinian body, not that of the 
Israeli soldier17 • 
The contained Palestinian body is also subject to violence at 
checkpoints and crossings: The body wilts in the heat as it 
is made to wait for hours on end, often without food or 
water; it is subject to searches by IDF soldiers; it is 
crushed against other bodies as dozens of them at a time are 
crammed into turnstiles at crossing points. There the body 
may also be subject to beatings by the Israeli Border Police. 
Palestinians are often subject to arrest at crossings, and 
when this occurs the body is bound with handcuffs and 
examination of intra-Palestinian violence lies outside the scope of 
this research. 
16 Settlers are also responsible for the destruction of Palestinian 
private property including homes, orchards and vehicles. Ninety per 
cent of Palestinian complaints about settler violence were closed 
without ever being investigated by the Israeli police in the year 
2007 (B'Tselem 2008). For a detailed account of violence against 
Palestinians by the Israeli security forces see Hoffstadter 2008. 
Restrictions on Palestinian movement often prevent them from 
traveling to the administrative offices where complaints against 
Jewish settlers and/or the Israeli security forces may be 
registered. 
17 For details see <www.btselem.org/english/Human_Shields/>. 
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restrained, and placed in detention and/or sOlitary 
confinement. The detained Palestinian body is deprived of 
sustenance for extended periods oftimei it is also subject 
to beatings and to violent interrogation techniques as well 
as to torture18 • 
Mortal effects 
The confined Palestinian body has also become increasingly 
vulnerable to death. Severe restrictions on movement can 
prevent the receipt of life-saving medical treatment, often 
resulting in death. As well, the Palestinian body is also the 
target of deadly Israeli military strikes in the Occupied 
Territories19 • Butler's notion of the zones of abjection as 
"unlivable" zones (1993 p.3) is pertinent here. 
Since 2000, restrictions on movement have prevented 
Palestinians from travelling through checkpoints and 
crossings to obtain life-saving medical treatment. The ailing 
Palestinian body remains confined, despite a desperate need 
for medical attention, eventually resulting in death - often 
a preventable death. In many cases death could have been 
18 For details see Machsomwatch 2004. 
19 Neve Gordon (2008) notes the disproportionate number of 
Palestinians killed by Israelis during the second intifada. Citing 
data from Israeli, American and Palestinian sources, Gordon 
estimates that 4046 Palestinians were killed by Israelis between 
September 2000 and December 2006, as compared to 1016 Israelis 
killed by Palestinians during the same period. Statistics for the 
same period from B'Tselem differ slightly: 4791 Palestinians killed 
by the Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories, as 
compared to 490 Israeli civilians, and 90 Israeli security force 
personnel killed by Palestinians. See 
<www.btselem.org/english/Statistics/Casualties.asp>[ACcessed 
October 10, 2009]. 
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avoided had travel permission been granted: Palestinians 
wounded in attacks, newborn infants, cancer and dialysis 
patients, stroke and heart attack victims (among others) have 
all perished as the result of being delayed or detained by 
the IDF at checkpoints, or refused permits for travel to 
obtain crucial life-saving medical treatment20 • Consequently 
the confined Palestinian body suffers the effects of illness 
or injury needlessly, and at the extreme resulting in a slow, 
painful and often, preventable death. 
The Palestinian body may also be fatally targeted in the 
zones of abjection. Since the year 2000, the Israeli 
government has used targeted assassinations to kill suspected 
Palestinian militants and political leaders, more often than 
20 Advanced medical treatment facilities are generally not available 
in the Occupied Territories, making it necessary for Palestinian 
patients to travel to Israel or Egypt to seek medical care, most 
notably for cancer patients. The situation is especially grave for 
Palestinian residents of Gaza, who are systematically denied exit 
permits to obtain medical care in Egypt. For example, Fawziyeh a-
Darin died of a heart attack when IDF soldiers refused passage 
through a checkpoint to an ambulance taking her to hospital, on 
February 26, 2008; Ahmad Wakhman, a week-old infant, died in 
December 2006 when IDF soldiers delayed his passage to hospital for 
urgent treatment - soldiers beat the driver of the vehicle who 
attempted to explain the urgency of the situation; Mahmoud Kamal 
Taha, a cancer patient, died in October 2007 after the IDF delayed 
his entry from Gaza into Israel for 10 days despite the fact that 
he had a permit to travel; for details on these and other instances 
see B'Tselem 2008. According to B'Tselem, between September 2000 
and December 2008, 66 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories died 
after medical care was delayed due to restrictions on movement. See 
<www.btselem.org/English/Statistics/Casualties_month_table.asp?Cate 
gory=21&region=TER>[AcCessed October 11, 2009]. Even patients with 
permission to travel to receive medical treatment are often denied 
passage by the Israeli security forces at crossing points (Oxfam et 
al 2008). For more details on the impact of travel restrictions on 
acute Palestinian health needs, see Aghbariyya et al 2007. 
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not killing civilians in the process21 • The Palestinian body 
is strategically targeted from above, and destroyed by mortar 
fire launched from Israeli helicopters. Weizman further notes 
that the IDF uses the terms "focused obstruction" or "focused 
preemption" (2007 p.244) to imply a swift and sanitized 
elimination of the body. In reality however, the destruction 
of the body from above is a bloody and messy affair. The body 
is reduced to bits of bone and blood and limbs and organs 
that scatter and stick to everything it comes into contact 
with: land, buildings, other bodies22 • The bodies of innocent 
bystanders are often destroyed in the process. The 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights notes that 742 
Palestinians were killed in extra-judicial killings between 
September 2000 and December 20, 2008 of which 512 persons 
were deliberately targeted by Israel and 230 were innocent 
bystanders23 • 
21 weizman (2007) notes that most states have at one time or another 
conducted assassinations of their enemies' military and political 
leadership. He also observes that while Israel has long used such 
assassinations against Palestinian and Lebanese resistance, "since 
the beginning of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 and 
increasingly since the evacuation of Gaza, targeted assassinations 
have become the most significant and frequent form of Israeli 
military attack" (p.23B). His study was published prior to 
operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 200B-2009, discussed on the 
following page. Targeted assassinations (also called extra-judicial 
executions) are illegal under international law. 
22 For example the documentary film Death in Gaza opens with a 
graphic scene in which Palestinian children collect the bloody bits 
of flesh of an assassinated Palestinian militant, for his burial. 
23 See <www.pchrgaza.org/alaqsaintifada.html> [Accessed October 10, 
2009]; B'Tselem's figures for the same period differ somewhat: 387 
persons directly targeted and 234 innocent bystanders; see 
<www.btselem.org/english/statistics/Casualties.asp> [Accessed 
October 10, 2009]. 
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The Palestinian civilian body is also increasingly vulnerable 
to death by IDF gunfire. Since September 2000 Israel has 
enacted open-fire regulations that allow IDF soldiers to open 
fire on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories even if 
their own lives are not in danger (B'Tselem 2008). In Gaza, 
the body is vulnerable to perishing in the "death zones", 
buffer areas that that surround Palestinian cities, refugee 
camps, towns, coastal and border areas - IDF soldiers are 
permitted to fatally target anyone who enters them (B'Tselem 
2008 p.6). 
Butler's notion of "unlivable" (1993 p.3) was manifest 
perhaps to a new level during Operation Cast Lead, Israel's 
military attack on Gaza from December 27, 2008 to January 18, 
2009. Operation Cast Lead transformed all of Gaza into one 
single death zone: Palestinian residents of Gaza were 
forbidden to leave the territory because Israeli restrictions 
on Palestinian movement remained in effect, consequently, 
every Palestinian living in Gaza risked being killed there24 • 
Israel's military attack on a spatially confined population 
in Gaza left approximately 1,400 Palestinians dead, and 5,380 
wounded25 • Most of them were civilians (United Nations 2009). 
24 Egypt, which shares responsibility with Israel for the Rafah 
crossing into Egypt, refused to allow Palestinians passage through 
this crossing and must be held partly responsible; see Kadman 2009. 
25 The data on wounded Palestinians in the text above is provided by 
the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza, and cited in The 
Humanitarian Monitor (2009). The United Nations report further 
notes that, "the percentage of civilians among those killed are 
generally consistent and raise very serious concerns with regard to 
the way Israel conducted the military operations in Gaza" (2009 
pp.l0-ll). The same report also cites three Israeli civilians and 
one soldier killed by Palestinian rocket fire into Israel, and nine 
IDF soldiers killed in combat, four of them in friendly fire 
incidents (United Nations 2009). The report condemned the ongoing 
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The United Nations concluded that, "the direct targeting and 
arbitrary killing of Palestinian civilians is a violation of 
the right to life" (2009 p.16)[Italics added]26. Butler's 
notion of unlivable (1993) bears reiteration here27 • 
In addition to killing and maiming Palestinian bodies by 
gunfire and mortar fire, the confined Palestinian body 
suffered a host of other corporeal effects resulting from 
Operation Cast Lead. These include the infliction of severe 
burns induced by the use of white phosphorous; penetrating 
detention of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit by Palestinian militants, as 
well as the launching of rockets into Israel, which the report 
notes, have also caused profound trauma among Israeli civilians 
together with damage to property and economic and social life. The 
report accuses both the Israeli government and Palestinian militant 
groups of waging attacks on civilian populations that constitute 
war crimes under international law. The Israeli government did not 
cooperate with the united Nations' investigation team and has 
rejected the report's findings; see in particular the Israeli 
government's official statement to this effect at < 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/MFA+Spokesman/2009/Pre 
ss+releases/Israel_reaction_decision_UN_Human_Rights_Council_16-
Oct-2009.htm>[Accessed 23 October 2009]. The Israeli MFA maintains 
a comprehensive website outlining the Israeli government's 
perspective on Operation Cast Lead, see 
<www.mfa.gov.il/GazaFacts>[Accessed October 9, 2009 and October 23, 
2009]. 
26 See in particular pp.198-247 in United Nations 2009 for details 
on the deliberate targeting of civilians; see also B'Tselem 2009. 
27 with regard to Butler's notion of unlivable, it is also 
interesting to note that upon completion of its disengagement from 
Gaza in 2005, Israel claimed that it was no longer responsible for 
ensuring the proper functioning of life there (B'Tselem, The Gaza 
Strip After Disengagement) [italics added]. According to a report 
released by eight international organizations, "The contention by 
Israeli officials that Israel is no longer bound by the laws of 
occupation since it redeployed its forces to the perimeter of the 
Gaza Strip in 2005 is a fallacy. Israel retains effective control 
of the Gaza Strip. Hence, the Israeli authorities are bound by 
their obligations under international humanitarian and human rights 
law to ensure the welfare of the Palestinian population in the OPT 
[Occupied Palestinian Territories]" (Oxfam et.al. 2008, p.6)[My 
addition to the text]. On this point see also Lein 2005. 
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wounds resulting from the use of flechettesi delays in 
receiving medical treatment for wounds sufferedi hunger and 
extreme cold resulting from food and fuel shortages in Gazai 
and disease as the result of IDF attacks on Gaza's sewage 
treatment facili ties28 • 
The body as a weapon of resistance 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber is deployed as a 
weapon of resistance against the Israeli occupation, and one 
that may be located within a larger historical continuum of 
resistance to colonial violence. Here, the body is both the 
target of oppression by the colonizer, and a weapon of 
resistance that seeks to liberate the colonized from colonial 
oppression. Following Fanon (1963), the notion of the body as 
a weapon is inextricably linked to resistance in 
decolonization and national liberation struggles. 
For Fanon (1963), the European colonial project that 
originated in the late 16th century was one whereby the 
colonies provided a source of materials and wealth for the 
colonists. This project was also one of colonial control and 
domination asserted over bodies: the body constitutes perhaps 
the primary object of control in the history of colonization. 
28 These are all detailed in United Nations 2009; see pp.247-253 on 
the use of white phosphorous and flechettes; and pp.253-269 on the 
destruction of food production and water and sewage treatment 
facilities. On white phosphorous, see also Human Rights Watch 2009. 
B'Tselem (2009), citing UN data and satellite photos, also notes 
the extraordinary destruction of homes, property and 
infrastructure: at least 1200 buildings and over 80 hothouses were 
destroyed, and tens of thousands of Palestinians were left 
homeless. 
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In order to control the wealth and resources of their 
colonies - notably territory and raw materials - the European 
colonial powers (Spain, Portugal, England, France and 
Holland) had to control the bodies of the indigenous 
inhabitants of their colonies. Bodies were exploited and 
enslaved so as to provide the labor with which these 
resources could be transformed into wealth for the colonial 
powers. In the process, colonized bodies across the Americas, 
Africa and Asia were subject to acts of violence and 
subjugation including enslavement and harsh labor, rape, 
sterilization, and mass-scale violent decimation through 
massacres and the spread of disease29 • Bodies continue to be 
the object of control in the context of modern colonial 
conflicts but also, ethno-national ones that are the product 
of colonization30 • 
However the body also plays a central role in resisting 
colonial domination and oppression. Fanon (1963) explores the 
notion of resistant bodies and the use of violence in 
decolonization efforts. For Fanon, decolonization - the 
liberation of colonized countries from the yoke of colonial 
powers - is of necessity a violent process, and one that 
occurs in response to the legacy of violent repression 
29 The essays in Pierce and Rao (2006) explore the use of violence 
as a means of disciplining bodies in a variety of colonial contexts 
from the sixteenth century to the present. See also Ballantyne and 
Burton 2005. 
30 For example, the systematic destruction of male bodies and the 
use of rape against women's bodies in ethnic cleansing campaigns in 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda; the use of torture by the United 
States in Central America during the 1980s, and more recently, in 
the context of the war on terror in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay. On 
torture and the war on terror see Strange 2006, Steele 2006, and 
Butler 2008. On violence and the body in Latin America see the 
essays in Aldama 2003. 
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imposed by the colonists on the colonized. Fanon is primarily 
concerned with decolonization in Africa during the mid-20th 
century, however, his observations about the resistant body 
are also relevant to this analysis of the body of the suicide 
bomber, deployed as a weapon in the context of late 20th 
century decolonization and national liberation struggles31 • 
The body of the suicide bomber is strategically deployed with 
a view to forcing the withdrawal of occupying forces from an 
existing nation or to liberate it from occupation, for 
example, as in Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan32 • It is also 
deployed in an effort to force the establishment of a 
national homeland or territory, for example by the Tamil 
minority in Sri Lanka, and by Chechen and Kashmiri 
separatists in Russia and India respectively. 
Thus the deployment of the body of the Palestinian suicide 
bomber as a weapon of resistance against the Israeli 
occupation may be situated within this contemporary continuum 
of resistance to colonial domination and occupation. The 
phenomenon of the Palestinian suicide bomber emerged within a 
larger global context of decolonization and national 
liberation struggles, as well as within the specific context 
of a protracted occupation by the state of Israel, a point 
taken up in more detail shortly. 
31 On the body as a weapon more generally, see in particular the 
excellent work exploring the dirty protests by IRA political 
prisoners in the North of Ireland by Feldman 1991; see also Neti in 
Aldama 2003, pp.59-76. 
32 I cite Iraq (above) with a good deal of hesitation because what 
began as a campaign to end the US-led occupation has escalated into 
a violent intra-national/religious conflict, what may even be 
considered a civil war between Sunni and Shiite Muslim factions. As 
Hafez (2006-a) notes, suicide bombings in Iraq now kill more Iraqis 
than Americans. 
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A succinct introduction to the modern suicide bomber 
The modern suicide bomber is defined as lIan individual who 
willingly uses his or her body to carry or deliver explosives 
or explosive materials to attack, kill, or maim others" 
(Hafez 2006 p.4) [Italics in original]. Further, the attack by 
the suicide bomber "is dependent upon the death of the 
perpetrator" (Institute for Counter Terrorism 2000 p.6) 
[Italics in original]. Most suicide bombers use explosive 
belts directly attached to their bodies. Other methods 
include driving a vehicle rigged with explosives toward the 
target, carrying and then detonating explosives, using 
grenades, and booby-trapping bicycles (Pedahzur 2005) 33. 
Much of the research literature consulted for this study was 
produced within the field of terrorism and security studies, 
and it examines the phenomenon of the suicide bomber within 
the context of global terrorism. This literature seeks 
primarily to define, identify, and prevent suicide terrorism. 
Consequently, much of the literature uses the term suicide 
terrorist and not suicide bomber, as well as the term suicide 
terrorism, to describe acts of suicide bombings. As Hafez 
(2006) observes, the terminology used to describe one who 
explodes her/himself in order to kill others is highly 
controversial and ideologically charged: one person's suicide 
terrorist, suicidal murderer or homicide bomber, is another 
33 For a general overview of suicide bombing, its definitions and 
characteristics, see Pape 2003, Pedahzur, "What is Suicide 
Terrorism?" 2005 pp.1-21, Pedahzur and Perlinger, "Introduction: 
characteristics of suicide attacks" in Pedahzur 2006 pp.1-12, and 
Moghadam, "Defining suicide terrorism" in Pedahzur 2006 pp.13-24. 
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person's freedom fighter or martyr. Moghadam (in Pedahzur 
2006) notes that there can be no universally agreed upon 
definition of the term suicide terrorist or suicide terrorism 
so long as the word terrorism - used mostly in the pejorative 
sense - is itself contested34 • Following Hafez (2006-a), I use 
the term suicide bomber35. 
The era of the modern suicide bomber began in Lebanon in 1983 
(Bloom 2005, Pape 2003, Pedahzur 2006) when Hezbollah 
operatives began using trucks laden with explosives to bomb 
US Marine barracks in Beirut, killing themselves in the 
process. Since that date, suicide bombers have also been 
deployed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam in Sri Lanka; 
by the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey; by Chechen 
separatists against Russian targets; by Kashrniri separatists 
in India; and by al-Qaeda and its affiliated cells and 
splinter groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Indonesia 
34 I have attempted to avoid using the term terrorism because, as 
Coulter-Smith and Owen (2005) point out, it is one that is plagued 
by semantic and ideological difficulties. They further observe a 
great deal of disagreement as to which acts constitute terrorism, 
and which do not, noting that while the term terrorism is generally 
applied to the actions of non-state actors, it may also be used to 
describe the actions of governments. Naaman notes that, "This 
discourse on terrorism also does not account for state terrorism, 
whereby state institutions such as the army or police inflict 
violence on civilian populations" (2007 p.939). On this point see 
also Rage 2003 and Falk 2002. Chapter 1 "Defining Terrorism" in 
Roffman 2006 provides a useful historical overview of the shifting 
meanings of the term terrorism from its popularization during the 
French Revolution to today, however, his analysis ultimately falls 
prey to the limitations noted by Coulter-Smith, Naaman and Rage. 
For a provocative philosophical discussion that examines the 
problematics of moral distinctions made between terrorism and war 
see Chapter 1, uTerrorism" in Asad 2007, pp.7-38. 
35 Rafez (2006-a) and Abufarha (2009) also use the term human bomb. 
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(among others), and in urban centers in the USA and the 
Uni ted Kingdom36. 
For the purposes of this study, I am primarily interested in 
the deployment of suicide bombers as a strategic tactic 
designed to achieve specific political and territorial goals, 
most notably those of national self-determination (Pape 2003) 
and resistance. with this in mind, this study considers 
Palestinian suicide bombers in the context of a protracted 
struggle against Jewish territorial encroachment and with a 
view to resisting the Israeli occupation and achieving 
Palestinian national and territorial rights37 . 
Palestinian suicide bombers 
Bamas was the first Palestinian group to deploy suicide 
bombers, beginning in the year 1993 (Kimhi and Even 2003, 
36 A detailed discussion of these suicide bombing campaigns lies 
outside the scope of this research; for details see Pedahzur 2005 
and 2006, Bloom 2005, Byman 2005, Shay 2004, Reuter 2004, 
Juergensmeyer 2003, and Institute for Counter-Terrorism 2000. For a 
general overview of the contemporary history of suicide bombings 
see Reuter 2004, UIntroduction" in Shay 2004 pp.I-23, and 
UIntroduction" in Bloom 2005 pp.I-18. On the organizational aspects 
of the groups that deploy suicide bombers, see in particular 
Moghadam's Chapter 4 in Pedahzur 2006 pp.81-107. A great deal of 
attention has been devoted to attempting to understand why 
individuals become suicide bombers; see Chapter 6 in Moghadam 2005, 
pp.118-154; Bloom's Chapter 2 in Moghadam 2005, pp.25-53, and 
Chapter 4 in Bloom 2005, pp.76-100. I deal with the issue of motive 
in greater detail in the following chapter when I discuss 
intentionality. 
37 Here again, the term "Jewish" is used here to include Zionist 
settlement on Palestinian inhabited lands prior to 1948, as well as 
Israeli expansion onto Palestinian lands after 1948. 
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Bafez 2006)38. Suicide bombings by Palestinians peaked in 
2001-2002, and have decreased steadily since 2003 39 . The 
earliest incidents of Palestinian suicide bombings (in 1993-
1994) tended to feature the use of explosives in vehicles, 
however these tactics soon shifted to the use of explosive 
belts strapped to the bodies of individual suicide bombers 
(Shay 2004). 
Attacks by Palestinian suicide bombers can be divided into 
two key phases, first, from 1993 to 2000; and second, from 
the start of the al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 to the present 
(Bloom 2004 and 2005). During the first phase, suicide 
bombers were deployed exclusively the by the Islamic 
organizations Bamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)40. 
38 There is no consensus in the research literature as to the date 
of the first suicide bombing by Hamasi some cite the year 1993, and 
others (for example Abufarha 2009), the year 1994. Israeli 
government statistics available from the Israeli MFA cite the first 
suicide bombing to have occurred on April 6, 1994, by Hamas. 
39 It has been difficult to determine with any certainty the number 
of Israelis killed in Palestinian suicide attacks. Hafez (2006-a) 
cites 159 Israelis killed in 26 suicide bombings between 1993 and 
2000. Data provided by the Israeli MFA note 269 civilians and 
soldiers killed in terror attacks between 1993 and 2000, see 
<www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/terrorism-
%200bstacle%20to%20peace/palestinian%20terror%20before%202000/fatal 
%20terrorist%20attacks%20in%20israel%20since%20the%20dop%20-
s>[Accessed April 13, 2006]. However these figures do not 
distinguish between suicide attacks and other types of attacks such 
as stabbings and shootings. The MFA cites 542 Israelis killed in 
suicide attacks from 2000 to 2008, see 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-
+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Suicide+and+Other+ 
Bombing+Attacks+in+Israel+Since.htm> [Accessed July 8 2008]. As 
Hafez (2006-a) notes, data about suicide bombings and their victims 
is collected and interpreted by many different organizations and 
statistics may to vary from source to source. 
40 Created in 1987, Hamas is the Arabic acronym for Harakac a1-
Muqawamah a1 Is1amiyya, the Islamic Resistance Movement. Hamas 
emerged from the Islamic Brotherhood, and was founded in an effort 
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Most importantly for the purposes of this research, 
Palestinian suicide bombings prior to the year 2000 were 
sporadic, the exclusive domain of the Palestinian Islamic 
groups and tended to generate low levels of popular support 
as most Palestinians supported the Oslo process and its 
promise of a Palestinian state (Hafez 2006-b, Bloom 2003 and 
2005)41. 
The start of the al-Aqsa intfada in 2000 marked a profound 
shift in the frequency with which Palestinian suicide bombers 
were deployed, the types of groups that deployed them, and 
to implement a more radical Palestinian nationalist program, and to 
compete with secular nationalist groups, notably the PLO, as well 
as with more fringe Islamic groups such as Islamic Jihad (Budeiri 
1995). While Hamas is best known in the West for its deployment of 
suicide bombers and rocket fire into Israel, it is a highly 
organized and structured social and political organization. Many 
Western writers (Levitt 2006 is good example of this tendency) 
consider Hamas exclusively within the context of global terrorism 
and/or Islamic extremism; exceptions include Mishal and Sela 2000, 
Hroub 2006, and Tamimi 2007. For a detailed analysis of Hamas' 
military tactics, including the deployment of suicide bombers, see 
Chapter 3 UControlled Violence" in Mishal and Sela 2000 pp.49-82; 
see also Tamimi 2007 pp.187-207. Palestinian Islamic Jihad was 
created in Gaza during the 1970s as a branch of the Egyptian 
Islamic Jihad. PIJ is a much smaller and less cohesive organization 
than Hamas, focusing on militant activity and lacking Hamas' social 
network and objectives. As is the case with Hamas, a good deal of 
the Western literature on PIJ explores the group's objectives and 
actions exclusively in the context of terrorism and Islamic 
fundamentalism (see for example Fighel 2003 and Shay 2004). On PIJ 
see Hatina 2001; while outdated, see the section on PIJ in Abu-Amr 
1994 for an overview of the group's history, objectives and 
activities to 1993. 
41 Bloom (2003 and 2005) notes that in 1999 over 70 per cent of 
Palestinians had faith in the peace process; support for suicide 
bombings fell to 20 per cent and support for Hamas was at its 
lowest point ever - below 12 per cent. She further observes that 
suicide bombing campaigns are more prevalent in countries where the 
local population supports such acts, and that militant groups also 
use suicide attacks to compete for popular support, a process she 
terms outbidding (2003, 2004, 2005). 
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the levels of popular support for suicide bombings. The 
number of suicide bombers deployed began to increase 
dramatically after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa intifada in 
September 2000, as did the numbers of their Israeli victims. 
The most notable shift occurred in 2001 when Palestinian 
secular organizations - notably the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades 
(AMB), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (DFLP) - began to deploy suicide bombers (Hafez 
2006-a, Asad 2007, Bloom 2004). As these scholars note, 
suicide bombing was no longer the exclusive domain of 
Palestinian Islamic organizations42 • 
Bloom notes a correlation between increased Palestinian 
popular support for suicide bombings after September 2000, 
and the failure of the Oslo peace process to deliver much in 
the way of tangible gains for Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories, much less its much-anticipated promise of an 
independent Palestinian state. As such, suicide bombings 
"resonate against a dual backdrop of economic hardship and 
the disappearance of any possible peace dividend" (Bloom 2004 
p.72). Bloom (2004) also cites ongoing settlement 
construction in the West Bank, restrictions on Palestinian 
movement, the use of closure, the faltering Palestinian 
economy, and the disproportionate use of force by the Israeli 
42 A basic overview of the al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades and the PFLP 
are provided in Hafez 2006-a. The AMB emerged in 2000 as a loose 
grouping of militias linked to the PLO faction Fatah. It sometimes 
collaborated on joint suicide bombing missions with Hamas and PIJ 
but remains primarily a secular nationalist group. The PFLP was 
formed in the 1960s as a Marxist-Leninist and nationalist 
organization; like the Marxist DFLP it attracts relatively low 
levels of support as compared to AMB and the Islamist groups. 
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security forces including targeted assassinations and the 
killing of innocent civilians, as factors that generated 
increased levels of popular Palestinian support for suicide 
bombings after the year 2000. 
In contrast, much of the research literature produced by 
Israeli authors, counter-terrorism think tanks and the 
Israeli government (in information produced most notably by 
the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 
consider Palestinian suicide terrorism - their term - to be 
the product of Palestinian anti-Semitism, a refusal to 
recognize Israel by Palestinian extremist groups, and a hate 
campaign against it43 • For example, Berko asserts that, 
The shaheed's act can be viewed as a kind of expressive 
suicide. It is his way ... to express rage, envy, and 
hatred for the Jews, Israel, and the rest of the Western 
world, and to release deep, violent impulses, which are 
difficult to control (2007 p.172). 
As well, this literature elides any reference to the 
Occupation: it is as if the Occupation does not exist. This 
literature does not consider the deployment of Palestinian 
suicide bombers to be related in any way to Israel's military 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, nor to Israeli spatial 
practices such as construction projects, nor to Israeli 
restrictions on Palestinian movement. 
I do not support Palestinian acts of suicide bombings. Yet I 
also find it impossible to justify Israel's practices in the 
43 See in particular Israel Information Center 2004, Intelligence 
and Terrorism Information Center 2006, and Paz 2000. 
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Occupied Territories, a point also eloquently argued by Hage 
(2003). The deployment of Palestinian suicide bombers -
certainly since the failure of the Oslo negotiation process 
in 2000 - must be considered in a relationship to worsening 
conditions of Occupation in the West Bank and Gaza. Thus I 
cite a direct correlation between these Israeli practices in 
the Occupied Territories, and Palestinian suicide bombing 
campaigns - this with reference to Bloom (2005) who asserts 
that Palestinian popular support for suicide bombings will 
not cease until Israel stops its heavy handed tactics and is 
prepared to negotiate a true peace settlement; and Hafez, who 
observes that, uSocieties under normal conditions do not 
embrace and venerate suicidal violence" (2006-a p.53). And, 
as Slater astutely asserts, 
Israel has not only occupied but also brutally repressed 
the Palestinian people for over four decades. 
Consequently, Palestinian resistance, even violent 
resistance, cannot be regarded as primarily a function 
of religious fanaticism or of a mindless, immutable, and 
a priori anti-Semitism - though both do play some role -
but rather of Israeli behavior (Slater 2009 p.l) 
For scholar Mai Jayyusi (cited in Asad 2007), acts of 
Palestinian suicide bombing constitute part of a historical 
continuum of Palestinian resistance44 • So too, for Abufarha 
(2009), who firmly locates acts of Palestinian suicide 
44 Unless otherwise indicated, citations of Jayyusi in Asad's text 
are not direct quotes from Jayyusi, but rather Asad, who describes 
observations made by Jayyusi in an unpublished conference paper 
presented in 2004. I have been unable to obtain a copy of this 
paper and consequently, rely on its citation by Asad. 
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bombing within a trajectory of resistance to what he terms 
Israeli state expansionism. To this I would add, that these 
acts constitute part of a historical continuum of Palestinian 
resistance to Jewish (Zionist and Israeli) encroachment on 
Palestinian inhabited territory, which also have a history 
dating back to the turn of the 20th century, and considered 
in Chapter 2. Scholars Slater (2009), Asad (2007), Hage 
(2003), Allen (2006-c) Khalili (2007), Whitehead and Abufarha 
(2008), and Abufarha (2009) all consider Palestinian acts of 
suicide bombings to be inextricably linked to the Israeli 
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, and my personal views 
are consistent with their assertions45 • 
45 There is a growing body of literature that grapples with the 
question of whether acts of suicide bombing constitute a 
justifiable response to acts of state violence, for example, in 
Asad 2007, and Honderich 2002, 2003. This material draws primarily 
on moral philosophy, but also on political theory and principles of 
international law. Of particular importance for the purposes of 
this study is the volume edited by Steven Law (2008), as it focuses 
specifically on the deployment of Palestinian suicide bombers. This 
collection of essays by philosophers responds to an essay by 
philosopher Ted Honderich, who argues that Palestinians have a 
moral right to terrorism and killing in the context of the Israeli 
occupation. All of the essays in this volume respond to Honderich's 
propositions, most of them using a framework of moral philosophy 
and some using principles of international humanitarian law. Some 
writers agree that Palestinians have the right to make recourse to 
suicide bombings, others categorically do not. Interestingly, all 
of the writers use the term terrorism. It is with a great amount of 
trepidation that I attempt to explore this matter in a footnote, 
yet it should be noted that this book presents one of the most 
thoughtful and carefully considered debates on the matter. So too 
does Asad (2007), however his study is much broader in its scope, 
considering suicide bombings more generally (not only in 
Palestine). Falk (2002) considers the Palestinian right to 
resistance in the context of the "just war" doctrine, examining the 
state of Israel's failures to respect the rights of Palestinians 
under international law, and he notes that some Israeli state 
practices may also be regarded as terrorism. While he steadfastly 
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The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber as a weapon 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber is what Fanon 
(1963) has termed a resistant body. The body of the suicide 
bomber is deployed as a weapon of resistance against the 
Israeli occupation and against Israel. And like the bodies of 
the Palestinian martyr of the 1920s and 1930s, the fida'i, 
and the shab discussed in Chapter 1, the body of the suicide 
bomber is also a locus of Palestinian resistance. 
The body of the suicide bomber, deployed as a weapon, 
explodes, and in so doing, it unleashes death and destruction 
upon Israeli bodies, in Israel. It inflicts mortal damage on 
Israeli bodies in the process of destroying itself. 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber enters public 
spaces in Israel - markets, buses, restaurants, discotheques. 
Her/his body is strapped with explosives and packed with 
metal shrapnel and marbles, all designed to maximize the 
damage and pain it inflicts on Israeli bodies. The suicide 
bomber carefully penetrates the target area in Israel. There 
s/he detonates her/himself. The body explodes. His or her 
body is torn to bits, and often only the head remains, "After 
argues in favor of the Palestinian right of resistance, he also 
argues that this right stops short of deploying suicide bombers. 
Unfortunately a more in-depth examination of this matter lies 
outside the scope of this writing, which cannot accommodate a more 
profound investigation into either moral philosophy, nor 
international law, that such a discussion would require. On a 
different but related note, Hamas views the deployment of suicide 
bombers as justifiable in the context of war, and considers the 
current conflict to constitute wari see in particular the 
interviews with the since assassinated Dr. Abdul Aziz Rantisi in 
Juergensmeyer 2003 pp.73-80i and in Stern 2003 pp.55-62. 
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a bomb has been strapped to a stomach, the head is normally 
left intact but the rest of the body disintegrates" (Berg 
2002 unpag. )46. 
The force of the body's explosion also violently tears 
Israeli bodies apart, killing some while maiming and wounding 
many others. The violent explosion of the body of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber sends Israeli bodies flying. It 
severs limbs from bodies, shatters bones, pierces skin and 
internal organs and singes flesh from the body. Fingers, 
hands, feet, ears, arms, eyes and legs lie scattered across 
the scene of the attack; bones protrude from skin; jumbles of 
guts and blood spill from bodies. Eardrums are shattered and 
blood pours from heads. Shrapnel and metal tear into flesh, 
become embedded into skin and eyes and tear internal organs 
to shreds. Blood and bodily detritus cling to the bodies of 
the survivors; living bodies mingle with dead ones; the smell 
of charred flesh and hair hang in the air47 • 
The description above attests to the destructive capability 
of the body of the Palestinian suicide bomber. At once a 
weapon, the body of the suicide bomber is also a deadly sort 
of equalizer by virtue of its ability to kill and maim 
Israeli bodies, 
This weapon [suicide bomber] is our winning card, which 
turned our weakness and feebleness into strength, and 
46 For a compelling study of the head of the suicide bomber, 
examined in the context of photography and the gaze, see Wigoder 
2006. 
47 The descriptions in the above section were compiled based on 
Israeli survivor accounts cited in Bards 2006, Brom 2006, westcott 
2002, Berg 2002, and Stork 2002. 
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created parity never before witnessed in the history of 
the struggle with the Zionist enemy. It also gave our 
people the ability to respond, deter, and inflict harm 
on the enemy" (Azet al-Rushuq, a member of Bamas' 
political bureau, cited in Bafez 2006-a p.26). 
The deployment of body of the Palestinian suicide bomber as a 
weapon, seeks to transform Palestinian weakness into strength 
by inflicting damage on Israeli bodies, thus producing a 
shift in the balance of power with the state of Israel. The 
IDF is a much more sophisticated and technologically advanced 
force than the Palestinian groups that deploy suicide 
bombers, however, the body of the Palestinian suicide bomber, 
deployed as a weapon, asserts its strength and power through 
acts of violence that target Israeli bodies. In so doing it 
has altered the landscape of the conflict. 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber and the refusal of 
otherness 
The body of the suicide bomber refuses to be spatially 
confined to the zones of abjection in the West Bank and Gaza. 
It moves more freely (albeit clandestinely) across territory, 
refusing spatial confinement. Confinement to enclaves or the 
zones of abjection in the West Bank and Gaza produces the 
Palestinian body as an inferior Other to Jewish Israeli 
bodies that enjoy complete freedom of movement. The refusal 
of the suicide bomber to be spatially contained constitutes a 
refusal of otherness produced by Israeli restrictions on 
movement. 
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Despite the fences, barriers and checkpoints that seek to 
contain it, the body of the suicide bomber penetrates into 
Israeli territory, where it is able to inflict serious and 
mortal damage upon Israelis. It penetrates the borders of the 
Israeli national body so to speak, inflicting damage on 
Israeli bodies, in Israel. The bodily incursion of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber into Israel also represents an 
attempt to bring the violence of the occupation into Israel 
proper (Bloom 2004, Abufarha 2009)48. In so doing, the suicide 
bomber is able to inflict some of the corporeal effects of 
military occupation and spatial containment - notably 
violence and mortal suffering - upon Israeli bodies. For 
Whitehead and Abufarha, Palestinian violence directed at 
Israeli targets in Israel "mimics Israel's violence in 
Palestine where the Israelis reach the Palestinian depth and 
spread terror throughout Palestine" (2008 p.405). Deployed as 
what a Hamas spokesman described as a deadly equalizer (in 
Hafez 2006-a), the body of the Palestinian suicide bomber 
also inflicts death, damage and destruction on Israeli bodies 
in the process of destroying itself. This ability to unleash 
death on Israelis, in Israel, as Israel has unleashed death 
on Palestinians in the Occupied Territories, may also be 
construed as a refusal of otherness, by the Palestinian 
suicide bomber. 
48 Some of the Israeli practices described earlier (notably the use 
of restrictions on movement, closure, checkpoints and barriers, and 
the construction of the separation barrier) have been deployed in a 
specific effort to contain the body of the Palestinian suicide 
bomber and to prevent its penetration into Israel. However as has 
been noted by human rights groups such as B'Tselem, Bimkom, 
MachsomWatch and Hamoked, the draconian use of these practices 
constitutes a form of collective punishment, rather than viable 
security mechanisms. 
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Martyrdom and the martyr in Palestine 
Martyrdom in Palestine is linked to self-sacrifice, whether 
deliberate and intentional or not. The Palestinian martyr (or 
shahid, from witness) is one who sacrifices his or her life 
for Palestine49 • The martyr has appeared and continues to 
appear in almost all spheres of Palestinian cultural and 
political life, in literature and art, film, political 
speeches and elegies (Abu Hashhash 2006), and in political 
and religious discourse. Earlier instances of the Palestinian 
martyr and Palestinian self-sacrifice were explored in 
Chapter 1, citing as examples, the martyr who sacrificed 
himself to the land of Palestine in a struggle to defend his 
land from Zionist encroachment during the 1920s and 1930s; 
The fida'i or guerilla fighter of the 1960s and 1970s, and 
the shabab of the first intifada, are of whom all linked to 
the possibility of self-sacrifice in the context of 
Palestinian resistance and national liberation efforts. 
During the first intifada, innocent bystanders who were 
killed by the Israeli army in the context of the occupation 
came to be considered martyrs or shahids. Khalili (2007) 
observes that the term shahid engenders multiple and shifting 
meanings, and may be mobilized to convey notions of heroism 
and resistance, as well as victimhood and suffering50. For 
49 Saloul (2003) explains that the term shahid, from shahada, means 
to bear witness to one's Islamic faith by way of self-sacrifice. I 
return to notions of self-sacrifice in Islam on page 148. 
50 Khalili (2007) notes that the notion of the innocent victim-as-
martyr or shahid was prevalent during the first intifada, during 
which support for Palestinians as victims of Israeli brutality 
found a supportive international audience. A similar argument can 
be found in Whitehead and Abufarha (2008). Khalili (2007) notes 
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Khalili, the common denominator of martyrdom during the first 
intifada - whether an activist's or an innocent bystander's -
was death at the hand of the Israeli oppressor. Martyrdom is 
trans formative because it "transforms that potentially 
senseless death into a redemptive self-sacrifice for the 
nation" (2007 p.140). 
Similarly, in Palestine today (and by today I mean the period 
of the al-Aqsa intifada), the term martyr or shahid refers 
"to anyone killed by the [ISraeli] aggressor, whether a 
fighter or victim of aggression, whether a member of an 
Islamic, Christian, secular or Marxist organization, whether 
targeted or untargeted" (Abufarha 2009 p.8)[my addition]. 
Suicide bombers, suspected militants killed in targeted 
assassinations, and civilians killed by the Israeli security 
forces, are all considered to be martyrs or shahids (Abufarha 
2009, Abu Hashhash 2006, Allen 2006-a). 
During the AI-Aqsa intifada, however, there occurred three 
substantial shifts in Palestinian conceptions of the martyr 
and martyrdom: first, the elevation of the suicide bomber to 
a higher status than the other martyrs as described above; 
second, an emphasis on intentional and deliberate self-
sacrifice by the suicide bomber; and third, the injection of 
Islamic religious discourses of self-sacrifice to existing 
secular nationalist ones. 
Those who sacrifice themselves in acts of suicide bombing 
came to be referred to even more specifically as istishhadi 
that the discourse of the martyr as a victim depoliticizes the act 
of dying for a cause. 
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(Abufarha 2009, Reuter 2004). As the one who performs the act 
of self-sacrifice, the istishhadi "occupies the highest, and 
most noble ground, above that of the shahid" (Abufarha 2009 
p.lO), because her or his act of self-sacrifice is 
deliberate, intentional and desired. 
Note that while I continue to use the English term martyr, 
unless indicated otherwise, from here on in I use it with 
specific reference to the istishhadi, one who sacrifices 
her/himself in an act of suicide bombing. 
Abufarha (2009) observes that the term istishhadi was 
introduced by Bamas, which sought to attach religious 
meanings to the act of self-sacrifice. Bamas was the first 
group to execute suicide bombings, which the group 
specifically refers to as ~amaliyat istishhadiya or martyrdom 
operations, and not suicide bombings51. Bamas' Islamic 
ideology and objectives have profoundly shaped discourses of 
martyrdom in Palestine today, even among the more secular 
organizations that deploy suicide bombers. Religious and 
nationalist discourses of martyrdom have become intertwined 
(Saloul 2003): Islamic religious notions of self-sacrifice 
overlap with nationalist ones, to create distinctly 
Palestinian discourses of martyrdom and the martyr. There is 
51 For Abufarha (2009), the term suicide is not appropriate to 
describe the actions of the human bomb, because it does not 
reference the notion of self-sacrifice. Nonetheless I continue to 
use the term suicide bomber in the thesis, because it is consistent 
with the terminology used throughout the thesis and in a majority 
of the research literature consulted. The term istishhadi refers to 
the masculine form in Arabic and therefore to male martyrs. The 
term istishh'hadiyah refers to female martyrs. While grammatically 
incorrect I use the term to istishhadi to refer to both male and 
female martyrs, in lieu of having to always use the gender specific 
terms istishhadi/istiahh'hadiyah. 
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not necessarily one singular and overarching notion of 
martyrdom in Palestine today, as these tend to vary according 
to the specific doctrines and objectives of the different 
organizations that conduct martyrdom operations, however the 
various conceptions of martyrdom do share certain 
commonalities. 
It was only upon making final revisions to this chapter that 
I came to fully understand the complexities of notions of the 
martyr and martyrdom in Palestine today. I am especially 
grateful to Palestinian anthropologist Nasser Abufarha 
(2009), whose important study was published just before 
completing my thesis, and to Khalili (2007) and Asad (2007). 
Their work alerted me to the shortcomings of my 
investigations, which had relied too heavily on Western 
literature (Bukay 2008, Berko 2007, Shay 2004, Juergensmeyer 
2003, Stern 2003, Davis 2002, Esposito 2002, and Paz 2000) 
that considered the Palestinian martyr and martyrdom in 
Palestine primarily in the context of religious terrorism and 
therefore, as being motivated primarily by Islamic religious 
notions of martyrdom52 • This literature focuses 
disproportionately on religious motivations for martyrdom, 
thereby downplaying the political aspects of Palestinian 
martyrdom53 • As such, much of this literature fails to 
52 For example, much of the literature cites interpretations by 
Islamic clerics that consider suicide bombings to be acts of 
martyrdom, and not acts of suicide. While these interpretations may 
be used to justify Palestinian martyrdom operations (and those in 
other countries), they do not in and of themselves motivate them 
(Asad 2007). 
53 The problem is not with analyses of Islamic notions of martyrdom 
per se, but rather with the disproportionate focus on martyrdom as 
being exclusively linked to the Islamic faith in these sources 
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adequately consider the Israeli occupation. As Asad (2007) 
astutely notes, to focus disproportionately on religious 
motivations fails to acknowledge the impact of the Israeli 
occupation. Consequently, none of these writers are able to 
grasp the complexities and particularities of martyrdom in 
the Palestinian context. These are polyvalent and informed by 
discourses of self-sacrifice in the context of soldiering and 
national resistance (Khalili 2007), as well as in defense of 
one's Islamic faith (Saloul 2003, Khosrokhavar 2005). 
As was discussed in Chapter 1, self-sacrifice is a feature of 
the modern nation. Self-sacrifice occurs most often in the 
context of soldiering and national defense, and is therefore 
considered to be a positive act in service of the nation. 
Self-sacrifice in this context is not intentional or 
deliberate. Self-sacrifice is also associated with resistance 
and national liberation struggles, yet here too, self-
sacrifice is not intentional or deliberate. This latter 
notion of self-sacrifice - which was also a secular notion of 
self-sacrifice (Khalili 2007) - was prevalent in Palestine 
before the suicide bomber emerged in 1993. 
Palestinian conceptions of self-sacrifice and martyrdom have 
also shifted since then, toward a privileging of intentional 
self-sacrifice by the istishhadi. Current Palestinian 
conceptions of martyrdom and the martyr have been informed by 
both, historical and modern Islamic notions of self-
(Bukay 2008, Mazarr 2007, Shay 2004, Palmer 2004, Davis 2003, 
Esposito 2002, and Hiro 2002). Many of these sources also tend to 
explore acts of violence as if they are inherent to Islam and not 
to other religions. Asad (2007) highlights mistakes made by many 
Western writers in their discussions of Islamic theological 
interpretations of martyrdom. 
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sacrifice. Historically in Islam, martyrdom occurred when one 
lost his [sic] life in the struggle or to defend his Islamic 
religious beliefs, or was killed in the service of God 
(Saloul 2003, Juergensmeyer 2003, Khosrokhavar 2005). As such 
martyrdom was considered a holy death (Khosrokhavar 2005)54. 
However, modern (late 20th century) Islamic notions of 
martyrdom center on intentional and deliberate self-sacrifice 
(Khosrokhavar 2005, Tamimi 2007). Khosrokhavar (2005) and 
Tamimi (2007) further observe that the modern Islamic notion 
of martyrdom as a certain and deliberate death concretized in 
the discourses and strategies of Hezbollah in Lebanon during 
the 1980s, and they both also note the influence of 
Hezbollah, on Hamas in Palestine55 . 
54 Khosrokhavar (2005) notes that the notion of holy death -
attributed to Muslims who died on the battlefield while fighting 
the enemy - likely emerged after the Muslim conquest of Palestine 
in the seventh century. Historical examples of Islamic martyrdom 
include most notably the Ismailis (also known as the Assassins), a 
Shiite sect whose members in the 11th and 12th century would slay 
Christian and Muslim opponents alike and then willingly be captured 
and killed for their actions; see also Khosrokhavar 2005, Shay 
2004, and Reuter 2004. 
55 The connections and cross-pollination of Islamic discourses of 
martyrdom in Iran, and then Lebanon, and later Palestine, is also 
observed by Robert Baer in his film The Cult of the Suicide Bomber. 
Baer cites the deportation by the Israeli government of 415 Hamas 
and PIJ militants to southern Lebanon in 1992, prompting closer 
links with Hezbollah, an observation also made by Khalili 2007, 
Hafez 2006, Reuter 2004, and Stern 2003. For Khosrokhavar (2005) 
and Tamimi (2007) the evolution of modern Islamic martyrdom 
discourses have also resulted from clerical interpretations of the 
Koran that distinguish between the act of suicide (which is 
prohibited in Islamic theology) and the act of martyrdom, which 
some clerics condone as the highest form of sacrifice for a noble 
cause - defending one's Islamic faith, for example. On this point 
see also Reuter 2004, Stern 2003, and Juergensmeyer 2003. 
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Notions of martyrdom in Palestine today link religious 
discourses with nationalist ones (Hafez 2006-a), as do those 
that emerged in Iran and Lebanon. However, martyrdom in 
Palestine today is distinct. I am most grateful to the 
investigations of Abufarha (2009), Abu Hashhash (2006) and 
Saloul (2003) in allowing me to understand the unique way in 
which Islamic religious and secular nationalist objectives 
intersect in Palestine, to produce distinctly Palestinian 
conceptions of martyrdom. 
For Abufarha (2009), martyrdom in Palestine is inextricably 
linked to intentional self-sacrifice, for Palestine. For him, 
martyrdom is linked first and foremost to Palestinian 
resistance and to Palestinian national liberation objectives. 
Further, while the discourses of martyrdom espoused by the 
Islamic organizations Hamas and PIJ are informed by Islamic 
thought, these groups execute martyrdom operations so as to 
achieve Palestinian national liberation objectives56 • For 
Abufarha (2009), the Islamic agendas of these two groups are 
based primarily on national liberation strategies of 
resistance, and guided by Islamic thought as a political 
strategy57. For Abufarha, the Islamic objectives of Hamas and 
the PIJ provide "an Islamic platform for the liberation of 
56 Abufarha (2009) notes that while most Palestinians are more 
interested in the Islamic groups' tactics of resistance than they 
are in building a society governed by Islamic law, he also concedes 
that the Palestinian resistance has been Islamized, and that there 
have been many changes in Palestinian society - changes that 
coincide with the Islamic ideologies of these groups - as the 
result of having Islamic groups lead the resistance. 
57 Abufarha further notes that Hamas's objectives are primarily 
nationalist but that it "conceives of Islam as the most solid 
ideology through which to achieve the goals of the Palestinian 
national struggle" (2009 p.IO). 
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Palestine" (2009 p.80). While this analysis moves slightly 
away from a focus on martyrdom, it is important to understand 
the relationship between the Islamic and nationalist 
objectives of Hamas and PIJ if one is to understand the 
fusion of Islamic and nationalist discourses that underpin 
acts of martyrdom in Palestine today. 
Therefore, and following Abufarha's analysis (2009), I 
consider the Palestinian martyr - the istishhadi - in the 
specific context of this research, to be one who deliberately 
and intentionally sacrifices her/his life, in an a martyrdom 
operation or act of suicide bombing, as an act of resistance 
against the occupation and against Israel, and one that seeks 
to further Palestinian national objectives - the creation of 
a Palestinian state - that mayor may also not be bound up in 
Islamic-religious ones, that is, the creation of a 
specifically Islamic state in Palestine. Here I draw the 
reader's attention to a shift in terminology, to the more 
frequent use of the term istishhadi or martyr. 
The istishhadi in commemorative posters 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber explodes and in 
the process it destroys itself. The body ceases to exist, 
prompting the question: What remains of this body, as 
remains? On one hand, there are physical remains flesh, 
blood, the head, other body parts perhaps. These bodily 
remains are collected at the scene of the attack by Israeli 
forensic specialists, separated from Israeli bodily remains, 
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and buried58 • On the other hand, there remains the visual 
depiction of the body, in the form of commemorative posters 
produced and disseminated by the groups that execute 
martyrdom missions59 • They commemorate the deceased as a 
martyr who sacrificed her/himself for Palestine. 
While commemorative posters are produced for all those who 
become martyrs or shahids in the context of the occupation 
(civilians, militants, suicide bombers), the focus here is on 
commemorative posters of the istishhadis60 • All of the 
Palestinian groups that deploy suicide bombers produce and 
disseminate print posters to commemorate their martyrs. The 
posters are displayed in public and private spaces alike in 
the West Bank and Gaza: on billboards, walls and buildings, 
58 Despite a good deal of research it has been almost impossible to 
ascertain exactly what happens to the physical remains of 
Palestinian suicide bombers. Israel generally refuses to hand their 
remains over to the families in the Occupied Territories, choosing 
instead to inter them in Israel (Farrell 2003). weiss (2002-b) 
provides a detailed account of the process by which Jewish-Israeli 
bodily remains are collected by ultra-Orthodox Jews in the 
aftermath of suicide attacks, and later sorted and identified at 
the National Institute of Forensic Medicine in Tel Aviv. 
59 The deploying groups also produce commemorative video material, 
which I discuss in the following chapter. I first discovered 
commemorative posters of the istishhadi on Hamas' English-language 
website hamasonline.com (taken offline under UK anti-terrorism 
legislation in late 2005), consequently, most of the images in my 
collection are of Hamas martyrs. 
60 Unless indicated otherwise, the scholars whose investigations I 
cite are writing about commemorative posters for Palestinian 
martyrs more generally (and as previously defined). However their 
remarks are nonetheless relevant to my own observations about the 
istishhadis. 
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inside shops and places of business, and inside people's 
homes (Abu Hashhash 2006, Allen 2006-a)61. 
The posters, through the combination of text and visual 
elements, depict the deceased as a martyr. As Allen notes, 
the posters represent "both the person who was killed and the 
martyr that person has become" (2006-a p.117). The posters 
fulfill a transformative function: they elevate the martyr's 
self-sacrifice - and the martyr her/himself - to a high or 
heroic status (Abu Hashhash 2006)62. Here I remind the reader 
of Abufarha's observation (2009) that the istishhadi occupies 
the highest ground in Palestine today. 
The posters fulfill a memorial function in that they help to 
preserve the memory of the istishhadi, and allow the her/him 
to maintain a presence among the living. Allen (2006-a) notes 
that during the second intifada the martyrs' posters became 
the most prevalent form of memorialization. I discussed the 
poster as a type of remains: in the absence of a body to 
bury, the posters also function as a surrogate or substitute 
site for public and private remembrance63 • 
61 For an outstanding analysis of commemorative posters of 
Palestinian martyrs read through discourses of photography, visual 
culture, art criticism and philosophy, see Abu Hashhash (2006). 
62 Many Israeli writers, notably Oliver and Steinberg (2005), 
contend that the posters serve primarily to glorify martyrdom so as 
to attract future suicide bombers. They contend that the lure and 
promise of martyrdom are so powerful that potential martyrs come to 
imagine themselves not only as heroes but "as something of a movie 
star" (2005 p.73). Their study posits these posters as the 
"centerpiece of a cosmology of martyrdom" (2005 p.72) that has 
seduced and put a stranglehold on Palestinians. See also 
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center 2006. 
63 The posters belong to a larger Palestinian tradition of 
commemorating martyrs in various forms, for example, memorials, 
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The commemorative posters share certain characteristics 
despite being produced by different groups. Most notably they 
all prominently feature at least one image of the istishhadi, 
photographed prior to her/his deployment. The posters are 
inscribed with text designating her or him as a martyr, 
together with her or his name, and the date of the martyrdom 
operation. The posters often include quotes from the martyrs' 
last will and testaments, in which s/he describes their 
reasons for martyrdom64 • And, with the exception of those 
produced by the PFLP, the posters include verses from the 
Koran (Abu Hashhash 2006), and often, those that reference 
eternal life as the reward for self-sacrifice. 
The istishhadi often wears army fatigues and holds a weapon, 
most often a Kalashnikov assault rifle, but sometimes, a 
knife65 • The martyr often wears a suicide belt. In posters 
produced by the Islamic groups Hamas and PIJ, the martyr 
holds the Koran and often, a Koran in one hand and a weapon 
in the other. Some posters combine photographs of the martyr 
with additional photographs and imagery, for example, of the 
al-Aqsa mosque or the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem; of 
scenes of the Israeli occupation; and photographs of the 
aftermath of martyrdom operations in Israel. There are most 
often more than one poster created for each martyr. Some 
posters rely more heavily on the juxtaposition of visual 
imagery, while others include more text, for example, more 
ceremonies and holidays, the naming of people and places after 
martyrs, songs and historical and literary texts (Khalili 2007). 
64 The last wills are considered in more detail in the following 
chapter. 
65 Abufarha notes that the Kalashnikov - the weapon of the 
fida'iyeen - "became a symbol of pride in Palestinian revolutionary 
culture like the sword in classical Arab poetry" (2009 p.44). 
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extensive citations from the martyr's last will and 
testament, more detailed descriptions of the martyrdom 
operation, or more verses from the Koran. 
The posters connect the martyr to Palestine through the use 
of the colors of the Palestinian flag, and images of the al-
Haram al-Sharif (site of the dome of the Rock and the al-Aqsa 
Mosque). These also symbolize the connection to a future 
Palestinian homeland with al-Quds (Jerusalem) as its 
capito166 • The juxtaposition of scenes of the Israeli the 
occupation together with scenes of the martyrdom operation 
posit the martyr's self-sacrifice as a form of resistance to 
the occupation. The Haram al-Sharif connects the martyr to 
the desired Palestinian national homeland, and to resistance 
as a means of creating a homeland. Through the combination of 
these images and symbols, the posters present a visual 
narrative of resistance and self-sacrifice for Palestine. 
Such is the case in the example provided in Figure 2 on the 
following page, a commemorative poster of Bamas martyr Reem 
al-Riyashi that places her at the centre of a visual 
narrative of self-sacrifice and resistance for Palestine67 • 
66 Khalidi (1997) notes that Jerusalem had long been the 
geographical, spiritual, cultural, political and administrative 
center of Palestine going back to the Ottoman empire, and he 
explores a connection to Jerusalem as one of the central factors in 
Palestinian national identity formation. 
67 On the representation of female martyrs see Hasso's excellent 
study (2005); see also Naaman (2007). 
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Figure 2 
Commemorative poster for Hamas martyr Reem al-Riyashi. 
Source: hamasonline.com 
The text reads, "The Martyr (AI istishIhadiyyah) Reem Saleh 
Al-Riyashi", thereby identifying her as a martyr68 • In the 
largest image, al-Riyashi hovers above the al-Aqsa mosque, 
signifying a connection to Palestine. She holds the Koran in 
one hand and an assault rifle in the other, symbols of Hamas' 
nationalist objectives informed by Islamic principles. The 
blue sky, the sun, the bird, and the transparent ghost image 
68 I am grateful to Reem Fadda for the translation and 
transliteration into English of the text on these posters. 
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of al-Riyashi an assemblage within an assemblage - depict 
al-Riyashi as a martyr in Paradise. To the right are three 
smaller photographs: al-Riyashi reading, most probably from 
her last will and testament; the scene of a martyrdom 
operation, probably al-Riyashi's; and a Palestinian woman and 
two children in the Occupied Territories, reading graffiti 
that says "Hamas". 
Like all commemorative posters, this one identifies al-
Riyashi as a martyr. The military fatigues, rifle and suicide 
belt connect al-Riyashi to Palestinian resistance. The al-
Aqsa mosque connects al-Riyashi to Palestine and it connects 
her self-sacrifice to Palestine and to Palestinian national 
liberation objectives, to a future Palestinian nation-state. 
Together the various visual components combine to present a 
narrative of Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation 
and of self-sacrifice for the Palestinian nation. 
The whole body of the martyr in the commemorative posters 
Abu Hashhash (2006) notes that the posters are created 
through a process of inclusion and exclusion, notably, the 
exclusion of any reference to death: the words death and 
suicide do not ever appear in the posters. Building on his 
observation, the exploded and destroyed body of the suicide 
bomber is also excluded from thee posters, an observation 
also made by Allen (2006-a)69. Instead, the posters depict the 
69 Referring to martyrs as all of those who perished in the context 
of the occupation, Allen asserts that, "never would a poster of 
this genre include an image of the martyr's death or show his or 
her wounds" (2006-a p.ll7). 
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whole body of the istishhadi, photographed prior to her/his 
deployment. And while photographs of the scenes of the 
martyrdom operation are sometimes included in the posters, 
they serve to highlight the destruction unleashed against 
Israeli bodies by the martyr, and not the destruction of the 
body of the martyr itself. 
The body of the martyr in the commemorative posters is not 
only a whole body: it is a soldier's body. The martyr wears 
army fatigues, a suicide belt, and wields a weapon: it is a 
militarized body. The body of the martyr serves to visually 
reinforce the notion of the body as a weapon of resistance, 
deployed against Israel. 
In Figure 3 on the following page, Hamas martyr Bassem 
Takruri wears a suicide belt. The belt designates the body as 
a weapon of resistance. Prominently occupying the background 
in Figure 3, are two hands holding oversized assault weapons, 
a symbol of armed Palestinian resistance. 
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Figure 3 
Commemorative poster for Hamas martyr Bassem Takruri. 
Takruri blew himself up on a bus in Jerusalem on May 18, 2003, killing seven Israelis 
and wounding 20. 
Source: hamasonline.com 
In Chapter 2, I examined the IDF soldier as the ideal Israeli 
body from 1967 onward, linking it to the military occupation 
of territory and to the realization of Israeli territorial 
ideals of wholeness, an ideal that is contingent on the 
fragmentation of Palestinian inhabited areas. The body of the 
IDF soldier is a strong and powerful body. So too is the 
Palestinian body in the commemorative images. The Palestinian 
martyr is visually depicted as a soldier: as a whole, strong 
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and powerful body. The whole body of the martyr functions as 
a visual, if not military equal, to the Israeli ideal body of 
the IDF soldier70 • 
The body of the martyr and the ideal of wholeness 
Chapter 1 explored the Palestinian body as a metaphor for 
land and for the loss of the homeland. In particular, the 
infertile Palestinian male body was explored as a metaphor 
for Palestinian territorial losses in the wake of al-Nakba in 
1948. On the one hand, the exploded and shattered body of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber provides a metaphor for 
Palestinian-inhabited territory in the West Bank, fragmented 
as it is by Israeli construction projects such as settlements 
and roads as discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
However the exploded body is elided in the commemorative 
posters, which instead depict the whole body of the martyr. 
The body of the istishhadi in the commemorative posters is a 
whole, strong and powerful body. It presents an idealized 
image of the Palestinian homeland as a whole one, despite its 
current fragmentation by Israeli construction projects in the 
West Bank in particular. Thus the posters also present an 
idealized image of the Palestinian nation as a whole, strong 
and powerful one. They present an image of the Palestinian 
nation as an equal to the Israeli nation. Here I return to 
70 This observation derives in part from Amireh (2003), who observes 
the militarization of Palestinian society at the end of the first 
intifada. She notes that while the use of weaponry was largely 
symbolic, it served to put Palestinian men on a more equal footing 
with the Israeli soldier. 
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Tina Sherwell's observation, made in Chapter 1, that the 
representations that individuals and communities create of 
themselves are contoured by how they wish to see themselves 
(Sherwel12003). 
Israelis and Palestinians in very different contexts -
deploy images of the whole body in an effort to reflect and 
uphold national ideals of wholeness. Meira Weiss (2002-a, 
2002-b) has written extensively about how depictions of the 
whole body serve to uphold Israeli ideals of the health and 
strength of the nation. For example she ~ites how Israeli 
media images of the fragmented bodies of victims of suicide 
bombings are depicted very briefly in the aftermath of such 
attacks, but soon disappear from the public realm. This shift 
mirrors ritualized acts of grieving that seek first to foster 
a collective sense of Israeli national loss and mourning, and 
later, of national wholeness and recovery. Weiss (2002-a and 
2002-b) has also written about the forensic reconstruction of 
the bodies of fallen Israeli soldiers, emphasizing that even 
in death the chosen body of the IDF soldier reflects and 
upholds Israeli ideals of strength and wholeness. In her 
analysis, the whole body serves to reinforce ideals of the 
health and strength of the Israeli nation, particularly in 
the aftermath of suicide attacks. 
Israeli and Palestinian ideals of wholeness are also bound up 
in idealized notions of the other's fragmentation. Israelis 
and Palestinians each use images of the fragmented body of 
the other in an attempt to represent weakness and 
vulnerability in the other. For example weizman (2007) notes 
that Israeli media images depicting the aftermath of targeted 
assassinations of suspected Palestinian militants blatantly 
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display the shattered and bloodied bodies of their victims. 
Palestinian media images of the aftermath of suicide bombings 
graphically depict the carnage perpetuated by the bomber, and 
specifically, the bloody detritus of dead and wounded Israeli 
bodies. This is not a thorough analysis of Israeli and 
Palestinian media images, but rather an attempt to briefly 
consider how ideals of wholeness are also linked attempts to 
visually depict the other as a fragmented and vulnerable 
body, and by extension, to reinforce ideals about the 
wholeness and strength of one's own nation. 
The body of the martyr and the refusal of Palestinian 
otherness 
The Palestinian body under Israeli occupation, confined as it 
is to enclaves - to zones of abjection - is produced as an 
inferior Other body to Jewish Israelis, as discussed. The 
body of the Palestinian suicide bomber, deployed as a weapon, 
serves as a refusal of Palestinian spatial subjugation and by 
extension, a refusal of otherness, in its ability to 
penetrate Israeli space and to destroy Israeli bodies, in 
Israel. 
However the body of the martyr in the commemorative posters, 
also conveys a refusal of Palestinian otherness. The 
commemorative posters serve as a reminder of the destructive 
potential of the Palestinian body. The body of martyr in the 
commemorative posters serves as a reminder of Palestinian 
resistance and defiance, strength and power: the Palestinian 
body is able to unleash death and destruction inside Israel. 
The body of the martyr in the commemorative posters, provides 
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a visual reminder of the destructive potential of the 
Palestinian body. And while the Separation Barrier has since 
2003 dramatically reduced the ability of the body of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber to enter Israel, the posters 
nonetheless act as a reminder that if unchecked, the 
Palestinian body will continue to pose a threat to the 
Israeli nation and to Israelis. 
Checkpoints and other restrictions on movement confine 
Palestinians to enclaves, however within these enclaves, 
these zones of abjection, the body of the martyr in 
commemorative posters displayed prominently across public 
spaces throughout the West Bank and Gaza, serves to visually 
dominate Palestinian-inhabited, Israeli-occupied territory. 
The body of the martyr constitutes a Palestinian attempt to 
control contested territory, at least visually. It serves to 
refuse Israeli control asserted over Palestinian-inhabited 
territories, at least visually. Unlike the physical body of 
the suicide bomber, these images cannot be spatially 
contained; nor can they be erased from the landscape. The 
body of the martyr in the commemorative posters, has become a 
permanent feature of Israeli-occupied, Palestinian inhabited 
territory (Allen 2006-a). 
The body of the Palestinian suicide bomber refuses otherness 
in its ability to trespass spatial boundaries and inflict 
damage on Israeli bodies, in Israel. The body of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber is capable of inflicting death on 
Israelis much as the IDF soldier is capable of inflicting 
death on Palestinians, albeit not to the same extent. 
163 
In its depiction as a soldier's body, a strong and powerful 
body, the body of the martyr mirrors the Israeli body ideal 
of the IDF soldier as a strong and powerful one and by 
extension, functions as a visual equal to the IDF soldier. In 
its depiction as a whole body, the body of the martyr 
presents an idealized image of the Palestinian national 
homeland as a whole, strong and powerful one, mirroring the 
Israeli national ideal of territorial wholeness, and 
presenting an image of the Palestinian nation as a strong and 
powerful one - as an equal to the Israeli nation. 
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Chapter 4 
Theorizing the performance of Palestinian martyrdom: 
intentionality, performance, and sUbjectivity under 
occupation l 
In focusing on the Palestinian martyr - the istishhadi - this 
chapter is centrally concerned with three key areas of 
investigation: intentionality, performance and sUbjectivity. 
This chapter foregrounds notions of the martyr's 
intentionality. It uses the term intentionality in its 
strictly defined sense, as pertaining to the purposeful and 
deliberate undertaking of an action or actions2 • The martyr 
intentionally chooses martyrdom: the martyr's act of self-
sacrifice is willful and intentional. This assertion derives 
from my own performance practice, as discussed in the 
following chapter. It also follows on from scholarly 
investigations, and the work of Farhad Khosrokhavar (2005) 
and Nasser Abufarha (2009) in particular. 
Following Khosrokhavar (2005), martyrdom is linked to 
sUbjectivity and to subject formation. Khosrokhavar (2005) 
1 I am most grateful to Neda Hadjikhani, PhD Candidate in Philosophy 
at SUNY Binghampton, for her invaluable feedback and suggestions on 
a draft version of this chapter. I am also grateful to the 
participants at the Radical Intersections: Performance Across 
Disciplines conference held at Northwestern University in April 
2009, for their feedback on sections of this chapter, presented at 
the conference. 
2 As defined in the Barber, Ed 2004, Canadian Oxford Dictionary. 
Intentionality has also been the subject of philosophical inquiry, 
where it is linked to questions of language, cognition and the 
mind; see for ex~ple the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality>. This area of 
philosophical investigation remains outside of my research 
framework. 
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asserts that martyrdom constitutes a type of subjectivity 
formed at the moment of the martyr's death. This prompted me 
to consider significant questions about Palestinian 
subjectivity under Israeli occupation. Given the focus on 
territory and territorial control in the thesis, my 
investigations in this chapter came to focus more 
specifically on the impact of Israeli spatial control in the 
Occupied Territories, on Palestinian subjectivity there. 
The Palestinian subject in the west Bank and Gaza is produced 
as an inferior Other subject, by Israeli spatial practices of 
confinement and restrictions on movement. However Israeli 
spatial control over the West Bank and Gaza is so extensive, 
and restrictions on Palestinian movement so severe, that they 
prevent Palestinians from living normal lives, diminishing 
possibilities for asserting control over one's daily life, 
and at the extreme, one's death. This produces Palestinians 
not only as inferior or Other subjects as compared to Jewish 
Israelis, but also, as non-subjects (Butler 2004, Collin 
2004). 
This chapter theorizes what I term the performance of 
Palestinian martyrdom. Performance consists in the 
istishhadi's performance, prior to deployment, for the 
purposes of producing the commemorative posters and also, 
commemorative video material. The istishhadi also performs 
for a pubic audience - albeit one that will only experience 
the performance posthumously, after her/his death. Individual 
Palestinians also perform, as social actors in public rituals 
- notably funeral marches - that commemorate the deceased 
martyr. Here performance engenders a collective, albeit 
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temporary transformation among members of the Palestinian 
public, but also, of occupied Palestinian territory. 
I consider the martyr's performance, prior to her/his 
deployment, as a type of subject formation performed in 
response to conditions of occupation that dramatically impact 
Palestinian SUbjectivity. In so doing I make reference to 
Bannerji's notion (2002) of the self-inventing subject. 
Through performance, the martyr enacts a refusal of the 
Israeli-imposed status of the inferior Other subject, as well 
as that of the non-subject. In performing as a martyr prior 
to deployment, the individual enacts a resistant type of 
subjectivity, characterized by intentionality and the 
performance of a type of power and control asserted over life 
and death, in response to the denial thereof, by Israel, in 
the West Bank and Gaza. 
This writing has also been influenced by the work of 
performance studies scholar Amelia Jones (1998), who examines 
the relationship between performance and SUbjectivity in body 
art practices of the 1960s and 1970s. 
The martyr's intentionality 
Much of the research literature consulted attempts to 
determine the reasons why Palestinian suicide bombers blow 
themselves up. This literature proposes a range of 
explanations, including active recruitment and manipulation 
by the deploying organizations; religious motivations, 
including Islamic extremism and fanaticism (Kimhi and Even 
2003, Paz 2000); the promise of reward, whether spiritual 
and/or financial (Ganor 2000, Intelligence and Terrorism 
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Information Center 2006); anti-Semitism and hatred of Israel 
(Berko 2007, Israel Information Center 2004); posthumous 
glorification (Oliver and Steinberg 2005); and hopelessness 
and despair (Stern 2003). For many of the writers above, 
these external factors either preclude or play a greater role 
than does the martyr's intentionality 3. 
Thus for example for Shay, while some Palestinian martyrs 
willingly volunteer to sacrifice themselves, the majority are 
influenced by factors such as family, religious beliefs, 
recruiters, and societal attitudes, what he terms "circles of 
influence surrounding the terrorist" (2004 pp.22-23). For 
Kimhi and Even, the small minority of Palestinian martyrs who 
willfully choose to die are religious or nationalist 
"fanatics" (2003 p.2), while the remainder are manipulated 
and exploited by the deploying organizations. Oliver and 
Steinberg (2005) cite the prevalence of a culture of 
martyrdom and death that glorifies the martyrs and martyrdom 
to such an extend that it succeeds in luring Palestinians to 
their deaths. Finally, in a statement that categorically 
emphasizes external manipulation, Paz writes: 
To the group member who is sent to kill and to be 
killed, death is presented as martyrdom - an act that 
will bring him closer to Allah. The individual who puts 
3 There is a related body of western and Israeli literature that 
seeks to explain the actions of female Palestinian suicide bombers, 
locating the women's actions not as the result of intentionality or 
individual choice, but rather, as the product of gender oppression, 
religious extremism and a lack of viable options for women in a 
patriarchal, Islamic society such as the one in Palestine. I deal 
with this matter in the following chapter. However it is worth 
mentioning here because it speaks to the denial of the martyr's 
intentionality. 
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such ideas into a youngster's mind turns him into a 
ticking time-bomb ... The group programs him [sic] so 
that he will explode at any given time as if by a remote 
control detonator" (2000 p.61)[Italics added]. 
Some writers concur that the individual makes a willful and 
carefully considered choice to become a martyr (Hafez 2006-a, 
Bloom 2003 and 2005, Pedahzur 2005, Khosrokhavar 2005, 
Juergensmeyer 2003, Stern 2003). However, some of these 
writers continue to stress other factors besides 
intentionality as the primary motivation for the martyr's 
actions. For example, Bloom (2005) and Hafez (2006-a) 
emphasize organizational factors 4 • Stern (2003) emphasizes 
despair. Ironically, so too does Khosrokhavar (2005), one of 
the strongest proponents of a theory of intentionality, and 
whose work I devote more attention to later in the chapter. 
It is useful to return to Abufarha's assertion (2009) that 
the istishhadi's actions are intentional and constitute acts 
of resistance to the occupation undertaken with a view to 
achieving national liberation objectives, and to cite Hage, 
who notes that, "it is impossible to understand the 
disposition toward self-sacrifice without an understanding of 
the unusually suffocating nature of Israeli colonialism" 
(2003 p.80). This view also finds echoes in the work of 
Slater (2009), Asad (2007), Allen (2006-c), Hasso (2005), and 
Mbebme (2003). 
Interestingly, Asad (2007) notes that motives (explanations) 
4 For a critical review of Hafez 2006-a see Allen 2006-c. I am most 
grateful to her analysis of Hafez as it helped me to refine my 
critique of much of the literature cited in this section. 
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are only sought when one disagrees with the action in 
question. Consequently, those who refuse to accept the 
martyrs' actions will go to great lengths to find religious 
and other reasons to explain them, 
we ask for an explanation in terms of motive only when 
we are suspicious of what the action means. We are not 
satisfied with 'He did it because he wanted to kill 
others (whom he regards as his enemies) by killing 
himself'. We ask: Why? - and assume that there is 
something bizarre about this action (2007 p.63). 
For Asad (2007), the martyrs' motives, whether we agree with 
them or not, must be considered to be deliberate and 
politically motivated. Building on the works cited above, I 
contend that the martyr intentionally chooses martyrdom. 
Israel's military occupation of Palestinian-inhabited 
territory provides a central impetus for this choice. The 
point of this research is not to categorically determine 
motive but rather to assert that the choice to become a 
martyr is a deliberate one made intentionally by the martyr, 
other possible contributing factors, notably religious 
convictions, notwithstanding5 • As Khosrokhavar asserts, 
That there is an organisational dimension to the 'human 
bomb' phenomenon is undeniable, but the anthropological 
dimension, which is bound up with a personal and 
eminently individual decision, is just as important. The 
5 Religious convictions certainly playa role in one's decision to 
sacrifice her/himself, as evident notably in the last will and 
testaments. However they do not in and of themselves, in my 
estimation, motivate martyrdom. 
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martyrs say so. In their testaments, video cassettes and 
writing, they often evoke the personal nature of their 
decisions (2005 p.131) [Italics added]6. 
Nowhere is the martyr's intentionality more definitive than 
in the last will and testament, written by the martyr prior 
to her/his deployment. In it the istishhadi categorically 
voices her/his intent to become a martyr and to execute a 
martyrdom operation. Mohammed Hafez (2006-a and 2006-b) 
provides a detailed study of the martyrs' last will and 
testaments in which they state their intent to sacrifice 
themselves. He notes, "The written and videotaped statements 
of suicide bombers contain a wealth of information about 
their personal motivations as well as the religious and 
nationalist symbols that inspired them" (2006-b p.167) 7. 
Intentionality is often expressed by the martyr in terms of a 
deliberate decision. For example, Hamas martyr Ismail 
Masawabi asserts that, "The wish to become a martyr dominated 
my life, my heart, my soul, my feelings •.. I have decided to 
become a shining light, illuminating the way for all Muslims 
- and a blazing fire to burn to death the enemy of god" (in 
Reuter 2004 p.9l) [italics added]. AMB martyr Dareen Abu Ayshe 
declares, "I have decided to be the second female martyr" (in 
6 Khosrokhavar's anthropological framework is of less interest to me 
than his focus on intentionality. 
7 Hafez notes three main themes in the last will and testaments 
(2006-a and 2006-b): First, the desire to become a martyr to 
demonstrate a commitment to God and to one's Islamic convictions; 
Second, martyrdom as a redemptive act that will punish the 
(Israeli) enemy while rewarding one's commitment to her/his faith; 
And third, afterlife and the reward of eternal life in Paradise; 
see in particular 2006-a pp.43-46 and 87-92. Hafez (2006-b) also 
notes that the martyrs use their last will and testaments to ask 
their families to celebrate their actions instead of mourning them. 
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Bafez 2006-a p.89)[Italics added]. Intentional self-sacrifice 
is also described as a desire or dream, as it is for Bamas 
martyr Reem al-Riyashi, "I have always wanted to be the first 
woman who sacrifices her life in the way of Allah" (Bamas 
2004)8. 
The performance of Palestinian martyrdom succinctly defined 
I theorize the performance of Palestinian martyrdom in 
greater detail beginning on page 184. For now, I provide this 
most succinct definition. The performance of martyrdom 
consists in actions performed by the martyr prior to 
deployment and documented for the purposes of creating and 
disseminating commemorative posters as well as commemorative 
video material9 • These actions consist primarily in posing and 
reciting the last will and testament for the camera. Through 
this performance, the istishhadi also "acts out" specific and 
central tenets of martyrdom, notably, intentional self-
sacrifice, and as a means of resistance, for Palestine. 
Performance also serves to connect the martyr to Palestine, 
to Palestinian resistance, and in some cases (as for Bamas 
and PIJ-deployed martyrs) to Islamic religious principles 
that underpin Palestinian national liberation objectives as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The martyr's actions are 
8 From a commemorative image of Reem al-Riyashi in my personal 
collection. A similar citation is available via the BBC, "I have 
always dreamt and wished to carry out a martyrdom-seeking 
operation ... I have always dreamt of sacrificing myself" (BBC 
Monitoring 2004). 
9 The process of documentation and the specifics of how the posters 
and videos are created, edited, assembled and produced, lie outside 
the scope of my research interests. 
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performed for a public audience that will experience the 
performance posthumously, after the martyr's death. Further, 
members of the Palestinian public also participate in the 
performance of martyrdom, notably in public rituals such as 
martyrs' funerals, in which they perform as social actors10 • 
On performance 
Theoretical considerations of performance elaborated by 
performance studies scholars Marvin Carlson (2004), Richard 
Schechner (2003 and 2002), Erika Fischer-Lichte (2008), 
Amelia Jones (1997 and 1998), and Peggy Phelan (1992 and 
1993), have informed my understanding of performance as 
relevant to my research. As Carlson (2004) notes, performance 
is an incredibly difficult concept to definitively define, 
because it eludes firm categorization within any single 
discipline, instead extending across several of them. 
Performance intersects with theoretical investigations in a 
range of academic disciplines, including but not limited to 
ethnography, anthropology, sociology, theatre and drama, art, 
linguistics and semiotics, postmodern philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, and postcolonial and cultural, feminist and 
10 My observations about performance and martyrdom developed 
independently and in large part as the result of my own performance 
practices. However it is important to note that Allen (2006-a) and 
Khalili (2007) both cite as performance, public acts that seek to 
commemorate and memorialize Palestinian martyrs, and in particular, 
funeral marches and processions. Abufarha (2009) writes about the 
cultural performance of martyrdom, situating his analysis within a 
cultural studies and anthropological framework of the performance 
of violence. Juergensmeyer (2003) discusses acts of terrorism such 
as suicide bombings and in particular that which occurred on 9/11 
in New York, as performances created specifically for a global 
media audience. 
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queer studies. For Carlson, performance may even be 
considered an antidiscipline, for it "resists the sort of 
definitions, boundaries, and limits" useful to academic 
structures (2004 p.206). The view that performance resists 
classification is echoed by Hoffman and Jonas (2005), who 
consider performance to be a pluri-disciplinary set of 
discourses. 
This interdisciplinary notion of performance is most 
relevant. I consider performance to be both an object of 
theoretical inquiry, and an action or series of actions 
performed for and received by an audience, that may unfold in 
aesthetic and/or non-aesthetic contexts. 
As Hoffman and Jonas observe, performance extends into every 
sphere of activity, "every action, in art as in life, is a 
performance" (2005 p.21). Here "performance is a 'quality' 
that can occur in any situation rather than a fenced-off 
genre" (Schechner 2003 p.22). Performance occurs in artistic, 
cultural and social.contexts, as well as various combinations 
thereofll. It can be understood in terms of behaviors 
rehearsed and repeated in everyday life (Goffman 1959, 
Schechner 2002), and as such it is also linked to the 
performance of social roles. As Carlson (2004) notes, 
performance is linked to all human activity and by extension, 
to its social and cultural encodings. 
11 Performance also unfolds in the realms of sport, business and 
advertising, however these are not relevant to my research. For 
Schechner (2003), ritual, theatre, play, games, sports, dance and 
music comprise the seven performance activities of humans. See also 
Chapter Two "What is Performance?" in Schechner 2002 pp.22-44 for a 
concise overview of key considerations of performance. 
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Social performance - performance in a socio-cultural (non-
aesthetic) context can include events such as "prayers, 
ritual readings and recitations, rites and ceremonies, 
festivals, and all those things we usually classify under 
religion and ritual" (Singer 1972, p. 71)12. Aesthetic 
performance - that which unfolds in an aesthetic or artistic 
context - most often involves performer(s) playing a dramatic 
or fictional role, in plays and films, for example13 • 
Aesthetic performance also includes practices, generally 
termed performance art, which rely primarily on the body of 
the artist and not on her/his performing a role (Carlson 
2004, Fischer Lichte 2008)14. Instances of aesthetic and non-
aesthetic performance alike most often tend to follow a 
script, be it dramatic or social; to be rehearsed and staged 
12 victor Turner and Milton Singer are two of the most influential 
theorists of social and cultural performance, respectively. Turner 
is best known for theorizing the concept of social drama, a subset 
of social performance practices defined as organized performance, 
for an audience, resulting in some type of collective or social 
transformation, and generally occurring in conflict situations. 
Social drama includes most notably, rites of passage (Schechner 
2003, Schechner and Appel 1990, and Carlson 2004). Cultural 
performances highlight particular instances of cultural 
organization, and they enable members of a given culture to display 
or show off their culture, both to themselves, and where relevant, 
to outsiders (Singer 1959). 
13 Following Fischer-Lichte (2008), I use the term aesthetic 
performance to describe all instances of artistic performance, both 
theatrical or dramatic performance (the performance of a fictional 
or dramatic work for an audience), and performance art. Carlson 
(2004), in contrast uses the term theatrical performance. The issue 
is not one of semantic distinction but rather personal preference. 
14 For Fischer-Lichte (2008) the distinction between aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic performance rests with whether the performance is 
sponsored by an arts institution, or not. On performance art see in 
particular Goldberg 2001 and 1998. Amelia Jones distinguishes body 
art from performance art, as a specific subset of performance art 
practices that unfolded during the 1960s and 1970s; see Jones 1998 
pp.12-14. 
175 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008); and be performed for an audience, one 
that mayor may not in turn also participate in the events. 
Following on from these investigations, performance is "an 
activity done by an individual or group in the presence of 
and for another individual or group" (Schechner 2003 p.22). 
Schechner's notion of performance derives from live theatre, 
however, I am more interested in the notion of performance 
being "for another individual or group" [italics added], than 
with it being experienced "in the presence of". In contrast 
to performance scholars such as Fischer-Lichte (2008) and 
Phelan (1992 and 1993), I do not consider liveness or 
presence to be the key condition for performance15 • This 
understanding of performance owes much to the work of Jones, 
who considers as performance not only action performed for a 
live audience but also actions performed in a private setting 
and documented "such that it [the performance] may be 
experienced subsequently through photography, film, video 
and/or text" (Jones 1998 p. 13) [Italics in original] [my 
addi tion], by an audience16 • This is the case with the 
15 Phelan (1992 and 1993) and Fischer-Lichte (2008) consider 
liveness - the co-presence of the performer and spectators - to be 
the key condition for performance, discussed specifically in an 
aesthetic context. They contend that performance must be 
experienced live by the viewer, requiring what Fischer-Lichte terms 
"the bodily co-presence of actors and spectators" (2008 p.68). For 
Phelan, "Performance's only life is in the present. Performance 
cannot be saved, recorded, documented, or otherwise participate in 
the circulation of representations of representation: once it does 
so, it becomes something other than performance" (1993 p.146). 
16 Writing in 2004, Phelan revisited some of her earlier 
observations about liveness and the documentation of performance, 
noting the prevalence of documentary technologies in recording 
performances today. However she continues to stress that liveness 
remains the most important aspect of experiencing performance. On 
performance art and its documentation see Auslander 2006. 
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martyr's performance, prior to her/his deployment, for the 
camera and by extension for posthumous experience by the 
viewer in the commemorative posters and videos. 
Performance may not require a live audience, however, 
performance must be for someone, "some audience that 
recognizes and validates it as performance" (Carlson 2004 
p.5). Thus I am also interested in what Fischer-Lichte (2008) 
calls reception, performance as received by the audience, 
considered here to be members of the Palestinian public. They 
play a central role in the posthumous reception of the 
martyr's performance, in the form of commemorative posters 
and video material, and by participating in public rituals 
such as funeral marches. 
Returning to the idea of performance as an activity or 
action, I am also concerned with the notion of performance 
that reflects the active "to perform", as in "to do, to 
behave, and to show" (Kirchenblatt-Gimblett, in Schechner 
2002, p.33). While some theorists, notably sociologist Erving 
Goffman (1959), have written of the ways in which humans 
unconsciously perform - behave - in everyday life, I am 
interested in performance that is deliberate and aware, 
involving what Carlson (2004) calls a consciousness on the 
part of the performer. Here performance is linked to playing 
a role, whether aesthetic or social. It may also be linked to 
the construction of the self (Carlson 2004), and this 
connects to my interest in subjectivity. Finally, I consider 
performance as embodied practice (Schechner 2002), as being 
contingent on the body and the body's deliberately performed 
actions. 
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To summarize, my specific interest in performance is of 
performance that is deliberate and aware; that is performed 
for an audience (though not necessarily a live one); that is 
corporeal and mobilizes the body; that is bound up in some 
kind of transformation at the level of the self and to a 
lesser extent, the audience; and that may be linked to 
subjectivity. 
The performance of Palestinian martyrdom and performance 
studies 
The performance of Palestinian martyrdom is difficult to 
classify using a framework of performance studies. It 
transcends and traverses the bounds of what may be theorized 
as either aesthetic or non-aesthetic performance, thereby 
eluding firm categorization as either one or the other. 
However and paradoxically, it contains elements of both. 
The performance of Palestinian martyrdom may be linked to the 
notion of becoming a character or performing a role in the 
context of aesthetic and non-aesthetic performance alike. It 
may also be linked to the performance of social roles in non-
aesthetic performance. In the first instance, the martyr's 
performance can be considered in terms of becoming a 
character or performing the role of a character in aesthetic 
performance, being "embodied (through performance) by an 
actor" (Carlson 1996 p.6). The martyr is not a fictional 
character, however the notion of becoming a character serves 
to highlight the fact that the martyr does perform a type of 
role. Becoming a character or performing a role is not 
limited to aesthetic performance as there are also instances 
1~ 
of non-aesthetic performance involving an individual (or more 
likely groups of individuals) becoming "characters", for 
example, during ceremonies and festivals 17 • Here, becoming a 
character occurs in the context of rites of passage, acts of 
religious worship, etc, rather than a fictional or dramatic 
role. The martyr's becoming a character occurs in the context 
of social performance, namely ritual, yet it draws on 
aesthetic elements such as staging in order to bring the 
character to life for the audience. This and all of the 
following elements are discussed in more detail beginning on 
page 184. 
As well, the Palestinian martyr performs according to a 
script that determines the parameters of how s/he acts, what 
s/he does, and what s/he says. As Carlson (2004), Schechner 
(2003) and Fischer-Lichte (2008) all observe, scripts are 
prevalent in aesthetic and non-aesthetic performance alike. 
Schechner defines a script most generally as "something that 
pre-exists any given enactment, which persists from enactment 
to enactment" (2003 p.68). According to the script of the 
performance of Palestinian martyrdom, key elements of the 
martyr's performance - for example, reciting verses from the 
Koran, reading the last will and testament, wearing specific 
insignia, dress and wielding props - are determined in 
advance by the deploying organization, with some variations 
depending on the specific objectives of the deploying group. 
The performance of martyrdom may also be considered as 
playing a social role, a part consisting in pre-established 
17 See for example Chapters 4 through 6 in Schechner 1993 pp.94-227; 
see also the essays in Schechner and Appel 1990. 
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behaviors presented by the performer on a series of occasions 
over time to the same audience (Goffman 1959). The role of 
martyr is performed over and over again, by dozens of 
Palestinian martyrs over a period spanning several years, for 
the Palestinian public at-large. The martyr resonates 
collectively as "a common identification through which 
Palestinians define themselves" (Eid 2008 p.3). The 
performance of martyrdom is linked to public rituals in which 
these common identifications are collectively produced and 
shared: public marches to celebrate the martyr; funeral 
processions after which the martyr is symbolically buried18 ; 
and visits by members of the public to pay their respect to 
the martyrs' families, for example. As such the performance 
of martyrdom may also be linked to ritual, "prescribed 
procedure that is dramatic, socially standardized, and 
repetitive ... " that "links individuals with broader goals and 
identities" (Hafez 2006-a p.41)19. What's more, because it 
involves the martyr together with social actors (the 
Palestinian public), the performance of martyrdom may also be 
considered, in Goffman's terms (1959), as constitutive of 
social relationships. 
A context for theorizing the performance of martyrdom 
This analysis of the performance of martyrdom is based on my 
mediated experience of commemorative posters and video 
18 I say "symbolically" because there tend to be no corporeal 
remains that may be physically interred, as noted in the previous 
chapter. 
19 For a comprehensive study of ritual see Bell 1997, Schechner 
2003, Schechner and Appel 1990, and Allsopp and Berghaus 1998. 
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material, observed and accessed primarily via the Internet. 
My analysis of this material has been largely mediated and 
deliberately so. I first discovered the commemorative posters 
under study on the Internet, and early in my doctoral 
research I decided against going to Palestine to conduct my 
investigations in-situ. Instead I continued to access much of 
this material on the Internet, as well as in documentary 
films and investigative reporting, and in the works of 
scholars from a variety of disciplines and points of view20 
(Hafez 2006-a and 2006-b, Khalili 2007, Allen 2006-a, 
Khosrokhavar 2005, Oliver and Steinberg 2005, Juergensmeyer 
2003, Stern 2002, and Reuter 2004, Hashhash 2006, Khalili 
2007, Allen 2006-a, Hasso 2005, and Naarnan 2007). I discussed 
commemorative posters in the previous chapter, and here a 
word must be said about the commemorative videos21 • 
20 In particular the films The Cult of the Suicide Bomber (both the 
UK and American editions)i Female Suicide Bombers: Dying to Kill; 
Suicide Killers; Death in Gaza; and Au nom du Hezbollah: Ai Manar. 
Some commemorative video material was accessed in its translated 
version in English on the website of the Middle East Media Research 
Institute TV Monitor Project (MEMRI)(www.memritv.org)i on the 
websites of the Israeli media watchdog group Palestinian Media 
Watch (PMW)i and on the online video Resource Library of the Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (www.mfa.gov.il). As with Oliver and 
Steinberg (2005), most of the material circulated by MEMRI, PMW and 
the MFA serves to promote a view of the Palestinian martyr 
(generally referred to as a suicide or homicide killer or 
terrorist) as the product of Islamic extremism, anti-Semitism and 
organizational manipulation. 
21 The first organization to disseminate videos of its martyrs was 
Hezbollah, in Lebanon in the early 1980s. By the 1990s, videos were 
being created by all of the Lebanese and Palestinian organizations 
that deployed suicide bombers (Rashwan 2002). Iraqi insurgent 
groups and al-Qaeda and its affiliates, among others, also produce 
commemorative videos of their martyrs. The earliest known use of 
video by a militant group in the region occurred in Afghanistan in 
the 1980s when the US-funded resistance movement was provided with 
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Like the commemorative posters, commemorative video material 
prominently features the martyr. The martyr most often wears 
the colors of the deploying group, together with military 
fatigues, a suicide belt, and wields a weapon. The martyr 
reads from her/his last will and testament and may also pray 
and recite verses from the Koran. Footage of the martyr may 
later be combined with additional footage (Stern 2003, Oliver 
and Steinberg 2005), for example, scenes from her/his 
martyrdom mission, speeches by leaders of the deploying 
organization, scenes of the funeral procession held for the 
martyr, and military training exercises. The videos combine 
many of the same visual elements as do the commemorative 
posters the use of weaponry, military fatigues, images of 
martyrdom operations - and like the posters, they place the 
martyr's self-sacrifice at the center of Palestinian 
resistance and national liberation objectives22 • 
a video camera used to record attacks on Soviet targets, and to 
subsequently circulate the footage; see Channel Terror. Brooks 
(2002) comments that, "Suicide bombing is, after all, perfectly 
suited to the television age. The bombers' farewell videos provide 
compelling footage, as do the interviews [conducted after their 
missions] with families" [unpag]. Similarly Juergensmeyer (2003) 
observes that terrorism is increasingly performed for a global 
television audience. 
22 A recent essay by Israeli curator Joshua Simon (2009) examines 
Palestinian martyrs' videos within the context of current video 
practice, positioning them in relation to propaganda images of war 
and terror on the one hand, and artists' videos on the other. He 
describes a macabre obsession with death and suicide as the primary 
focus of the videos. In my opinion his analysis falls short of 
grasping the true function of the videos: to commemorate the martyr 
as a hero who sacrificed her/himself for Palestine. His reading of 
the videos focuses disproportionately on the martyrs' Islamic 
religious motivations, without any consideration of the Occupation. 
His framework echoes that of much of the research literature 
written by Israeli authors in particular, and as described earlier 
in this chapter and the previous one. 
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The commemorative videos are circulated on the deploying 
groups' affiliated television networks and/or websites23 • They 
are also distributed to the media (Reuter 2004) and are 
broadcast in whole or in part by Palestinian media outlets 
and across the Middle East, including on satellite channels 
such as Qatar-based al-Jazeera, and Dubai-based Al Arabiya24 • 
On the performance of martyrdom, mediation and documentation 
I have not been witness to the martyr's performance for the 
documentary eye of the camera - the "behind the scenes" so to 
speak. Very few people have. My experience of the martyr's 
performance through textual analysis and documentation is 
informed by the work of Amelia Jones (1997 and 1998), who 
studied body art works of the 1960s and 1970s exclusively by 
way of their documentation, some 20 to 30 years after the 
works were performed for a live audience. Jones refers to the 
documentation of the performance as "documentary traces" 
(1997 p.12)25. Jones observes, "the problems raised by my 
absence (my not having been there) are largely logistical 
rather than ethical or hermeneutic" (1997 p.11). Whilst she 
concedes that experiencing a performance via its 
23 For example, Hamas has broadcast videos on its television 
station, Aqsa TV (see Channel Terror). They are also broadcast on 
Hezbollah's Al-Manar TV, based in Lebanon (see Au Nom du 
Hezbollah) . 
24 Unlike the television stations affiliated with groups that deploy 
or explicitly support suicide bombers (such as Aqsa-TV and Al-
Manar), these networks do not necessarily do so with a view to 
promoting acts of suicide bombing or martyrdom, although they have 
been accused of doing so by many in the West; see Channel Terror. 
25 In the previous chapter, the commemorative posters were 
considered as a type of remains, and the same can be said of the 
commemorative videos. 
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documentation is different from watching it live, she asserts 
that knowledge about the performance may certainly develop 
from having experienced it via documentation, and that this 
knowledge is just as valid as that which develops from 
experiencing the live performance (1997 and 1998). I don't 
consider the martyr's performance to be performance art, 
however, the matter of the lack of direct (lived) experience 
of performance as elaborated by Jones, serves to 
contextualize and frame my own experience of the martyr's 
performance. 
The performance of Palestinian martyrdom 
To reiterate, the performance of martyrdom consists in 
actions performed by the individual martyr prior to 
deployment - notably posing and reciting the last will and 
testament - and documented for the purposes of creating and 
disseminating commemorative posters and video material. The 
individual performs as a martyr by way of specific dress and 
props, and corporeal actions and gestures, that have come to 
be associated with martyrdom, intentional self-sacrifice, and 
Palestinian resistance, by the deploying groups. In so doing, 
the martyr also "acts out" or performs central tenets of 
Palestinian martyrdom: intentional self-sacrifice, as a means 
of resistance, for Palestine26 • 
26 I use the term "act out" in the sense of Kirchenblatt-Greenberg' s 
"to do, to behave and to show" (in Schechner 2002 p.33), and not in 
the psychoanalytic sense of acting out in the context of trauma. I 
am grateful to Carlson's text (2004) for making me aware of this 
distinction. 
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The performance of martyrdom consists in a ritual act 
conceived and orchestrated to stage and document the martyr 
as a martyr for a posthumous audience27 • The performance is 
ritualistic because it is repetitive - performed by every 
martyr prior to deployment, with some variations depending on 
the deploying group; it is dramatic and involves aesthetic 
and theatrical elements; and it connects the martyr to 
her/his imminent self-sacrifice, and to Palestine. 
At the time of the performance, the martyr has not yet 
executed the act of martyrdom. S/he performs as a martyr as 
part of a larger process through which the individual may 
become a martyr in the eyes of the Palestinian public, to be 
discussed in more detail on page 193. This occurs via the 
commemorative media (posters and videos), which serve in 
large part to present he or she who intentionally sacrificed 
her/his life, as a martyr or istishhadi, to a Palestinian 
public audience. 
The martyr's performance is aimed primarily at a primarily 
Palestinian audience (Abu Hashhash 2006, Khalili 2007), but 
it is also indirectly aimed at an Israeli and international 
27 Brooks (2002) contends that this pre-deployment ritual is 
designed to make it impossible for the martyr to subsequently back 
out of her/his mission because of the humiliation it would entail. 
Prior to their missions, the martyrs also perform acts associated 
with Islamic burial rites and the afterlife, as described in Hafez 
2006-a, Khosrokhavar 2005 and Brooks 2002. Their observations are 
limited to male martyrs. For example the martyr to be washes, 
cleans, shaves and purifies his body, and wraps himself in a burial 
shroud as if preparing for burial in the Islamic tradition. 
Sometimes the martyr lies in an empty grave to symbolize a peaceful 
death (Hafez 2006-a, Brooks 2002). The martyr may participate in 
symbolic burial and ceremonies. The martyr fasts and recites 
prayers, and writes the last will and testament. 
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audience (Khosrokhavar 2005)28. Aimed at a Palestinian 
audience, the performance seeks to inspire pride and an 
identification with the istishhadi; aimed at an Israeli 
audience, it sends a message that they are not safe from the 
actions of the martyr (Wigoder 2006). 
And, like the act of martyrdom itself, the martyr's 
performance is intentional. As Carlson (2004) asserts, 
performance involves consciousness on the part of the 
performer, who is aware that s/he is performing. 
Staging 
On the one hand, staging is largely determined by the 
deploying organizations. Each organization stages or 
orchestrates its martyrs' performances through the use of 
specific insignia, colors, dress and props. These may also be 
more or less religious, depending on the group's specific 
ideologies and objectives. Regardless of these nuances, the 
deploying organizations play a prominent role in directing 
the performance. Beyond staging, it can also be said that the 
martyr's performance follows a script that broadly determines 
what the martyr does and says, the parameters of which are 
also largely determined by the deploying group. For example, 
Wigoder writes abut the suicide bomber's posing for the 
camera as one of the many "gestures and performances that the 
Islamists stage" (2006 p.453) [Italics added], and his 
observations are also true of the more secular organizations. 
Wigoder's observations also apply to all of the actions 
28 Abu Hashhash is discussing commemorative posters specifically. 
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performed by the martyr - not only the pose - and they 
highlight the central role played by the deploying groups. 
However, the organizations' involvement in directing the 
performance is not incompatible with the martyr's 
intentionality: Like the act of martyrdom itself, the 
performance of martyrdom is willful and intentional. 
Staging is central to the martyr's performance as a martyr. 
Staging, "the aesthetic dimension in all possible types of 
performance" (Fischer-Lichte 2008 p.190), includes all of the 
aesthetic, planned and pre-rehearsed elements of a 
performance. Staging is distinct from the performance but is 
necessary to create the conditions for a successful 
performance, because it lends an impression of authenticity 
and makes the performance believable for the audience 
(Fischer-Lichte 2008). 
The martyr's performance may also be linked to the notion of 
becoming a character. Staging - notably the dress and props 
worn by the martyr - enables her/him to become the 
"character" of the martyr. Staging designates the performer 
as a martyr and enables her/him to bring the "character" to 
life for the audience. While the performance of martyrdom 
draws heavily on aesthetic forms such as staging to enable 
the martyr to authentically play the role of the martyr, the 
martyr is not a fictional character. The martyr also performs 
a social role, through the establishment of a social 
relationship with the audience after her/his death, through 
the martyrs' funerals in particular, discussed beginning on 
page 195. 
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Staging involves wearing specific dress and wielding props 
that have come to be associated with martyrdom by the 
deploying organizations: their insignia, military fatigues 
and weapons and in some instances, the Koran. The martyrs don 
the colors of the deploying organization, most often in the 
form of a sash worn across the chest, a headband, or both. 
Martyrs deployed by Bamas wear green; those deployed by the 
PIJ, black and gold; and those from the AMB, black and white. 
AMB martyrs often wear a black and white keffiyeh around the 
head or neck, while Bamas and PIJ martyrs sometimes wear a 
red and white keffiyeh. These groups use the colors of the 
Palestinian flag (white, black, red and green), thereby 
linking the martyr to Palestine. 
Dress and props also link the martyr to resistance and to 
Palestinian national liberation objectives. The keffiyeh worn 
by the martyr is a symbol of Palestinian resistance, as are 
the army fatigues, suicide belt and weapons. The belt and 
weaponry symbolize the means by which Palestinian martyrs 
(and the groups that deploy them) seek to realize Palestinian 
national objectives29 • More religious props such as sashes or 
headbands inscribed with the phrase Allahu akbar (God is 
great or God is the greatest), the hijab (for women martyrs), 
and the Koran connect the martyr to the Islamic faith and to 
Islam as a guiding principle of Palestinian national 
objectives in the discourses of Bamas and PIJ and as 
discussed in the previous chapter. 
29 The keffiyeh has been a symbol of Palestinian resistance going 
back to the Arab revolts of the 1930s. Khalili (2007) observes that 
while the props described above (headbands, the keffiyeh, weapons) 
are Palestinian nationalist symbols, they are also reminiscent of 
stagings used by martyrs in Iran and those deployed by Hezbollah. 
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Staging connects the martyr to Palestinian resistance and to 
Palestine. But it does not in and of itself connect the 
martyr to the third and in some ways most central (for my 
purposes) tenet of martyrdom: willful and intentional self-
sacrifice. On the one hand, Hafez notes that props such as 
guns and bombs "symbolize empowered individuals making a free 
choice to self-sacrifice" (2006-a p.41). While the suicide 
belt in particular symbolizes the martyr's self-sacrifice, 
none of these props alone are able to demonstrate or convey 
the istishhadi's willfulness or intentionality to the 
audience. 
Performing intentionality 
It is not the props alone that symbolize an empowered 
individual making a free choice to self-sacrifice, but 
rather, the body that does. Intentionality requires the body 
and the body's deliberately performed gestures and actions. 
The martyr poses for the camera30 • The martyr's pose is 
strong, the body's gestures deliberate. The pose is that of 
30 For a discussion of photographic conventions of the pose, see 
Owens, "Medusa Effect" (1992). For an excellent discussion of the 
pose examined in the context of Palestinian suicide bombers, see 
Wigoder (2006). Wigoder examines the pose of the suicide bomber as 
a type of "pre-emptive mimicry" (2006 p.454) that is directed at 
Israelis and that sends a message that they are not safe from the 
suicide bomber. Of particular interest is a section of writing 
(pp.454-455) in which Wigoder links the suicide bomber's pose to 
those of Israeli military pilots who pose next to their planes 
prior to conducting targeted assassinations of Palestinian 
militants. He notes that in both of these types of images, the pose 
constitutes a gesture of power. Without equating the photographs of 
the suicide bomber and the pilot, wigoder observes certain 
parallels between them, notably the use of posed photography prior 
to executing their missions. 
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one who has chosen her/his course of action, implying 
intentionality. The martyr turns her/his body to face the 
audience head-on, demonstrating a sense of conviction and 
steadfastness, as does eye contact with the viewer. The body 
of the martyr functions as a locus of intentionality for the 
act of self-sacrifice but also, for the martyr's performance. 
The martyr's intentionality is performed for a public, albeit 
posthumous audience. Intentionality is enacted in the 
conscious and aware nature of the performance, and in the 
martyr's deliberate pose, gesture and actions. It is also 
enacted in the last will and testament. In it, the martyr 
voices her/his intent to sacrifice her/himself. The martyr's 
last will and testament communicates the martyr's intentional 
choice of self-sacrifice, to a public audience. Through 
performance, the martyr's intentionality is received by the 
audience as a fait accompli: by the time the audience 
experiences the performance in the commemorative posters and 
videos, the martyr will have already fulfilled her/his stated 
intention of self-sacrifice. 
Embodiment and the body 
Fischer-Lichte discusses embodiment in the context of 
performance. She notes that embodiment "creates the 
possibility for the body to function as the object, subject, 
material and source of symbolic construction" (2008 p.89). 
The martyr's actions and gestures, appropriately staged, 
bring the linked tenets of martyrdom - intentional self-
sacrifice and resistance, for Palestine - to life, so to 
speak, through the register of the body. 
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In performing the act of martyrdom itself, the body is 
destroyed. The desire to sacrifice the mortal body is often 
expressed by the martyr in very graphic terms in the last 
will and testament. For example, Hamas martyr Muhammad Hazza 
al-Ghoul states, "How beautiful for the splinters of my bones 
to be the response that blows up the enemy ... " (in Hafez 
2006-a p.90). PIJ martyr Hanadi Jaradat speaks of deciding to 
turn her body into shrapnel as a weapon against the Zionist 
colonial enemy (MEMRI 2005). So too does Hamas martyr Reem 
al-Riyashi, who states, "I have always wished ..• that my body 
would be shrapnel that tears the sons of Zion [ •.. ] By God I 
wished to be the first female martyr who carried out a 
martyrdom-seeking operation where my body would be scattered 
in the air" (BBe Monitoring 2004, unpag.)31. 
The martyr reads the last will and testament aloud, to the 
viewer or audience. This act of reading the last will and 
testament is verbal, but also, corporeal. The martyr faces 
the camera and by extension, the viewer. The martyr reads the 
last will and testament to the viewer, periodically looking 
at the viewer, and making eye contact with the viewer. In 
addressing her/himself to the audience in this way, the 
martyr not only reads the last will and testament but also 
performs it, and I remind the reader that one of the key 
conditions of performance is that it is for someone. 
31 Abufarha (2009) has written about how the spread of Palestinian 
flesh and blood in Israel - in historic Palestine - serves to 
maintain a Palestinian connection to historically Palestinian land. 
Sherwell (2001), writing about the martyr in Palestinian painting, 
notes that the martyr's blood fertilizes the land and symbolically 
transforms it into the Palestinian national homeland. 
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The martyr's reading the last will aloud, to the viewer, 
shifts the focus to the body and to the voice; it transforms 
the act of reading into one of a shared relationship between 
the performer and the audience. This occurs through the 
voice, which "builds a bridge and establishes a relationship 
between two subjects" (Fischer-Lichte 2008 p.130). "The voice 
leaps from the body and vibrates through space so that it is 
heard by both the speaker/singer and others" (2008 p.125). 
Unlike in Fischer-Lichte's example, the martyr and the 
audience do not hear the voice simultaneously. However the 
martyr's voice does serve to build a relationship between the 
martyr and the audience, albeit one that develops 
posthumously after the martyr's death. Fischer-Lichte notes 
that in singing, the singer's voice exudes presence; the 
martyr's voice too exudes presence. It allows the martyr to 
be "present" and to connect with the audience even though 
s/he is no longer physically present. The martyr's voice may 
also be considered a type of "remains", for it is left behind 
after the martyr is gone. The voice - as remains - enables 
the martyr to live on or at least to maintain a presence 
among the living - to create a relationship with the living. 
The body also conveys strength and power, through the pose. 
The posing body is a resistant body, the locus of the 
martyr's power: the power to resist the occupation, the power 
to destroy itself, and in so doing, the power to destroy 
Israelis. The previous chapter explored how the whole body of 
the martyr in commemorative posters provides an idealized 
image of the Palestinian nation as a strong, powerful and 
resistant one. The body's gestures and actions in 
performance, and notably the pose, provide this ideal. The 
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body in performance - the strong, powerful and resistant body 
of the martyr - serves to convey this ideal, via the 
commemorative posters and videos, of the Palestinian nation 
as a whole, strong and powerful one. 
The performance of martyrdom as a type of becoming 
The performance of martyrdom is central to a process by way 
of which the deceased martyr is depicted by the deploying 
groups as a martyr, after her/his death. Performance is also 
central to the process by which the deceased becomes a martyr 
in the eyes of members of the Palestinian public. The 
martyr's performance helps to transform the individual into a 
martyr in the eyes of members of the Palestinian public. This 
aspect of the transformation occurs posthumously, when the 
performance is received by members of the Palestinian public 
via the commemorative posters and videos 32 • 
However, the individual's performance might also constitute 
an act of self-transformation. Performance provokes a type of 
32 Jones (1998) notes that meaning is not entirely contained in, nor 
exclusively generated by the performance alone. Meaning emerges in 
an intersubjective exchange between the performer and the viewer. 
In some ways the individual may only "become" a martyr if s/he is 
considered to be a martyr by the viewer. While many Palestinian and 
other viewers may consider the individual to be a martyr, many 
others do not. writing about representation and not performance, 
Lori Allen notes, "Martyr representations resonate with people, 
repel them, or cause both reactions simultaneously ... and depending 
on the viewer's own history, as well as the social and political 
context in which the display and observation occurs" (2006-a 
p.122). For example, Oliver and Steinberg (2005), MEMRI, PMWand 
the Israeli MFA, in their analyses of commemorative posters and 
videos, consider the martyrs to be homicide killers and not 
martyrs. 
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transformation at the level of the self, prior to death, and 
enacted by virtue of the martyr's performance. This may also 
be described as a sort of "becoming". I propose that in 
performing as a martyr, the individual also "becomes" a 
martyr in her/his own eyes. 
In contextualizing the performance of martyrdom I referred to 
the notion in performance studies, of becoming a character. 
Becoming a character in both aesthetic and non-aesthetic 
performance has a fixed duration: the performance lasts for a 
set period of time. In aesthetic performance, a dramatic 
actor performs as her/his fictional character for the 
duration of the performance; social actors perform their 
roles for what may be minutes, days, or years, but a fixed 
timeframe nonetheless. 
In the case of the martyr's performance one might assume that 
once the performance ends, the martyr will remove the dress 
and props that allowed her/him to "become" the character of 
the martyr for the performance, and continue to prepare for, 
and subsequently execute, her/his martyrdom mission. 
However the performance of martyrdom differs from aesthetic 
and social performance in that the martyr does not 
necessarily become a character for the duration of the 
performance alone. While the individual becomes the character 
of the martyr for the purposes of performance, this 
"becoming" may not necessarily end when the performance does. 
It is not easy to categorically determine with absolute 
certainty the point at which this becoming mayor may not 
come to and end. It is possible that in performing as a 
martyr, the individual also becomes a martyr, or at least 
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comes to perceive her/himself as a martyr. Performance might 
thus constitute a moment of self-transformation. 
Performing as a martyr is designed in part to foster 
identification with the act of martyrdom by the martyr to be, 
and may serve to enable the martyr to perceive or "see" 
her/himself as a martyr. This is speculative, however I 
suggest that performance produces a transformation at the 
level of the self. Because the act of performing as a martyr 
always precedes the act of self-sacrifice upon which 
martyrdom is contingent, the martyr in some way "becomes" or 
at least comes to perceive her/himself as a martyr as the 
result of her/his performance. Performance constitutes a type 
of "becoming". 
The performance of martyrdom and public transformation 
The performance of martyrdom was theorized as being performed 
by the martyr for a posthumous audience in members of the 
Palestinian public, and received primarily in the form of the 
commemorative posters and videos. However members of the 
Palestinian population at-large also participate in the 
performance of martyrdom. In examining this type of group or 
collective performance by members of the Palestinian public I 
consider public participation in martyr's funerals in the 
Occupied Territories. In using the terms "group" and 
"collective" I do not wish to imply that all Palestinians in 
the west Bank and Gaza participate in the funerals, nor that 
those who do participate share the same experience, nor that 
all of them share the same views about the martyrs' 
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funerals 33 . Rather I use these terms to distinguish the 
individual martyr's performance of martyrdom, from that which 
occurs in public, during the martyrs' funerals, and in which 
hundreds or even thousands of Palestinians may participate 
and perform as social actors. Writing about Palestinian 
commemorative practices more generally - practices that 
include the martyrs' funerals - Laleh Khalili observes that, 
"ordinary Palestinians become not only the audience for these 
institutional performances, but also actors within them" 
(2007 p.222)34. Similarly, Allen notes, "The process of 
remembering martyrs is performed" (2006-a p.114)[Italics 
added] . 
Funerals are held for all Palestinian martyrs or shahids 
killed in the context of the occupation, be they innocent 
civilians, militants targeted and assassinated, or 
istishhadi 35 • Martyrs' funerals consist primarily in public 
33 Allen (2006-a) takes up this point about the lack of collective 
consensus with regard to the martyr's funerals among members of the 
Palestinian public, and explores how they function as a forum for 
the expression of political differences and debate among members of 
the Palestinian public. 
34 In using the term " institutional" Khalili is referring to 
organized forms of commemoration associated with an organization or 
institution including (for example), the Palestinian Authority, 
non-governmental organizations and cultural institutions, and 
political parties or organizations. While she examines some 
commemorative practices in the Occupied Territories, her focus is 
on those that take place in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. 
35 The research material consulted does not always distinguish 
between funerals held specifically for istishhadis, those held for 
militants assassinated by the Israeli security forces, and those 
held for innocent Palestinians killed in the context of the 
occupation. As Allen notes, "Most of the more than 3,800 
Palestinians killed since 2000 [as of her writing in 2006] as a 
result of the occupation were memorialized with a martyr funeral 
whether they were engaged in active struggle or not" (2006-a 
p.113). For a most comprehensive analysis of the martyr's funerals 
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processions, culminating in a burial ceremony36. The martyr's 
bodily remains, whether physical or symbolic (there are no 
remains to bury in the case of the istishhadi), are carried 
through the streets to their final resting place, where the 
martyr is interred. 
There are varying degrees of public participation in the 
funerals. Some Palestinians watch as the funeral procession 
passes (Allen 2006-a), while others march in the procession 
that follows the remains of the martyr. Some marchers wield 
banners and flags, or hold commemorative posters of the 
martyr. Some marchers wear military fatigues and may also 
wield weapons37. Not all of those who participate, whether as 
observers or marchers, support acts of martyrdom, as Allen 
(2006-a) has remarked, for the funerals are part of daily 
life under Israeli Occupation38 . And, as Allen further notes, 
the funerals are also "the only expression of commitment to 
the struggle against occupation available to most people 
see Allen 2006-ai on the funerals in the larger context of 
Palestinian commemorative practices see Khalili 2007 and in 
particular pp.124-127 and pp.187-213. 
36 Allen notes that while it was during the second intifada that 
public martyrs' funerals became prevalent, they may be traced back 
to the days of the British Mandate in Palestine. 
37 Media depictions in the West often show images of Palestinian 
marchers dressed as martyrs, wearing army fatigues and headbands 
and strapping themselves with explosive belts. In so doing they too 
can be seen to be performing as martyrs. However I have been unable 
to establish with any certainty whether these media images are of 
martyrs' funerals, or of demonstrations and commemorative events. 
There is one such scene in the film Cult of the Suicide Bomber, 
however, it was filmed not at a martyr's funeral but rather at a 
demonstration held to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the 
deployment of suicide bomber Tariq Hamid, a Hamas martyr, in 2005. 
38 She further observes that some Palestinians participate for 
social reasons (to see family and friends), or to get out of the 
house or away from WOrki or out of a sense of solidarity with the 
families (Allen 2006-a). 
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other than those activists willing to take up arms (a small 
minority of the population)" (2006-a p.112). 
The funerals are also linked to loss. They allow members of 
the Palestinian public to come together in public to support 
the families of those who sacrificed themselves (Allen 2006-
a). However they also serve to transform loss into heroism, 
dignity and honor (Khalili 2007); to celebrate the martyr's 
sacrifice of life; and to allow for the public expression of 
pride (Allen 2006-a). 
The martyrs' funerals may also be considered in terms of 
ritual. They have "a recognizable form, a script, and a 
culturally validated socializing function" (Allen 2006-a 
p.l08). They serve to foster social bonds between members of 
the public and the deceased martyr, with her/his family, and 
with other members of the Palestinian public; and to foster 
connections between individual Palestinians and broader 
national identities and goals. 
Ritual in performance studies is theorized as occurring 
within social drama, where it is often linked to liminality, 
a transformation or change in social status of the 
participants and by extension the entire society, most 
notably in ceremonial rites of passage39 • The martyrs' 
funerals involve a type of transformation, however, there are 
limits to the notion of liminality here, because any 
transformation that may occur is not permanent, nor is it 
linked to any real or lasting change in the social status of 
39 As Fischer-Lichte (2008) and Carlson (2004) observe, the term 
liminality was coined by theorist Victor Turner in reference to the 
works of Arnold van Gennep and his 1909 text titled The Rites of 
Passage. 
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Palestinians. 
What's more, ritual in performance studies is considered to 
be a conservative force that provides a structure for 
predictable changes (Cohen-Cruz 1998). And so while 
liminality in ritual is linked to transformation, it tends to 
be limited to that which preserves the status quo (Carlson 
2004): when the liminal period ends, individuals are always 
inserted or reinserted into their existing or newly defined 
places in society (Schechner 1993). 
However the notion of liminality as a type of transformation 
is still a useful one. Fischer-Lichte (2008) distinguishes 
between liminality that occurs in ritual, and that which 
occurs in aesthetic performance. The transformations caused 
by liminality in aesthetic performance for her, are temporary 
and take effect for the duration of the performance4o • This 
transformation is impermanent, fleeting, and in the moment. 
Yet it is not invalid. For Fischer-Lichte, the 
transformations produced by performance may be corporeal or 
psychic; they can transform spectators into actors; and they 
can create community. 
The martyrs' funerals may be linked to transformation on 
several levels. They serve to publicly acknowledge the 
istishhadi's self-sacrifice, and in so doing they transform 
the deceased into a hero, much as the commemorative posters 
do, and they publicly elevate the martyr to a higher status. 
The funerals serve to transform loss into heroism (Khalili 
40 While the martyr's funerals are not aesthetic performance in a 
strict sense they do draw upon on aesthetic elements such as 
staging. 
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2007). They also transform individual experience into a group 
one, or at least a temporarily shared one: they temporarily 
create community by uniting the participants in acknowledging 
sacrifice (Allen 2006-a), and in sharing a social bond, 
despite any differences between them41 . 
The funerals also serve to temporarily transform territory 
under Israeli control. The funerals are performed under 
ultimate Israeli spatial and military control. However in 
coming together to watch and/or participate in the funeral, 
and in marching through Israeli-controlled, Palestinian 
inhabited territory, through the streets to the burial site, 
Palestinians are able to assert some kind of control - albeit 
temporarily - over contested territory in the West Bank and 
Gaza, and this represents a temporary transformation of 
space. 
Martyrdom as a type of subject formation: Khosrokhavar's 
individual in death 
Martyrdom, for Khosrokhavar (2005) is a type of sUbjectivity 
formed in death42. For him, modern (late 20th century) Islamic 
martyrdom constitutes a type of subjectivity that occurs at 
41 The funerals, following Allen (2006-a) also create a shared space 
for the airing and discussion of differences, thus also reflecting 
a type of community building. 
42 A major weakness of Khosrokhavar's study is that he fails to 
locate his arguments within a theoretical framework of 
subjectivity, nor does he define his understanding of the terms 
subjectivity, subject formation and the subject. As well he tends 
to conflate much of his terminology, for example, subjectivity and 
subject formation; the subject, the self and the individual. I 
examine notions of sUbjectivity in more detail beginning on page 
204. 
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the moment of the martyr's death, at which point the martyr 
becomes "an individual in death" (2005 p.46)43. Modern Islamic 
martyrdom, for Khosrokhavar, is linked to the emergence of 
Islamism attempts within the Islamic world to merge 
religion and politics44 • Modern Islamic martyrdom is also 
linked to sUbjectivity and to individual choice (Khosrokhavar 
2005). 
For Khosrokhavar, the martyr intentionally chooses to 
sacrifice himself45 • However his analysis rests on the premise 
that the martyr intentionally chooses death because self-
assertion - what he also terms self-realization - the desire 
to be an individual or a self, is impossible in life. This 
impossibility arises, for Khosrokhavar, because modern 
Islamic societies offer the promise of self-assertion but 
demand conformity, thereby precluding any real possibility of 
43 Khosrokhavar uses the terms martyr and individual in death 
interchangeably. He exclusively considers young, religious Muslim 
men who become martyrs by sacrificing themselves in acts of suicide 
bombing. 
44 Khosrokhavar defines Islamism as "a politic-religious current 
that tries to appropriate power and justifies a possible recourse 
to violence to install by authoritarian means a regime based on 
shari'a [Islamic religious law] ... placing particular emphasis on 
opposition to the West" (Khosrokhavar 2005 p.34)[my addition to the 
text]. Susan Buck-Morss (2003) considers Islamism in a postcolonial 
context, as a form of political protest against Western political 
hegemony and attempts to control and assert power over the Islamic 
world; see pp.41-62. So too does Khalili, who defines Islamism most 
broadly as, "the utilization of religious practices, discourses, 
and symbols to achieve concrete political goals, almost always 
within the territorialized nation-state" (2007 p.26). Khosrokhavar 
cites as examples of Islamism, the emergence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt in the 1950s together with the challenges it 
poses to secular politics there; the creation of the Islamic 
Republic in Iran; Hamas' national-religious objectives in Palestine 
and Hezbollah's in Lebanon; and al-Queda's goal of building an 
trans-national umma or community of Muslims. 
45 Khosrokhovar is exclusively concerned with male martyrs. 
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individuation or self-assertion. using Nietzsche's concept of 
ressentiment (resentment), he outlines a theory of the modern 
Islamic martyr, what he terms a radical Islamic 
"martyropathic subject" (2005 p.60) who blames the Western 
enemy for his inability to individuate or assert himself46 • 
Fuelled by the belief that self-assertion in life is 
impossible, the martyr turns to death (his own) and killing 
(the enemy), "There is at once a desire for self-assertion 
and a realisation that it is impossible. The dilemma is 
resolved through the destruction of both the self and those 
who are perceived as obstacles to self-realisation" 
(Khosrokhavar 2005 p.45). 
Khosrokhavar's Palestinian individual in death 
Similarly, for Khosrokhavar the Palestinian martyr or 
individual in death is the product of despair and 
hopelessness that result from the individual's failure to 
assert himself, as well as from the impossibility of 
collective Palestinian self-assertion - the failure to 
achieve Palestinian nationhood. This failure has led to the 
emergence, over the course of the al-Aqsa intifada, of what 
he considers to be a specifically negative or pessimistic 
form of Palestinian martyrdom. The increasing brutality of 
the occupation, the failures of the Oslo peace process, and 
the ineffectiveness and abuses of power on the part of the 
Palestinian Authority have for Khosrokhavar combined to 
foster a sense of despair and hopelessness for Palestinian 
46 Khosrokhavar often equates modern Islam with radical or 
fundamentalist Islam, which is highly problematic. 
202 
martyrs, so much so that they crave death (their own) and 
killing (the Israeli enemy) more than anything else, "One 
major feature of this wish to die and kill the enemy is the 
feeling that ... there is no future" (2005 p.132) [ ... ] "A 
glorious death is the royal road that allows them to escape 
the mediocrity to which they have been condemned" (2005 
p.137). 
Khosrokhavar's analysis is more insightful and nuanced than 
many of the ones discussed at the beginning of this chapter 
and in the previous one, yet it falls prey to some of the 
same pitfalls. Namely, it downplays the connections between 
acts of self-sacrifice and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian-inhabited territory, instead focusing 
disproportionately on despair as providing the main impetus 
for martyrdom. In contrast, I contend that the Palestinian 
martyr's death may be considered an act of self-assertion in 
the face of the occupation, because it is an act of 
resistance to the occupation and one that inflicts harm on 
the Israeli enemy. 
More importantly, Khosrokhavar's assertions - while highly 
problematic - inspired me to consider a relationship first 
between Palestinian martyrdom and Palestinian subjectivity, 
and second, between the performance of Palestinian martyrdom 
and the enactment of a SUbjectivity characterized by 
resistance. Khosrokhavar does not adequately define or 
explain what he means by the subject, subjectivity or subject 
formation, and so I had to elaborate a more specific 
theoretical framework that would allow me to explore these 
complex and heavily theorized concepts, as discussed below. 
Because territory is a central focus of the thesis, I focus 
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my analysis on examining the ways in which Israeli control 
asserted over Palestinian-inhabited territory may be linked 
to Palestinian subject formation. First, however, it is 
necessary to situate these notions within a broader 
theoretical framework of the subject, SUbjectivity and 
subject formation. 
The subject and subject formation 
The question of subjectivity, of what makes human beings into 
subjects, has been a matter of concern for philosophical 
inquiry going back to ancient Greek thought (Strozier 2002). 
Of greater concern to me are more contemporary theories of 
the subject. In the mid-20th century, scholarship (notably 
poststructuralist thought and Lacanian psychoanalysis) came 
to radically and profoundly interrogate existing conceptions 
of how subjects are formed, together with the modern notion 
of the subject itself47 • The modern subject had previously 
been theorized as self-founding, unitary and coherent, 
47 Scholarship that began to emerge at this time included but was 
not limited to, in addition to the areas of investigation cited 
above, phenomenological investigations (most notably by Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty), feminist theory (notably the work of Simone de 
Beauvoir, Luce Irigary and Helene Cixous - and I note a good deal 
of overlap between feminist and poststructuralist theory, 
especially in France), and investigations by Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, and Jean-Frangois Lyotard. This by no means 
constitutes a full list of all the theories of SUbjectivity at this 
time; a comprehensive study of these movements and scholars lies 
outside the focus of this research. For a comprehensive 
introduction to key theories of SUbjectivity and subject formation, 
see in particular Blackman, L. et. al 2008, and Johnston 1990 
pp.67-78. Grosz's outstanding investigation (1994) into 
corporeality and SUbjectivity, provides an innovative reading of 
the subject as considered by key thinkers such as Nietsche, Deleuze 
and Guattari, Freud and Lacan, and Merleau-Ponty. 
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autonomous and self-intentional (as described in Strozier 
2002, McLaren 2002 and Johnston 1990)48. This modern subject 
was radically unhinged as theoretical propositions began to 
interrogate notions of the subject as unitary, self-founding 
and autonomous. New conceptions of the subject as fractured 
and de-centered, "as an ever-varying matrix of biological, 
social, and cultural determinants" (Johnston 1990 p.69), were 
theorized. The (normative) Western, male subject came to be 
challenged by feminist, postcolonial and queer scholarship 49. 
Of particular relevance to my understanding of the subject, 
is the notion that subjects are produced, and this follows on 
from my interest, explored in Chapter 2, in the body as 
produced. This notion dominates postmodern theories of 
sUbjectivity. Subjects are produced by a complex web of 
psychic, cultural, and social factors, including ideology 
(Althusser), desire (Deleuze and Guattari), psychic rupture 
48 This notion of the subject that dominated modern philosophical 
inquiry from the 17th century until the mid-20th century is 
generally traced back to Descartes, who famously linked 
subjectivity to cognition and to knowledge (I think, therefore I 
am) and to dualism (the mind-body split), and consequently to the 
belief that the locus of subjectivity rests in the mind and not the 
body. The modern notion of the subject can also be traced to Kant's 
rational, knowing Enlightenment subject. My observations here are 
derived from readings of Grosz 1994, Jones 1998, McLaren 2002, and 
Strozier 2002. For a detailed discussion of the subject in 
Descartes and Kant, see Schwyzer 1997. What's more, while generally 
not explicitly stated, the modern, self-founding subject is Western 
and male. 
49 A detailed study of this scholarship lies outside the scope of 
this research. I briefly discuss otherness in the following 
section. There is not one unitary feminist theory of the subject, 
but rather, several schools; for details see Grosz 1994, and Hekman 
1995. The critique of heteronormativity is a major theme in the 
work of Judith Butler; see in particular Butler 1999, 1993, and 
2004. 
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(Lacan), discourse and power (Foucault), and social norms 
(Butler) 50. 
Palestinian subjectivity and the Israeli occupation of the 
west Bank and Gaza 
This research cannot fully consider all of the factors that 
combine to produce Palestinian subjectivity in the west Bank 
and Gaza. Discursive, psychic, social, cultural, and economic 
factors, among others, contribute to producing Palestinian 
subjectivity, as does most importantly for the purposes of 
this study, Israeli control wielded over Palestinian-
inhabited territory in the West Bank and Gaza and by 
extension, over Palestinian subjects there. 
This research could be called to task for eliding some of the 
complexities of Palestinian SUbjectivity and subject 
formation, for it focuses heavily on external factors, 
notably the Israeli occupation and Israeli spatial practices 
in the west Bank and Gaza. The intention is not to simplify 
the complexities of Palestinian subjectivity or subject 
formation, nor to present Palestinians as victims, but rather 
to set limits through which to frame an analysis of 
Palestinian subjectivity under conditions of occupation, and 
to highlight the disproportionate amount of Israeli control 
50 These cursory observations describe some of the most influential 
theories and theorists of subjectivity; a more in depth discussion 
lies outside the scope of my research. This brief listing does not 
do justice to the complexities of the theories advanced by many of 
these scholars, nor to the overlap among their theoretical 
propositions (for example, Deleuze and Guattari draw upon Foucault; 
Butler draws on Althusser, Lacan and Foucault, etc.). 
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wielded over Palestinian-occupied territory in the West Bank 
and Gaza and by extension, over Palestinians theres1 • 
This study is examines alterity, nationalism, and spatial 
control, as central to Palestinian sUbjectivity in the West 
Bank and Gaza. 
51 Junka (2006) observes that Palestinian sUbjectivity has often 
been considered within the narrow parameters of victimhood on the 
one hand, and militancy on the other. She writes, "lack of 
attention to the internal politics among Palestinians risks 
simplifying the complexities of power relations within which these 
expressions of Palestinian subjectivity took place" (2006 
p.423) [Italics added]. On the one hand, Junka's observations 
alerted me to the fact that my study focuses disproportionately on 
external factors (Israeli control), rather than on internal ones 
(Palestinian internal politics for example). This decision, 
however, was a deliberate one, in keeping with my focus in the 
thesis on territory and on spatial control. However it is also 
important to note that Palestinian internal politics in the 
Occupied territories unfold within and are limited by the larger 
context of the Israeli occupation. Consequently the Israeli state 
is able to exercise a great degree of influence (wielded directly 
or indirectly) over Palestinian politics, and over the Palestinian 
Authority in particular. Without wanting to downplay the 
complexities of internal Palestinian politics nor their effects on 
the Palestinian population, Israeli government policies have 
profoundly affected and contoured Palestinian internal politics; 
see Rabbani 2006. Since the start of the second intifada, Israel 
has pursued an aggressive strategy aimed at destabilizing 
Palestinian politics: it imprisoned then PA president Yassir Arafat 
for three years and assassinated leading figures of the Palestinian 
opposition movement (Hamas and Islamic Jihad); it physically 
destroyed Palestinian political institutions and infrastructure; 
and it refuses to recognize the democratically elected Hamas 
government. Kimmerling considers these efforts to be politicide, "a 
process that has, as its ultimate goal, the dissolution of the 
Palestinian people's existence as a legitimate social, political, 
and economic entity" (2003 pp.3-4). Jamal (2005) describes these 
actions as the near-paralysis of Palestinian politics. For him, the 
impact of Israeli policies weighs heavily on Palestinian politics, 
however, so too do internal factors such as factionalism and the 
failure to achieve consensus about political strategies for 
achieving national goals. 
207 
More generally and prior to 1967, as a settler-colonial 
project, Zionism produced the Palestinian subject as an 
inferior Other, and I reiterate once more Stuart Hall's 
observation (1990), that colonial subjects are constructed as 
Other by, and are perceived to be, inferior to the dominant 
colonial power. Political theorist Linda Tabar observes more 
generally that, "Zionism was founded upon the constitutive 
exclusion of the Palestinian subject and the negation of the 
rights of this indigenous population" (2007 p.11) [Italics 
added]. 
Palestinian sUbjectivity has been also contoured in large 
part in response to territorial losses. Tina Sherwell (2003) 
notes that Palestinian national identity has been forged not 
by the stability of the nation, but out of a collective 
longing for a nation-state. The same can be said of 
Palestinian sUbjectivity. Notably, al-Nakba (the catastrophe) 
of 1948 and the territorial losses it entailed for the 
majority of Palestinians, has played a central role in 
producing Palestinians as subjects and certainly as national 
subjects. For Lori Allen, "nationalism is hegemonic, 
structuring the texture of social life, its ideologies 
guiding the formation of sUbjectivity and political identity" 
(2006-a p.110)[italics added]S2. I am grateful to Allen's 
52 Allen (2006-a) examines the ways in which martyr's posters and 
funerals serve to "hail" Palestinians in the Occupied Territories 
as national/nationalist subjects (note that she uses both terms). 
Zachary Lockman notes that as a force that structures identity and 
SUbjectivity, nationalism is problematic because it consists in "a 
unitary and internally unconflicted ideal that represents the 
authentic core of personhood in all circumstances superior to or 
even excluding all other identities, sentiments, interests, 
loyalties, and aspirations" (quoted in Kanaaneh 2003 p.l8). 
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observation about the link between nationalism and subject 
formation and so I also use the term national subject - a 
term also used by Sherwell (2003) - in considering notions of 
Palestinian subjectivity. 
The self-inventing national subject 
Subjectivity, for sociologist Himani Bannerji (2002), is both 
invented and inventing: the subject is produced both 
externally and internally. Writing about gendered and 
colonized subjects in India during the 19th century, 
subjects, for Bannerji are externally invented as Other, for 
example, women by men, and colonized peoples by their 
colonizers. Yet she contends that is also possible for 
subjects to invent themselves within a given social or 
historical contextS3 • However, Bannerji notes, the process of 
self-invention is always shaped by the larger social or 
historical context in which it unfolds, as well as by the 
discourses of otherness that came to produce the subject as 
53 Self-invention for Bannerji involves the creation of an ideal 
type of SUbjectivity with which members of the group in question 
will identify and by extension, emulate and seek to become. She is 
primarily concerned with the social and cultural construction of 
middle-class women's subjectivity in the western Indian region of 
Bengal in the mid- to late-19th century, a period when the Bengali 
middle class in India began to emerge and take shape. At this time 
there was a significant effort made by members of the Bengali 
middle class to distinguish themselves from members of other Indian 
classes (particularly the lower classes), as well as from the 
British colonists. This required the creation of an ideal type of 
middle-class Bengali subjectivity with which members of that 
community would self-identify and by extension, attempt to become. 
In this context Bengali women created a specific type of female 
subjectivity for Bengali middle class women as distinct from that 
of Bengali middle class men; it centered on modesty and education, 
and these ideals were transmitted notably in women's magazines. 
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Other in the first place, what she terms doubling. Bannerji's 
self-inventing subject is not to be confused with the modern 
self-founding subject. The self-inventing subject is one who 
seeks to invent or in some cases transform her/himself in 
response to or in addition to already existing social, 
discursive and psychic factors that have already produced the 
subject. Thus her focus is on the subject's ability to invent 
her/himself within or in response to existing limits or 
conditions~. 
Bannerji's notion of the self-inventing subject is also 
relevant to Jewish subject formation in historic Palestine 
going back to the late 19th century. There, Jews were able to 
invent themselves as they desired as national subjects, by 
asserting control over territory in Palestine and 
transforming it into Jewish national territory - the state of 
Israel. 
Spurred in the late 19th century by the emergence of Zionism, 
Jewish self-invention as national subjects would unfold in 
Palestine55 • There, European Jews would transform themselves 
from landless, inferior Other subjects (to European 
gentiles), into national subjects in a Jewish national 
54 This point that finds echoes in the work of Judith Butler, 
without directly referencing her. I return to Butler in the section 
dealing with the Palestinian non-subject. 
55 This discussion of Jewish self-invention does not take into 
account all of the various processes (psychic, discursive, social, 
etc.) that produce subjects and as such does not constitute a 
comprehensive analysis of Jewish subject formation in historic 
Palestine. Such a discussion lies outside the scope of this 
writing. Rather I focus on the invention of the Jewish national 
subject in Palestine in a relationship to territory there. 
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territory56. The Zionist settlers to Palestine succeeded in 
becoming national subjects in their own national territory, a 
process that came to fruition with the creation of the state 
of Israel, whence Israelis became national subjects in a 
sovereign national homeland. Jews in Palestine had succeeded 
in inventing themselves as they desired, as national subjects 
but also, as a sovereign nation, Israel. 
Since 1948, Israeli national subjectivity has been 
inextricably linked to soldiering. Because Israeli 
sovereignty is backed by military power (Weiss 2002-a), 
soldiering plays a central role in producing Israelis as 
national subjects57 • And because military service is 
compulsory for Jewish-Israelis, soldiering is more central to 
Israeli subjectivity than it is to concepts of selfhood in 
many other nations. Following Weiss (2002-a), it may also be 
said that the ideal Israeli national subjectivity - a 
56 The transformation of the Jewish body in Palestine was discussed 
in Chapter Two. The desire for Jewish self-invention was itself the 
product of Jewish otherness in Europe and the lack of a national 
territory that Jews could call their own. European Jews were often 
forbidden to own or otherwise control land, in Eastern Europe in 
particular. Jews were also subject to laws that dictated where they 
could or could not reside, as was famously the case with the Jewish 
Pale of settlement in Russia (1791-1917), an area that comprises 
present-day Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belorus. Over 90 
per cent of Russian Jews were forced to live in the Pale, with many 
of them forcibly deported there (see 
www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/pale.html). The 
argument can also be made that eastern European Jews were spatially 
produced as inferior Other subjects by virtue of their territorial 
confinement within the Russian Pale of settlement. 
57 It should be noted that the normative Israeli subject - like the 
normative Israeli body discussed in Chapter Two - is Jewish, 
masculine and male, and Ashkenazi, producing as Others, Palestinian 
citizens of Israel, Sephardim, women, and queers, among others. A 
more comprehensive analysis of Israeli sUbjectivity lies outside 
the scope of this research. 
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willingness to fight and die for his country - is embodied by 
the IDF soldier58 • 
In contrast to Israeli national subjects, to date it has been 
impossible for Palestinians to invent themselves as they 
desire as national subjects in a sovereign national 
territory. What's more, Jewish/Israeli59 self-invention as 
national subjects in historic Palestine had a profound impact 
on Palestinian subjectivity, for the loss of their land and 
their widespread deterritorialization in 1947-1949 dealt a 
serious blow to Palestinian self-invention as national 
subjects in a sovereign Palestinian national territory. Since 
1967, the possibility of Palestinian self-invention as 
national subjects in a national territory has also 
increasingly been stymied by Israel's military occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza60 • 
The Palestinian subject of Israeli spatial control 
Israel wields a disproportionate level of control over 
Palestinian-inhabited territory and over Palestinian movement 
in the Occupied Territories - and by extension, over 
Palestinians - manifest most notably in their confinement to 
58 Kimmerling (1993) notes that Israeli society is also 
characterized by the constant anticipation of and preparation for 
war, and as a result, "Israeli militarism tends to serve as one of 
the central organizational principles of the society" (1993 p.199). 
59 My use of the term "Jewish" refers specifically to Jewish 
subjectivity in Palestine between 1880 and 1948, and my use of the 
term "Israeli", to Israeli sUbjectivity after 1948. 
60 For Israeli political theorist Neve Gordon, Israel's refusal in 
1967 to grant Palestinians in the Occupied Territories citizenship 
and to integrate them into Israeli society has served to constitute 
them as "non-national subjects" (2008 p.32). 
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enclaves. Consequently a relationship between Israeli spatial 
control and Palestinian sUbjectivity is presented. 
The Palestinian subject in the West Bank and Gaza is 
spatially produced as an inferior Other subject by virtue of 
its spatial control and confinement, by Israel. The 
Palestinian subject there, is spatially confined to enclaves 
by Israeli construction projects, checkpoints, fences and 
barriers, and subject to severe restrictions on movement 
across territory. In contrast Jewish Israeli subjects enjoy 
unlimited freedom of movement across territory in Israel and 
most of the West Bank, on proprietary and exclusively Jewish 
roads systems. Spatial control thus produces the Palestinian 
subject as an inferior Other to Jewish Israeli subjects who 
enjoy unfettered movement across territory. This relationship 
was cited in the previous chapter in a discussion of 
Palestinian corporeality and otherness. However Israeli 
control over Palestinian-inhabited territory is so severe, 
its restrictions on Palestinian movement so severe, that they 
produce the Palestinian subject in the West Bank and Gaza not 
only as an inferior Other subject, but also as a non-
subject~. 
The Palestinian non-subject of Israeli spatial control 
Grounding her analysis of the subject in a reading of Hannah 
Arendt's The Human Condition, the subject, for Collin, is one 
61 As theorized by Butler (1993) and Collin (2004). 
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who figures in speech and action (2004)62. In contrast the 
non-subject, for Collin (2004), is someone who has yet to be 
recognized as a subject - who has yet to figure in speech and 
action. Most importantly for my analysis, the non-subject 
"needs first demand their right of entry" (Collin 2004 
p.lS) [italics added] to the space of the subject. However the 
authority to decide who is or is not recognized as a subject, 
for Collin, rests with the subject himself, "He [the subject] 
has the authority to denounce the authority of the subject" 
(2004 p.lS). Without explicitly mentioning it, the subject, 
in my reading of Collin, is constituted through relations of 
power ("authority"). 
Following Collin, it is the Israeli state that has the 
authority to decide who is recognized as a subject in the 
Occupied Territories, and who is not. By virtue of their 
62 For Collin the subject is a speaking subject who figures in 
speech and in action - whose voice can be heard. Collin is writing 
about sexual difference and of women as Others to men. Collin is 
concerned with alterity and ethics and argues for a new formulation 
of the subject that is ethical and plural, and characterized by 
respect for difference. This "plural" subject (2004 p.21) would 
speak with one voice, subverting the subject/non-subject dichotomy 
in which (sexual) difference produces women as unequal Others - as 
non-subjects - to men. Julia Kristeva has theorized the speaking 
subject as one who is split by language; the speaking subject has 
also been considered in communication studies. The case can be made 
that Palestinians have been "silenced" (legally, politically, 
discursively) by the Israeli state: for example, former Israeli 
prime minister Golda Meir was quoted in an interview published in 
the Sunday Times (and later in the Washington Post) in June 1969 as 
saying that there is no such thing as a Palestinian people. Israeli 
writer and journalist David Grossman, in a public lecture in London 
in 2005, noted the rendering invisible of Palestinians through 
discourse in Israel, observing that until the start of the first 
intifada in 1987, Israeli state broadcasters were forbidden from 
using the term Palestinian. A more in-depth discussion lies outside 
the scope of this research. 
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spatial confinement to enclaves, and the harsh restrictions 
on movement imposed on them by Israel, Palestinians in the 
Occupied Territories are not recognized as subjects as 
compared to Jewish Israelis who enjoy complete freedom of 
movement across territory. 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are produced as non-
subjects owing to Israeli practices of containment, control, 
and restrictions on movement63 • I return again to Butler's 
theory of zones of abjection (1993). Israeli restrictions on 
Palestinian movement serve to exclude Palestinians from the 
status or domain of the subject, for they serve to confine 
Palestinians to enclaves - previously explored as zones of 
abjection - "those I unlivable , and I uninhabitable , zones of 
social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those 
who are not yet 'subjects,' but who form the constitutive 
outside to the domain of the subject" (Butler 1993 p.3)" 
[Italics added]. Confinement to zones of abjection thus 
produces Palestinians as non-subjects". 
63 For Gordon (2008) restrictions on movement serve to constitute 
and administer what he terms the "moving subject" (p.38). While 
Gordon is similarly critical of these restrictions, I would venture 
that these restrictions produce a non-moving subject. 
64 While Butler (1993) links zones of abjection to the non-subject, 
the subject in Butler is not necessarily produced spatially. 
Rather, subjects are formed through a process of assuming a sex, 
what she terms identification. To become a subject requires one to 
identify with the normative sex (heterosexuality). For Butler, 
compulsory heterosexuality promotes normative (heterosexual) 
identifications while disavowing non-normative (homosexual) ones. 
Therefore, non-normative identification with the "wrong" sex 
produces non-subjects. It is these non-subjects (also termed abject 
beings by Butler) who populate Butler's zones of abjection. 
Subjectivity, the subject and subject formation (particularly of 
sexed subjects) is one of the predominant and recurrent themes in 
Butler's extensive oeuvre (1993, 1997, 2004, 2005). She examines 
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The non-subject, for Butler, is constituted by force of 
exclusion65 • So too, for Collin. Collin's notion, cited 
earlier, of "right of entry" to the space of the subject 
(2004 p.lS) may be considered literally in this context: the 
Jewish settlements and road networks, fences, barriers and 
checkpoints and travel restrictions that serve to spatially 
confine Palestinians and restrict their movement across 
the various processes through which subjects are formed; these may 
be discursive (read for example through Derrida and Austin), and/or 
psychoanalytic (read through Kristeva and Lacan among others). As 
well, subjects are produced by social norms that are internalized 
and reproduced by the subject. Subjects are also produced by power, 
both external and internal to the subject. For Butler there is not 
one single, finite moment or process that can be said to form the 
subject, rather, subjects are continually being formed. Butler has 
been criticized for overemphasizing discourse in subject formation, 
and for doing away with the subject altogether; see Kirby 2006 
pp.129-143 for a summary of these arguments, as well as Salih 2002 
pp.137-152. 
65 Palestinians in the Occupied Territories are not only spatially 
excluded from the domain or status of the subject, but also, 
juridically. Palestinians there are ruled by Israeli military law, 
and thereby denied the legal framework available to Jewish Israelis 
(the Jewish settlers) in the west Bank, who are governed by Israeli 
civilian law. Gordon (2008) notes that one of the most striking 
characteristics of the second intifada is the extensive suspension 
of the law in the Occupied Territories, resulting for example in 
extrajuridcal executions (targeted assassinations). The lack of 
recourse to law and to legal protection can also be said to produce 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as non-subjects. Israel has 
refused to respect international humanitarian law in the Occupied 
Territories and this has also served to deny Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza fundamental legal rights and protections. 
Butler, discussing the denial of legal rights in the context of 
indefinite detention for terror suspects at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, 
notes that because the detainees are not protected by international 
law, they "are not subjects in any legal or normative sense" (2005 
p.xvi). The same thing may be said of Palestinians in the Occupied 
Territories. While the issue of law lies outside the scope of this 
writing it is useful to identify a link between the Palestinian 
non-subject in the Occupied Territories and the denial of their 
legal rights there, particularly as compared to Jewish Israelis. 
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territory also serve to restrict Palestinian entry to the 
space of the subject, thereby producing them as non-subjects. 
The Palestinian non-subject and the lack of control over 
daily life 
within these zones of abjection Israel wields control not 
only over territory but also asserts near-absolute control 
over virtually all aspects of Palestinian daily life. Jeff 
Halper calls this the matrix of control, "an interlocking 
series of mechanisms ... that allows Israel to control every 
aspect of Palestinian life in the Occupied Territories" (2006 
p.63). These observations are not meant to imply that 
Palestinians have no control over their actions or lives, nor 
that they do not aspire to greater degrees of control. Rather 
I wish to emphasize the degree to which Israeli control of 
Palestinian-inhabited territory, exercised in large part by 
way of spatial confinement and restrictions on movement, 
serve to impede normal daily life. 
For example, Israeli spatial control prevents Palestinians 
from maintaining normal kinship relations: residency 
restrictions prevent Palestinians from living where they want 
to and with whom, and make it difficult and in some cases 
impossible for Palestinians to marry or live with their 
spouses. Residents of Gaza may not live in the West Bank and 
vice-versa, resulting in the separation of families and 
difficulties for married couples with different residency 
permits. Palestinian residents of the Occupied Territories 
who are married to Israeli citizens may not live in Israel 
with their spouses (Macintyre 2006). In 2008 Israeli 
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introduced new permit restrictions on residency to make it 
even more difficult for Gazans to live in the West Bank, and 
began to forcibly remove them from the West Bank as illegal 
aliens (B'Tselem and Hamoked 2008)66. Restrictions on movement 
prevent Palestinians from traveling over distances long and 
short alike, to spend time with family members and friends; 
they also prevent many forms of social and political 
interaction, by preventing Palestinians from attending social 
functions, meetings, or participating in political 
activities. Palestinians are unable to travel to their places 
of employment; restrictions on movement often prevent them 
from being employed at all: Palestinians may no longer travel 
to work inside Israel. Similarly, spatial confinement 
prevents Palestinians from attending school and from 
uni versi ty level education in particular67 • Because of 
restrictions on the movement of goods, it is often difficult 
for them to buy food and consumer goods of their choosing, 
sometimes if at all. It has become increasingly difficult for 
Palestinians to plant or harvest their fields and orchards, 
owing to the construction of the Separation Barrier in the 
West Bank which often separates Palestinians from their 
66 According to these groups, "Israel is taking unilateral measures 
to institutionalize and perpetuate a new factual and legal reality 
of separation between residents of the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank, while severing the interdependent social, economic and 
cultural ties between the two groups, infringing their rights and 
impeding the possibility that the Palestinian people will realize 
their right to self determination" (B'Tselem and Hamoked 2008 
unpag) . 
67 Restrictions on movement make it difficult if not impossible for 
Palestinians to study in Israel and abroad. Palestinians accepted 
to Israeli universities are subject to strict military restrictions 
that prevent them from entering Israel; see www.gisha.org. On 
restrictions that prevent Palestinians from studying abroad see 
Held Back (2008). 
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fields and orchards. Palestinians are also prevented from 
frequenting restaurants or galleries or cultural centers and 
consequently, from enjoying forms of entertainment, art, 
music, and theatre, among others. Palestinians are often 
prevented from leaving their homes at all, owing to closure 
and also to curfews - and here Israel also controls time68 • 
The Occupied Territories may therefore be considered 
unlivable (Butler 1993 p.3) because Palestinians there are 
systematically denied the ability to exert control over the 
daily activities that comprise a normal, everyday life, and 
consequently, are deprived of almost all possibility of 
leading a normal life. Israeli spatial control in the West 
Bank and Gaza can be seen to produce Palestinians there as 
non-subjects by drastically limiting their ability to live 
normal daily lives. More recently in Gaza during Operation 
Cast Lead, it has impacted their ability to live, as 
discussed in detail in the previous chapter69 • Thus Israel 
asserts control not only over Palestinian life in the 
Occupied Territories, but also, Palestinian death, and this 
was discussed in the previous chapter in the section dealing 
with the mortal effects of Israeli restrictions on 
Palestinian movement. 
68 Control of time by virtue of closure and restrictions on movement 
is examined in detail in Haas (2002), who asserts that Israeli 
control of time makes any semblance of normal daily life 
impossible. 
69 My interest in Palestinian subjectivity during the war in Gaza 
inspired the creation of a studio work titled the Concrete Infinity 
Gaza Project, to be shown as part of my viva exhibition. 
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Sovereign power: power over life and death 
Postcolonial scholar Achille Mbembe has theorized control 
asserted over the subjects of modern colonialism by the 
colonizing power as sovereign power, "the power and capacity 
to dictate who may live and who must die" (2003 p.ll). As 
such sovereign power is also linked to the power to kilpo • 
For Mbembe, the exercise of sovereign power often requires 
the occupation of territory, and occupation in turn relegates 
"the colonized into a third zone between subjecthood and 
objecthood" (2003 p.26). Mbembe's "third zone" corresponds to 
Butler's zones of abjection - enclaves in the West Bank and 
Gaza - and so the third zone may also be linked to the 
spatial production of Palestinians as non-subjects. 
Following Mbembe (2003), Israel asserts sovereign power over 
Palestinians in the in the Occupied Territories. Israeli 
sovereign power may be interpreted not only literally as the 
power to kill Palestinian (as in the case of Operation Cast 
Lead in Gaza) but also, the ability to unleash what Mbembe 
terms "invisible killing" (2003 p.30). For him, the 
subjection of Palestinians to violence, spatial confinement, 
and the militarization of their daily lives, has conferred 
70 Notions of sovereignty, for Mbembe, extend beyond its traditional 
use in political science, which locates it within the boundaries of 
the nation state. For Mbembe, "sovereignty means the capacity to 
define who matters and who does not, who is disposable and who is 
not" (2003 p.27) [Italics in the original]. His notion of "who 
matters and who does not" finds echoes in Butler's observations 
(1993), cited in Chapter 2, that some bodies matter, while some do 
not. I would like to acknowledge that it was by virtue of its 
citation in Junka 2006 that I discovered Mbembe's essay. 
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upon them the status of living dead (Mbembe 2003)71. Mbebme's 
notion of living dead may be linked back to Butler's notion 
of unlivable (1993), to the near impossibility of leading a 
normal daily life in the West Bank and Gaza as the direct 
result of Israeli spatial control and restrictions on 
movement - and in some cases (as in Operation Cast Lead), 
over life itself. Therefore, and following Butler and Mbembe, 
it is not only spatial confinement that produces Palestinians 
as non-subjects. Palestinians are also produced as non-
subjects owing to the denial, by Israel, of Palestinian 
control over daily life, and by extension, death, in the 
Occupied Territories. 
The refusal of the status of the non-subject 
Scholars Farhad Khosrokhavar and Mai Jayyusi both invoke the 
notion of subjectivity in discussing Palestinian martyrs, 
albeit in vastly different ways. For Khosrokhavar (2005) the 
Palestinian martyr's sUbjectivity emerges at the moment of 
death; this death is a pessimistic one because it is the 
product of despair and hopelessness. In contrast, for 
Jayyusi, the martyr's death is an optimistic one because it 
"snatches responsibility for his own life and death from the 
Israeli occupiers" (in Asad 2007 p.48). 
This bears a return to the notion of intentionality. The 
martyr intentionally chooses death, enacted in the martyrdom 
mission. For Jayyusi, the martyr's intentional death 
71 Mbembe theorizes the subjection of large numbers of people to 
devastating and violent conditions of life such that that the 
status of living dead is conferred on them, as necropower. 
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constitutes an attempt to assert some degree of control, if 
only over her/his death: by intentionally choosing death in 
the act of self-sacrifice, the istishhadi wrests control over 
death away from the Israeli occupier (in Asad 2007). The 
martyr's assertion of control over her/his death must be 
considered in the context of a profound and almost absolute 
lack of control over daily life in the West Bank and Gaza, 
and by extension death, as discussed. 
As well, the martyr's assertion of control over her/his death 
may be considered a refusal of the status of the non-subject, 
who is largely denied control over daily life by the Israeli 
occupiers, but also, over death. In intentionally asserting 
control over her/his death, the martyr refuses the status of 
the non-subject. And in so doing, the martyr also aims to 
make life unlivable for Israelis: s/he seeks to disrupt their 
"normal peaceful life" (Hage 2003 p.68). 
The martyr's performance as an equal to the IDF soldier 
In order to kill effectively, the body of the suicide bomber 
must pass undetected until it reaches the site of detonation, 
at which point it will explode. As Mbembe observes, "the 
'suicide bomber' wears no ordinary soldier's uniform and 
displays no weapon" (2003 p.36). However the opposite is true 
of the performance that precedes the act of martyrdom. Here, 
the martyr performs wearing military fatigues, a suicide belt 
and wielding a weapon. In so doing, the martyr performs as a 
type of soldier, as discussed. 
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The visual image of the martyr, depicted as a whole and 
powerful, militarized body in the commemorative images, was 
theorized as a visual, if not military equal to the IDF 
soldier, and constituting a refusal of Israeli-imposed 
inferior otherness. This refusal is also enacted by the 
martyr, in performance. In performing as a soldier, the 
martyr puts her/himself on par with the IDF soldier, as an 
equal. And in performing as an equal to the IDF soldier, the 
martyr also puts her/himself on par with the Israeli national 
subject as embodied by the IDF soldier. 
In performing as a soldier - as an equal to the Israeli 
national subject the martyr enacts a refusal of inferior 
Other SUbjectivity. And in performing as a soldier - and by 
extension, as an equal to the Israeli national subject the 
martyr also performs a type of Palestinian national 
SUbjectivity on par with - and not inferior to Israeli 
national SUbjectivity. Performance constitutes a performed 
refusal of otherness. 
Performance may also be considered a type of subject 
formation. I remind the reader of Bannerji's notion of the 
self-inventing subject (2002), one who seeks to invent or 
transform herself [sic] in response to already existing 
factors that produced the subject. By performing as an equal 
to the Israeli national subject (the IDF soldier), the 
istishhadi enacts a type of SUbjectivity that is equal to 
that of the Israeli national subject. In so doing, the martyr 
enacts, albeit fleetingly, a type of Palestinian self-
invented SUbjectivity as a national subject on par with that 
of the Israeli national subject. As such performance 
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constitutes an act, contra Khosrokhavar (2005), of self-
assertion. 
The performance of martyrdom and the enactment of sovereign 
power 
Israeli sovereign power (Mbembe 2003) asserted over 
Palestinians - the power to dictate who will live and who 
will die, but also, the power to kill - is made possible by 
military occupation. Sovereign power is asserted over 
Palestinians in the Occupied Territories by the IDF. It is 
also asserted, albeit somewhat differently, over Israelis, by 
the Palestinian martyr. The martyr deploys her/his body 
against Israelis, as a weapon designed to kill. The body of 
the martyr is a locus of this sovereign power: the exploding 
body unleashes death and it unleashes the power to kill 
Israelis. The istishhadi asserts sovereign power over life 
and death in the act of martyrdom itself. 
The martyr also performs or enacts a type of sovereign power, 
prior to her/his deployment, in the performance of martyrdom. 
The martyr enacts sovereign power in her/his performance as a 
militarized and powerful body, adorned by weapons and by the 
suicide belt in particular. The martyr enacts sovereign power 
in her/his performance as a soldier, one who, like the IDF 
soldier, is capable of killing, of asserting power over life 
and death. The martyr's assertion of sovereign power is also 
performed in the reading of the last will and testament in 
which the martyr voices her/his intent to sacrifice 
her/himself, and to kill Israelis in the process. Through 
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performance, the martyr enacts her/his ability to assert 
sovereign power over Israeli life and death. 
The performance of martyrdom and the enactment of a resistant 
sUbjectivity 
In the previous chapter, the body of the suicide bomber was 
examined as a weapon of resistance. The body of the martyr 
resists spatial confinement and enters Israel, where it 
explodes. Butler (1993) and Collin (2004) both assert that 
the subject is constituted by force of exclusion, and I noted 
how Israeli spatial control and restrictions on movement 
serve to exclude Palestinians from the space or domain of the 
subject, producing them as non-subjects. 
Through performance, the martyr resists exclusion from the 
domain or space of the subject. By performing as an equal, 
the martyr enacts a refusal of inferior Other subjectivity 
and enacts a subjectivity equal to that of the Israeli 
national subject. As well, through performance, the martyr 
enacts sovereign power. In so doing, the martyr enacts a 
refusal of the status of the non-subject. And in so doing, 
the martyr enacts a resistant form of subjectivity, and here 
too, performance constitutes a type of subject formation. 
Israeli restrictions on Palestinian movement during the 
second intifada have also impacted Palestinian efforts at 
resistance in the Occupied Territories. Spatial 
enclavization, the construction of the Separation Barrier, 
the use of closure and curfew have all served to limit 
opportunities for Palestinian resistance, for example, 
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demonstrations, strikes, travel to file paperwork against 
house demolitions or land seizures; they have also impeded 
the ability to meet and organize in person72 • 
For Jayyusi, the Palestinian martyr "must be understood in 
relation to new forms of sUbjectivity formed in the context 
of resistance to the particular powers that circumscribe 
them" (in Asad 2007 p.46) [Italics added]. Power, considered 
here as Israeli spatial control, circumscribes Palestinian 
subjectivity under occupation to such an extent that it 
produces Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as non-
subjects who are prevented from asserting control over most 
aspects of daily life but also, over death. The martyr 
resists this power in the act of martyrdom itself. The martyr 
also resists this power in the act of performance, by 
enacting sovereign power. Martyrdom is an act of resistance 
to the Israeli occupation. So too is the act of performance. 
72 In particular these have dramatically reduced Palestinian efforts 
at non-violent resistance (Junka 2006 and Allen 2006-b). Unlike 
during the first intifada when it was possible for Palestinians to 
boycott Israeli goods and services and/or to refuse to work in 
Israel as forms of resistance, these avenues for resistance are 
largely unavailable now; see Junka 2006, Allen 2006-b, Haas 2002 
and Falk 2002. For a comparison of Palestinian resistance in the 
first and second intifadas, see Allen 2006-b. None of the above is 
to say that Palestinian resistance has ceased, rather, Israeli 
control has made all such efforts much more difficult to achieve. 
As Qumsiyeh (2008) observes, "Palestinians resist by simply living 
in their homes, going to school, eating and living" (unpag). He 
cites a range of strategies of resistance including demonstrations, 
blockades and cordons to prevent house demolitions, legal 
challenges, witnessing and oral history projects, international 
solidarity work, and cultural projects. While the specifics of 
Palestinian resistance lie outside the scope of this research, it 
is nonetheless relevant to cite the impact of Israeli spatial 
control and restrictions on movement, on efforts at Palestinian 
resistance during the second intifada. 
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Israeli control of Palestinian-inhabited territory in the 
west Bank and Gaza has, particularly since the start of the 
second intifada, dramatically impacted Palestinian 
sUbjectivity. It has produced Palestinians under occupation 
as inferior Other subjects to Jewish Israelis but also, as 
non-subjects, notably as a result of spatial confinements and 
draconian restrictions on movement. I have theorized some of 
the ways in which the Palestinian martyr has attempted to 
refuse these forms of subjectivity, not only in the act of 
martyrdom itself, but also, in the act of performance. 
My conclusion, contra much of the research literature 
consulted, is that the act of martyrdom itself is 
intentional: the martyr intentionally chooses death. 
Martyrdom also constitutes an act of resistance against the 
occupation. Performance too is intentional and constitutes an 
act of resistance, not only against Israel's military 
occupation of Palestinian-inhabited territory but also, to 
the forms of Palestinian sUbjectivity that it engenders. 
Through performance, the martyr enacts a refusal of 
otherness, as well as a refusal of the status of the non-
subject itself. 
Finally, the sUbjectivities embodied by the IDF soldier and 
the Palestinian martyr - while vastly different - are both 
violent and dangerous, linked as they are to death and to 
killing. This is not to relativize or directly compare the 
IDF soldier and the Palestinian martyr, rather, to be aware 
of the dangers posed by these subjectivities, both of which 
are produced in the context of a violent and deadly military 
occupation. 
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Chapter 5 
Performance as research and practice 
This more personal section of writing discusses the practice 
element of my doctoral project. It focuses on my performance 
practice in particular, because while performance is central 
to my studio practice, it also played a defining role in the 
development and elaboration of the thesis. 
The practice element of this project is where the material in 
the thesis and my own lived experiences converge. The 
practice is a type of dialogue or bridge, between material 
considered in the thesis, personal experiences, and global 
events that unfolded over the course of my doctoral project. 
The practice enables me to creatively engage with the subject 
matter of the thesis but also, with that which falls outside 
the scope of the thesis, and notably, suicide bombing attacks 
outside of Palestine and Israel. The thesis was written 
during a period (2005 to 2009) when suicide bombings 
escalated dramatically worldwide but especially in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and in Western urban centers. It was also 
written in the aftermath of 9/11 and during the war on 
terror1 • The thesis is not directly concerned with these 
events. However these events - and suicide bombings in New 
York and London in particular - affected and disturbed me 
considerably. The London bombings on July 7th 2005 took place 
on the morning of my upgrade exam. One of the target 
locations was Aldgate tube station, located just a few 
1 The events of 9/11 predate my doctoral research by several years. 
However, the attacks on New York City in September 2001 had a 
profound effect on me that still resonates today. 
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minutes away from my flat in Whitechapel. The subject matter 
of the thesis had struck too close to home. 
The practice responds to global events both inside and 
outside of Israel and Palestine, using performance-based 
self-portraiture, video, and text-based work. This work will 
be presented and discussed at the viva exam, and a selection 
of these projects is included on a DVD that accompanies the 
thesis 2 • 
The present writing focuses on my performance practice, and 
it considers a series of three staged, self-portrait images I 
created using performance3 • It focuses on my performance 
practice because performance was central to the development, 
framework and contents of the thesis: the thesis would never 
have been written as it is, if not for my performance 
practice. I began using performance as a strategy to decipher 
material under consideration in the written element at the 
very early stages of my doctoral research, in 2004. 
Performance served as a site for experimentation in which I 
2 This work includes the narrative short video Blow Up, whose 
protagonist is so disturbed by the attacks on London that she blows 
herself up in a local mosque, included on DVD. Another work, The 
Concrete Infinity Gaza Project, is a text-based project created 
during Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in 2008-2009, and consists in a 
handwritten account of my daily activities for those 23 days, also 
included on DVD. Undertaken during a period of unprecedented 
constraint to Palestinian daily life, it contrasts my freedom to 
structure daily life as I wish, with the reality on the ground in 
Gaza. It was also created in response to constraints on Palestinian 
SUbjectivity as explored in Chapter 4 of the thesis. This work is 
inspired by Adrian Piper's Concrete Infinity Documentation Project 
(1970), in which she records all of her daily activities for 30 
days as part of a process of self assertion and self exploration. A 
descriptive list of the DVD's contents can be found on page 308. 
3 These images are also included on the DVD. 
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"tryon" material under consideration in the thesis. My 
performance practice evolved from mimetic acts performed in 
the privacy of my studio and with a view to developing the 
thesis, to acts performed in my studio and photographed for 
exhibition for a public audience. Performance, in the context 
of this doctoral project, constitutes both a research 
methodology, and a means of art making. This writing examines 
my performance practice as both. 
Performance as research and practice 
During the first year of doctoral study my project was 
concerned with the work of artists using transgressive 
approaches to Holocaust representation - altering and 
manipulating documentary photographs and using the swastika 
and other Nazi symbols - to ask challenging questions about 
the legacy of the Holocaust, about victims and perpetrators, 
and about the politics of Holocaust memory in the USA, 
Germany, and Israel in particular4 • 
4 My investigations focused on the film The Night Porter by director 
Liliana Cavani; the work of Jewish and Israeli artists Alan 
Schechner, Boaz Arad and Roee Rosen; Anselm Kiefer's occupations 
series; and an exhibition featuring the work of artists using Nazi 
imagery and symbols, titled Mirroring Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent 
Art, held at the Jewish Museum in New York in 2002. Texts by Norman 
Kleeblatt (2002), Peter Novick (1999) and Norman Finkelstein (2000) 
were central to my investigations. On transgressive art see Julius 
2002. This research followed on from my MA research, which 
contrasted the documentary strategies employed by director Steven 
Spielberg in the film Schindler's List, with the manipulation of 
documentary photographs from the Holocaust by artist Alan 
Schechner. 
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In April 2004, while doing research on the Internet, I 
unexpectedly stumbled upon the first commemorative image of a 
Palestinian istishhadi I had ever seen. It was of Bamas 
martyr Reem al-Riyahsi. The image captivated me, so much so 
that within a few months female Palestinian suicide bombers 
and the images that commemorate them as martyrs, became a 
central focus of investigation. 
Writing in 2009, it is difficult to communicate to the reader 
the profound effect this material had on me. I could not 
fathom why someone would strap explosives to her body and 
explode herself so violently. The research literature offered 
a range of explanations as to why Palestinian women became 
suicide bombers: emotional vulnerability and social 
exclusion, the influence of Islamic religious extremism, and 
gender inequality in Palestines • For Beyler, the deployment of 
female suicide bombers was "one of the most extreme forms of 
exploitation of women" (2003 p.lS). Some writers (Rabinovitch 
2004, Chesler 2004) claimed that al-Riyashi's deployment was 
a forced suicide, a punishment meted out by Bamas for her 
having allegedly committed adultery. All of this literature 
depicted the women as victims of gender oppression, religious 
extremism, and personal circumstances. I was swayed by these 
allegations, especially given the dearth of alternative 
5 See in particular Shemin 2002, Fighel 2003, Beyler 2003, Israel 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2003-a and 2003-b, Chesler 2004, and 
victor 2004. For more recent yet similar arguments, see also 
Schweitzer 2006 and Alvanou 2007. Zedalis (2004) identifies the use 
of female suicide bombers in Palestine as being primarily 
strategic, because they are able to reach their targets more 
effectively than men. 
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literature available on the subject at the time6 • 
Paradoxically, I was also critical of the lack of attention 
to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in this 
literature? . 
My research into female Palestinian suicide bombers carne to 
focus on Reem al-Riyashi as a case study. She was the first 
woman ever to be deployed by Barnas, in what the research 
literature described as a sudden reversal of the group's 
prohibition on using women to execute suicide bombings. I was 
curious about this shift, and I was especially interested in 
her motives. 
I was looking to establish a link between Barnas' Islarnist 
doctrine, women's gender oppression in Palestine, and Reem 
al-Riyahi's deployment. I considered Reem al-Riyashi to be a 
victim of her gender and her faith. I was hoping to find some 
kind of visual evidence of her victimhood in her 
commemorative images. Yet there was nothing in these images 
to indicate victimhood. Looking at these images, Reem al-
Riyashi stared back at me as a strong and powerful, defiant 
fighter. 
6 Two exceptions are critical book reviews of Victor 2004, by Rose 
(2004) and Ismail (2004). Hasso (2005), Brunner (2005) and Naaman 
(2007) later published studies refuting the findings of this 
literature; a succinct critique thereof can also be found in 
Abufarha (2009). 
? In an essay I wrote in 2004 I asserted that the phenomenon of 
female Palestinian suicide bombers was one of "women's dwindling 
position in an escalating climate of Israeli occupation and Islamic 
fundamentalist influence". At that time my understanding of Islam 
was generated exclusively through Western writing about Islamic 
religious extremism and fundamentalism, and as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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And so I turned to performance. I decided to perform as Reem 
al-Riyashi. 
Precedents for my performance: Performing Lucia 
I had used performance once before, when I struggled to 
understand the fictional character Lucia (played by Charlotte 
Rampling), one of the protagonists of the film The Night 
Porter, then a key focus of the thesisB • Performance enabled 
me to arrive at a new understanding about Lucia and about the 
power dynamics in the film. 
Set in Vienna in 1957, the film, through a series of 
flashbacks, tells the story of Lucia, then a concentration 
camp inmate, and her relationship with Max (played by Dirk 
Bogarde), an SS officer with whom she had a presumed non-
consensual sexual relationship. Lucia and Max, victim and 
perpetrator, meet unexpectedly twelve years after the end of 
the war and resume their affair. 
I considered Lucia to be a double victim: first, during 
wartime, and second, when she resumes her affair with Max in 
the film's present9 • I was especially perturbed by what is 
B My performance practice can be traced back to my experiences with 
street performance (often discussed in performance studies texts as 
street theater). During the 1990s I participated in such 
performances as a member of ACT-UP, as well as of various feminist, 
anti-war and Jewish activist groups. I participated in performance 
not as an art form but as a type of activist protest that mobilized 
aesthetic and theatrical strategies for social change ends. On 
street theatre see Colleran and Spencer 1998, Cohen Cruz 1998, and 
Carlson 2004 pp.179-204. 
9 Writing in 1977 but still relevant today, Teresa de Laurentis 
(1977) noted that the film was heavily criticized by women because 
233 
probably the film's most iconic scene, a flashback to the 
past in which Lucia performs the song Wenn ich mir was 
wilnschen durfte (If I Were to Wish for Something) for a group 
of SS officers. Topless, barefoot, wearing oversized men's 
trousers held up by suspenders, elbow-length black gloves, 
and an SS officer's hat, playing with her breasts, running 
her hand along her stomach and down the front of her pants, 
simulating masturbation, and dancing provocatively. For me 
this scene was the epitome of her victimization. What 
troubled me most was that Lucia appeared to derive pleasure 
from the act of performing. This scene disturbed and angered 
me. 
Figure 1 Still images from the film The Night Porter in which Lucia (Charlotte 
Rampling) performs Wenn ich mir was wOnschen dOrfte 
My struggle to understand her performance, prompted me to 
experiment with performance. I performed as Lucia, in a loose 
restaging of that scene that so disturbed and confounded me. 
I did so over a period of several months, in the privacy of 
my studio. 
they found it difficult to accept Lucia's behavior - what they 
perceived as her victimhood - as metaphors for the female 
experience, and this is true of my reaction to the film. 
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Performance required props. It required an SS officer's hat, 
breeches and boots. The first time I put them on I felt an 
immediate and unexpected surge of power. The SS insignia of 
the totenkopf or death's head is for me, the symbol of 
ultimate power over life and death, and over Jewish life and 
death in particular, for it was the SS that ran the mobile 
killing squads and later the extermination camps. I put these 
props on and felt their power. And I felt a sense of pleasure 
in performing with such powerful objects. I surmised that is 
what Lucia might have felt as well. 
By restaging Lucia's performance over a period of several 
months, I came to understand that she wielded a certain 
amount of power over Max: she was not a mere victim. I too 
had experienced a sense of pleasure in performance, and a 
feeling of power that derived from this act. Performance 
provided me with new insight that filmic (visual) and textual 
analysis alone could not provide. My performance had 
functioned as a type of research methodology: it enabled me 
to arrive at a new understanding of Lucia and of the film. 
Performing as Reem al-Riyashi 
Following on from my experience with performing as Lucia, I 
used a strategy of performance in an effort to resolve some 
of the questions that profoundly troubled me about Reem al-
Riyashi and about Palestinian suicide bombers more generally. 
I decided to perform as Reem al-Riyashi as I observed her in 
the commemorative images. Performing in this way would allow 
me to "act out" some of the visual material being considered 
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in the thesis. It would (I hoped) enable me to identify 
visual clues as to her motivates for blowing herself up. I 
would stage myself as Reem al-Riyashi, as a female martyr. My 
performance would take place in the privacy of my studio. It 
would be photographed and subsequently viewed by an audience 
of one: myself. 
I printed the commemorative images of Reem al-Riyashi and 
hung them on the walls of my studio. I observed the way she 
held her body, the way she posed and looked at the viewer. I 
tried to mimic her pose, her stance, her gestures. I wore a 
hijab and a military tunic; I held the Koran. I wore various 
incarnations of a suicide belt: at first, military pouches 
purchased from army surplus stores and later, ones that I 
made myself. 
I wanted to put myself in her place, to temporarily "become" 
Reem al-Riyahsi as she posed for the camera, prior to her 
suicide mission. In photographing and subsequently viewing my 
performance I was hoping to "see" myself as Reem al-Riyashi, 
and by extension, to see her in a new and different light, 
one that might provide me with new insight or understanding 
of her actions and motives. 
Performance as a research methodology 
Unlike performing as Lucia, however, my performances of Reem 
al-Riyashi provoked a profound feeling of discomfort. I hated 
doing it. wearing the hijab made me uncomfortable. Wearing 
the suicide belt made me uncomfortable. I felt uncomfortable 
in my attempts at mimesis. I cringed when I looked at the 
236 
images I took of my performances. My blue eyes and white skin 
made me feel out of place in the image. Seeing myself in 
these images provoked a sense of discomfort. My performances 
did not lead to new insight into Reem al-Riyashi's motives. 
Over time, I began to question my desire to explore motive 
and victimhood as linked to gender and to the Islamic 
religion in the thesis. I felt that it was not my place to do 
SOlO. My performance spurred me to rethink my views on the 
matter of motive and victimhood, as it had in the case of 
Lucia's perceived victimhood. 
As well, my performance was willful, deliberate, and 
intentional. There was a sense of conviction in my 
performance, in my pose, in my stance and gestures. There was 
a sense of conviction in Reem al-Riyahsi's pose, stance and 
gestures as I observed them in the commemorative images. In 
putting myself in her place, so to speak, in attempting to 
mimic her gestures and pose, I discovered that to do so 
required deliberate and intentional actions. My performance 
revealed a connection between intention and action: first, I 
came to understand the actions performed by Reem al-Riyashi 
for the camera as intentional, and as a result I later came 
to consider the act of suicide bombing itself as an 
intentional one. Performance provided the impetus to consider 
the notion of intentionality, and to further develop this 
aspect of my research in the written element. 
10 Later research substantiated this. To do so requires a much 
better understanding of the complexities of gender in the Arab 
world and/or in the Islamic religion. See for example, Hasso 2005, 
Saloul 2003 and Mahmoud 2005. 
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Performance required me to physically position myself. I had 
to adopt specific positions, face the camera, hold props, 
hold the pose. This led me to reflect more critically on my 
own position. My performance spurred me to position myself 
differently in relation to the subject matter of the thesis. 
Over time, my perspective shifted dramatically, away from 
questions of motive, and by extension, gender and religion. 
My performance also inspired me to position myself more 
critically and assertively in relation to the research 
literature: it prompted me to adopt a much more critical 
position vis-a-vis literature produced within the field of 
terrorism and security studies, as discussed in Chapters 3 
and 4. 
My performance also made me more aware of the centrality of 
the body. In performing as Reem al-Riyahsi, I had to hold my 
body a certain way. I had a suicide belt strapped to my body, 
and the belt made me more aware of the body, of the body's 
destruction in the act of suicide bombing. This also made me 
more aware of the body's destructive potential. The body in 
performance is a strong body, one that performs with strength 
and conviction in its gestures, pose, and actions. The act of 
performance is contingent on the body. So too, is the act of 
suicide bombing. Performance prompted me to elaborate this 
relationship more definitively, and to focus more closely on 
the body and on corporeality in the thesis. 
Performance produced a substantial shift in the written 
element: away from a visual analysis of commemorative images 
of Reem al-Riyashi, to a more sustained focus on the body; 
and away from questions of victimhood and motive linked to 
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gender and religionll • These shifts occurred over an extended 
period of time, over approximately two years. 
My performance also led me to consider the martyr's donning 
props and posing for the camera, as performance. In 
conjunction with philosophical texts dealing with 
sUbjectivity and intentionality (Khosrokhavar 2005, Butler 
1993, Collin 2004, Bannerji 2002), I later elaborated a 
theory of the performance of martyrdom, drawing on 
scholarship in the field of performance studies, and linking 
the martyr's performance to the struggle over territory but 
also, for selfhood. 
My performance began as a strategy used to better understand 
the motives of Palestinian female suicide bombers as 
described in the research literature available at the time. 
Combined with scholarly research, it produced a substantial 
shift in the thesis element, toward a framework that 
considered the Palestinian suicide bomber using a framework 
of corporeality, intentionality, performance and 
subjectivity. In so doing, performance served as a research 
methodology. 
Performance as responsibility to the Other 
In Autumn 2006 I was invited to participate in an exhibition 
titled Levinas: The Ethics of Encounter, held in conjunction 
with a conference on the work of philosopher Emmanuel 
II The publication in Third Text of Mahmoud Abu Hashhash's excellent 
investigation (2006) into the visual representation of martyrdom in 
Palestine was also a contributing factor in my decision to abandon 
a visual analysis of the commemorative posters. 
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Levinas. As a result I discovered Levinas' writings on 
sUbjectivity and otherness (1981). These enabled me to 
retrospectively arrive at a new understanding of my 
performance as Reem al-Riyashi. 
For Levinas, the locus of one's subjectivity lies not in the 
self but in the other (1981, 1985)12. For him, the 
determinative structure of subjectivity is responsibility 
(Levinas 1981, 1985). Responsibility manifests as 
substitution, Uthe possibility of putting oneself in the 
place of the other" (Levinas 1981, p.1l7). 
I performed as Reem al-Riyashii I attempted to put myself in 
her place. At the time I began my performances, I hated Reem 
al-Riyashi. I hated her not so much for being a suicide 
bomber, but for being (in my opinion), a victim. I perceived 
her as my ultimate Other. I, a Jew, secular, agnostic, a 
feminist ... She, a Palestinian, a devout Muslim, a suicide 
bomber and possibly, a forced suicide13 • Reem al-Riyashi's 
actions (and those of Palestinian suicide bomber more 
generally) disturbed mei my performances disturbed me. Yet I 
persisted in the act of performance. 
Performance served as a sort of process of engagement: for 
approximately two years I engaged with Reem al-Riyahsi 
through performance. I came to understand this process of 
engagement as one of responsibility to Reem al-Riyashi and to 
the subject matter of the thesis (palestinian suicide 
12 I reiterate that my understanding of the Other derives primarily 
from postcolonial discourse (Hall 1990, Bhabha 1994, Peleg 1994), 
as outlined in Chapter 2. 
13 This dichotomy is problematic in its over-simplification of 
difference, yet that was my perception at the time. 
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bombers) more generally. Despite being deeply troubled and 
disturbed by the phenomenon of the Palestinian suicide bomber 
and Reem al-Riyashi in particular, I attempted to arrive at a 
new understanding of their actions. I did so primarily 
through performance. 
By putting myself in Reem al-Riyashi's place in the act of 
performance, I temporarily "became" Reem al-Riyashi. In so 
doing, I came to understand her otherwise than I had 
previously been able to. My performance can be understood as 
a responsibility to put myself in the place of my other, but 
also, as a responsibility to her as my perceived other: a 
responsibility to attempt to understand, despite my 
perception (and at times hatred) for her as my Other. 
Performance as studio practice 
Over time, my performances became less private and less 
mimetic. They evolved into works created for a public 
audience. My performances came to be staged and photographed 
to produce a work for public, gallery display. These 
performances take place in the studio and are documented so 
that they may be experienced in public (Jones 1998), as life-
sized, self-portrait images 14 • Sometimes these works take the 
14 Describing the early works of Yayoi Kusama, who photographed 
herself performing in her studio, Amelia Jones writes, "she 
performs herself in a private setting for the public-making eye of 
the camera" (1998 p.7). This is also true of my own performance 
work. My use of performance-based self-portraiture has also been 
indirectly influenced by Cindy Sherman's Untitled Film Stills 
series (1977-1980), a series of staged photographs in which the 
artist performs in a variety of women's roles, including the 
starlet and the housewife. While my work is quite different from 
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form of life-sized printed images (approximately five feet by 
eight feet), and sometimes, life-sized digital projections15 • 
My performances were staged over a period of several months 
and years, and the process of creating the various self-
portraits overlapped temporally. The self-portraits went 
through a process of development and refinement over time, as 
I perfected props and staging, as well as my own gestures and 
poses. Some of the final images to be shown at the viva 
required up to four stagings over a period of months and 
years 16 • For each self-portrait, I would have to acquire 
props, purchasing them or making them myself. At first I 
would perform and take photos alone in my studio. Later I had 
a professional photographer photograph the performances for 
me. 
In the self-portrait works, I perform as a Christian 
fundamentalist American cheerleader, and as an Islamic 
suicide bomber/martyr. I also perform as a neo-Nazi, and in 
Sherman's (hers is concerned with women's representation in popular 
culture, and mine, with the critique of cultural identity), her use 
of mimesis or imitation, props, performance, the posed still image, 
and her concern with gender, resonate in my own performance work 
discussed in this writing. It is perhaps impossible to create this 
type of staged and performed lens-based work without acknowledging 
a debt to Sherman's seminal work. My performance practice also owes 
a considerable debt to the practices of feminist artists (in 
addition to Kusama) such as Hannah wilke, Eleanor Antin, and Adrian 
piper, artists who used their own, often naked bodies in posed, 
performance-based photography during the 1960s and 1970s. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the relationships between performance 
and photography, see the essays in Choiniere and Theriault (2005). 
15 Note that they will be presented as life-sized digital 
projections at the viva. 
16 The viva exhibit will be accompanied by a selection of these 
earlier images, three of which are included on the DVD that 
accompanies the thesis. 
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response to film The Night Porter 7 • I used the Wenn ich mir 
was wtinschen durfte scene as a point of departure, yet I had 
to make the performance my own. For example, I didn't feel 
comfortable exposing my breasts, and I didn't want to sing. I 
began to experiment with posing and with the still, self-
portrait image. 
I began to pose in front of Nazi flags, and this approach 
became a visual template for all of my subsequent self-
portrait images: they are all staged and performed in front 
of flags. In this particular performance (see Figure 2 on the 
following page), the pose I adopted developed from Kiefer's 
Occupations series (1969), in which the artist photographed 
himself doing the Heil Hitler salute in cities across Germany 
and Europe18 • I posed in front of an SS flag, doing the Heil 
Hitler salute. This performance was also influenced by 
artists using Nazi symbols in their work, and by the 
exhibition Mirroring Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent Art. 
The performance, while referencing The Night Porter, came to 
be about Jewish identity and transgression. Wearing the 
swastika and performing the Heil Hitler salute was taboo for 
me. It constituted a transgressive act. There I was, a Jew 
and the daughter and granddaughter of Holocaust survivors, 
performing the Hitler salute and wearing the SS death's head 
17 I do not specifically discuss my performance as a neo-Nazi in 
this writing in order to focus more closely on my experiments with 
the film The Night Porter. One such self-portrait image is included 
on DVD. It will also be presented and discussed at the viva exam. 
18 During the early stages of my doctoral research I briefly 
experimented with restaging this work. Kiefer's work was the 
subject of much of my undergraduate research. On the Occupations 
series, see in particular Huyssen 1995. 
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- the ultimate symbol of Jewish death. I experienced a 
profound sense of freedom in creating this work: performed 
far away from my family and my home, this work became a means 
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Figure 2 After Lucia. Self-portrait, 2006. 
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of trespassing what I perceived to be the boundaries of 
appropriate behavior for me as a Jew. 
Performance as a female Islamic suicide bomber/martyr 
In wearing the 88 props I felt a sense of power. In contrast, 
the props I wore to perform as a female martyr, and the 
suicide belt in particular, made me feel physically 
uncomfortable. The suicide belt was tight and prevented me 
from moving easily; it also presented me with the undeniable 
prospect of the destruction of the body. On page 157, I 
observed that the exploded and destroyed body of the 
Palestinian suicide bomber is visually elided in the 
commemorative posters. This, I explained, was necessary in 
order to present an image of the Palestinian nation as a 
strong and powerful one. 
Through performance, however, wanted to address the matter of 
the elided and destroyed body of the suicide bomber. I wanted 
to focus attention on the body and the body's destruction in 
the act of suicide bombing. I did so by exposing parts of my 
body, by strapping the belt directly to my flesh, using a 
strategy of narcissism, self display (Jones 1998) in my 
performance19 • 
I also wanted to somehow address gender and religion -
something that I decided against examining in the thesis but 
that I felt could be more appropriately addressed in art, 
19 For Jones (1998), narcissism was a strategy used by feminist body 
artists during the 1960s and 1970s, to subvert the male gaze 
traditionally associated with women's objectification - by 
deliberately drawing attention to the naked female body. 
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through creative interpretation and expression. I began to 
mix religious symbols with partial nUdity: for example, 
wearing a niqab (face veil) and holding the Koran, with the 
suicide belt partially covering my exposed skin. In so doing 
I attempted to reveal a tension between the two; see Figure 3 
on the following page. 
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Figure 3 Self-portrait as an Islamic suicide bomber/martyr. Self-
portrait, 2006. 248 
Writing about Cindy Sherman's works created in 1987-1988, 
Peggy Phelan locates the artist's critique of the 
construction of femininity in the notion of a llmimetic re-
posing" (1993 p.64), a re-enactment of that which is being 
critiqued. Phelan notes that, "In order to critique the 
imitative pose she [Sherman] enacted that pose" (1993 
p.64)[my addition]. I too use this strategy. My performance 
is not an exact re-enactment of the source material: I am not 
wearing a shirt, and my face is fully veiled. My performance 
originates with Reem a1-Riyashi as I observe her in the 
commemorative images, but my performance becomes less 
mimetic, and more ambiguous. Some viewers may interpret this 
self-portrait as my being critical of suicide bombings, 
however, others may read it as my condoning them. 
This performance puts me in an uncomfortable position. 
Created in 2006, in the wake of suicide attacks on London and 
during the war on terror, performance becomes a putting 
myself on the line. What does it mean to stage oneself as a 
suicide bomber in the larger context of the war on terror? I 
believe that to do so, is a potentially risky act20 • 
In an effort to highlight the climate of the war on terror, I 
created another performance to accompany that of the Islamic 
suicide bomber: an American, Christian fundamentalist 
cheerleader; see Figure 4 on the following page. 
20 The larger political climate of the war on terror had and 
continues to have implications for my work and for artists more 
generally (particularly in the USA), where the Patriot Act, 
surveillance, racial profiling and other security measures were 
used to surveil and censor artistic expression; for details see 
College Art Association (2004). 
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Figure 4 Self-portrait as a Christian fundamentalist cheerleader, 2006. 
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My cheerleader holds a gun and a bible: she is a cheerleader 
for the war on terror21 • In performing the cheerleader, the 
work becomes a critique of religion more generally, and not 
of Islam exclusively. I exhibit these two images as a 
diptych, as a single work titled Patriot Acts (see Figure 5 
on the following page). Positioned side by side, the Islamic 
suicide bomber and the Christian fundamentalist cheerleader 
enable me to indirectly broach issues of gender and 
religion22 • This also allows me to locate my engagement with 
these themes within a larger critique of the war on terror23 • 
21 My performance as a cheerleader also sought to critique growing 
patriotism and militarization in post 9/11 American culture, 
particularly at sporting events, a shift I observed during my many 
visits there and by way of the media. In addition to rallying 
support for their football teams, cheerleaders play an active role 
in supporting American troops, travelling to Iraq and Afghanistan 
to perform for soldiers there, and posing for photos holding 
assault rifles. 
22 It was only in 2007 with the exhibition Global Feminisms at the 
Brooklyn Museum in New York, that I became aware of Oreet Ashery's 
Self-Porrrair as Marcus Fisher I-IV series (2000), in which Ashery 
stages herself as a male Orthodox Jew. In Self-Portrair as Marcus 
Fisher I, Ashery, wearing a beard, side-curls (payes) and 
traditional orthodox dress, cradles her right breast - which 
protrudes from inside her partially unbuttoned shirt - in her 
hands, gazing down at it. My performance as a partially exposed 
Islamic suicide bomber finds some echoes in Ashery's juxtaposition 
of the bare breast, with traditional male religious dress: both 
projects trouble assumptions about gender in the context of 
religious orthodoxy or piety. As well, my work shares her 
underlying concerns with otherness, Jewish identity, and 
transgression. Ashery's performances as Marcus Fisher - which also 
include live performances and video work - is at once transgressive 
(wearing men's clothing is forbidden for women in Orthodox 
Judaism), and it is also about visibly asserting her own Jewish 
identity in Britain, where she lives and works. Ashery describes 
her performance as Marcus Fisher in In and Our of Love wirh Marcus 
Fisher - an alrer ego and an Arr project (undated); see also 
Garfield 2002. 
23 Performance artist Guillermo Gomez-Pefia also juxtaposes the 
niqab, partial nudity and weaponry in live and lens-based 
performance to comment on the war on terror. This work is part of a 
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-Figure 5 Patriot Acts, diptych, 2006 
With this in mind, my Islamic suicide bomber and my Christian 
fundamentalist cheerleader are what Levinas (1981) has called 
Others of the same: they are both religious extremists, and 
they are both associated with acts of war. In the context of 
larger, sustained critique of otherness and racism in the USA, and 
it uses the spectacularization of otherness to "heighten features 
of fear and desire in the Anglo imagination" and, in the wake of 
9/11, "to open up a sui generis ceremonial space for the audience 
to reflect on its new relationship with cultural, racial, and 
political Otherness" (in Gomez-Pella and Collaborators 2004); see 
also Gomez-Pella 2004 in the same volume; and Gomez-Pella et. ale 
2006. 
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the war on terror, each one requires the other in order to 
perpetuate acts of war in their respective parts of the 
world24 . 
On my performance and North American Jewish cultural identity 
My performance is also a form of trespass (Julius 2002). 
Through performance, I seek to position myself outside of 
mainstream North American Jewish cultural identity as I 
understand and experienced it25. The term mainstream is used 
to describe a type of cultural identity promoted by the 
Jewish establishment (Jewish community leaders), and with 
which a majority of Jews in North America tend to identify. 
To define Jewish identity in North America today is 
problematic, because it is not determined exclusively by 
national or geographic origin, nor by heredity (Stratton 
2000). llJewishness disrupts the very categories of identity 
because it is not national, not genealogical, not religious, 
but all of these in dialogical tension with one another" 
(Boyarin and Boyarin 1993, p.721). The emergence of Zionism 
in late nineteenth century Europe paved the way for the 
emergence of new and secular forms of Jewish identity and for 
the possibility that Jewish identity may be freely chosen, 
24 On the interconnectedness of Islamic and Christian fundamentalist 
doctrines in the context of the war on terror see in particular the 
excellent series, The Power of Nightmares. 
25 Subsequent references to mainstream North American Jewish 
cultural idGnti-ty sometimes use "Jewish identity" as a more concise 
term. with the exception of Stratton (2000), all of the research 
literature consulted deals specifically with Jewish American 
identity, hence the frequent use of the term Jewish American 
identity in this writing. 
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rather than religious or genealogical, liTo be Jewish now 
meant to identify with the Jewish people and its cultural 
heritage" (Silberstein 1994, p.2)26. 
Stuart Hall (1990) cites two distinct approaches to cultural 
identity. The first consists in an essential and stable mode 
of group identity based on notions of sameness, for example, 
a shared history and ancestry, and this may be termed an 
essentialist identity. The second, is of identity as a 
process, not based on notions of sameness but rather, as 
constructed. This point is also made with specific reference 
to Jewish identity, by Silberstein (1994) and Kleeblatt 
(1996). Kleeblatt cites African-American historian and 
scholar Henry Louis Gates, Jr., who asserts, "Identities are 
not stable attributes but sites of contestation and 
negotiation" (1996 p.6). 
The problems posed by these two approaches, in discussing 
Jewish identity, is that Jewish community leaders tend to 
privilege or promote an essentialist form of Jewish identity 
based on shared ancestry, ethnicity, and the Jewish religion, 
but also, an identification with the Holocaust and the state 
of Israel. The problem arises for me not with these 
identifications in and of themselves (though I do find them 
to be problematic), rather, with the notion that this mode of 
26 As scholar John Stratton observes, the shift from Judaism 
(religious affiliation) to Jewishness (as a secular mode of 
organization) problematizes JJJewish" as a type of identification: 
JJJewish" may be determined by racial/biological heredity, such as 
having a Jewish parent; JJJewish" can designate someone who 
practices Judaism (the Jewish religion) without being born Jewish, 
for example, one who converts to Judaism; and Jewish also implies 
an identification with Jewish culture. Jewish may also be all three 
of these together (Stratton 2000). 
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Jewish identity is the one that Jews in North America do or 
should share. In reinforcing a singular, essentialist 
identity as the only acceptable type of Jewish identity, the 
Jewish establishment marginalizes Jews who do not define 
their identities according to these conceptions of what it 
means to be Jewish. As Dorinne K. Kondo (cited in Silberstein 
1994) asserts, cultural identity is produced within relations 
of power that privilege certain forms of identification over 
others. In the case of Jewish identity, the Holocaust and 
support for the state of Israel constitute acceptable modes 
of identification. Consequently, those Jews who question or 
define themselves otherwise - and especially those of us who 
are critical of the actions of the government of Israel - are 
marginalized, silenced, and often called self-hating Jews27. 
Further, Because lJidentity presupposes alterity" (Kearney 
2004, p.149), any effort by a group to establish the 
parameters of its own identity inherently entails the 
exclusion or silencing of Others (Silberstein 1994). 
27 As Sarah Roy (2007) observes, "To be Jewish and opposed to 
Israel's occupation of Palestine is still untenable for many Jews 
and certainly for the American Jewish establishment. We are called 
self-haters and heretics and viewed as aberrations and deformities" 
(2007 p.13). See also Rosenfeld (2006): produced by the American 
Jewish Committee - one of the largest and most prominent American 
Jewish organizations in the USA - the report considers criticism of 
Israel's treatment of Palestinians, by Jews, to be a new form of 
anti-Semitism on par with or even worse than Arab anti-Semitism and 
that in Nazi Germany. Rabbi Michael Lerner, editor of Tikkun 
magazine, has cautioned that accusations of anti-Semitism or self-
hatred leveled at Jews aims to silence dissent by scaring Jewish 
critics of Israel from speaking out; see Lerner 2007. 
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Accordingly, Jewish American identity produces dominant and 
marginal identity positions wi thin Jewish identi t y 28. 
My objective in this writing is to identify a sense of 
connectedness to the Holocaust and to the state of Israel, as 
central factors that shape mainstream Jewish identity, and 
importantly, as they shaped my own Jewish identity formation 
as I experienced it growing Up29. It is outside of this 
essentialist form of Jewish cultural identity that I seek to 
position myself, through performance, and I return to this 
point shortly. 
American historian Peter Novick (1999) notes that 
contemporary Jewish American identity has corne to be defined 
not by religious beliefs or shared ethnic and cultural 
characteristics, but by a sense of connectedness to the 
Holocaust and to the state of Israel. For Stratton (2000), 
the Holocaust as a focus of Jewish American identity - what 
he terms "Holocaust Jewishness" (2000 p.ll) - fulfilled a 
28 It also produces what Silberstein (1994) terms Others without. 
Silberstein (1994) and Peleg (1994) have observed that Palestinians 
are considered to be the Others of Israeli Jews, and I would add 
that they are also considered Others by North American Jews, 
particularly in the wake of suicide bombing attacks and rocket fire 
into Israel: these acts are often depicted as attacks on all Jews 
by Jewish community leaders. One cannot speak of Others inside and 
outside Jewish identity without mentioning the Jew as Other to 
gentiles in Europe and later, in America. As Other within Europe 
the Jew occupied a contradictory place, at times idealized and 
tolerated, at others persecuted and condemned (Garb 1995). Jews 
became accepted in the USA as they never did in Europe (Stratton 
2000). At first marginalized within American society, Jews now 
represent one of the most educated, upwardly mobile and successful 
communities in the USA (Goldberg-a 2002). However, Jewish upward 
mobility and acceptance in the post-War years, came at the price of 
assimilation (Boyarin and Boyarin 1997, Stratton 2000). 
29 On Jewish American identity see also Kleeblatt 1996 pp.3-38. 
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need for new forms of collective identification as a result 
of growing secularism and intermarriage among American Jews 30 • 
Novick (1999) notes that while most American Jews support and 
feel connected to the state of Israel, this connection is not 
a unifying identity in and of itself, for there are vast 
differences of opinion among American Jews with respect to 
Israeli state policy. However Novick (1999) also observes 
that the connection to the state of Israel is carefully 
nurtured by Jewish community leaders, who often invoke the 
Holocaust to generate support for Israel among American 
Jews 31 • 
Historian Steven T. Rosenthal (2005) also explores the 
complex relationships between the state of Israel and Jewish 
American identity formation. Like Novick, he notes divisions 
among American Jews with regard to Israeli state policies, 
noting that despite American Jews' "support for and obsession 
with Israel" (2005 p.209), there has also been a fair amount 
of opposition to Israeli state policies. For Rosenthal 
(2005), disagreement with Israeli state policies by American 
30 Novick (1999) cites the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the 1967 
and 1973 wars in Israel as early factors that contributed to 
growing American-Jewish identification with both the Holocaust and 
the state of Israel. On Jewish American identity and the Holocaust 
see also Rapaport 2005. 
31 Novick (1999) further notes that the connection between the 
Holocaust and Israel is carefully nurtured, with the Holocaust 
invoked to defend Israel's more oppressive acts against 
Palestinians. For Novick, the shift to a Holocaust-centered Jewish 
identity as well as toward a reliance on the Holocaust to foster 
support for the Israeli state, was the result of a substantial 
change in American Jewish leadership in the past quarter century, 
"The Jewish leaders making the relevant decisions have been, 
overall, more particularist, more religious, and more Israel-
oriented" (1999 p.280) than their predecessors were in the 1970s. 
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Jews does not preclude their overall support for the state of 
Israel, however. As well, the events of 9/11, combined with 
Palestinian suicide bombing campaigns, have substantially 
shifted American Jewish opinion toward more cohesive support 
for Israeli state policies (Rosenthal 2005). Ultimately for 
Rosenthal, American Jews' strong identification with the 
Jewish state over the past 50 years has occurred at the 
expense of other religious and cultural forms of identity 
formation, "American Jews' identification with Israel has 
largely failed to reinforce other aspects of Jewishness" 
(Rosenthal 2005 p.223). 
My own personal experiences reflect observations by Novick 
and Rosenthal, albeit on a more personal level. Importantly, 
it was a connection to the Holocaust and to the state of 
Israel that defined my own sense of Jewish identity growing 
up in Montreal32 • I was raised in an insular and exclusively 
Jewish environment: I was educated at Jewish private school 
at the primary and secondary levels33 , and was raised in an 
all Jewish neighborhood; all of my friends were Jewish, and 
all my parents' friends were Jewish. While my family observed 
certain religious holidays and traditions, we were largely 
secular. My exposure to non-religious aspects of Jewish 
culture revolved primarily around Israeli culture: going to 
Israeli cultural fairs, learning Hebrew, singing Israeli folk 
songs, etc. We celebrated Israeli independence day. We were 
32 While I technically grew up in Canada, the province of Quebec is 
culturally distinct, and I do not identify as a Canadian but rather 
as a Montrealer and a Quebecker. Consequently I would never use the 
term Jewish Canadian to describe myself. 
33 Public school in the UK system. 
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schooled in Israeli history. The summer camp I attended was 
called Masada. 
Israel was central to my sense of identity as a Jew. So too 
was the Holocaust. My mother and her parents were survivors. 
Holocaust commemoration was part of our school curriculum and 
Yom Hashoah (Holocaust remembrance day) was observed yearly. 
As well, I came of age at a time when the Holocaust was 
entering the North American mainstream in novels, made for 
television movies, and the founding of Holocaust memorial 
institutions, as also discussed in Novick (1999). 
Memory: I'm in grade four. The mezzanine outside the gym is 
full of black and white photos of the Holocaust. We walk 
around looking at the photos. We are called into assembly. 
The principal tells us that we have nothing to be afraid of 
anymore because IT will never happen again: we have Israel 
now. We sing Hatikvah and go back to class. 
Mirroring Evil and the contested nature of Jewish identity 
The exhibition Mirroring Evil: Nazi Imagery/Recent Art (2002) 
indirectly challenged essentialist conceptions of Jewish 
American identity. This exhibition of works by artists using 
Nazi symbols to explore the legacy of the Nazi era, shifted 
the focus from the victims of Nazism, to the Nazi 
perpetrators. Because of this, it provoked tremendous outrage 
from Jewish community leaders, who accused the exhibition of 
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trivializing the Holocaust and the memory of its victims 34 • 
The heated debates over Mirroring Evil created a firestorm 
about essentialist modes of Jewish American identity and the 
central role of the Holocaust therein. In so doing, the 
exhibit exposed the contested nature of secular Jewish 
American identity and it underscored the existence of Jewish 
cultural identifications lIother" than with Israel (Boyarin 
and Boyarin 1993, p.7!3) and the Holocaust among a younger 
generation of American Jews35 • 
These debates helped me to better understand my own 
conflicted and contested sense of Jewish identity: I identify 
as Jewish, and yet as I grew older, I became entirely non-
practicing (in terms of religion), more critical of the 
complexities of the Holocaust and its memory in society, and 
highly critical of Israeli state policies toward 
Palestinians. 
Inspired by the transgressive approaches of the artists in 
the show as well as by theoretical writing in the catalog 
(Kleeblatt 2002), Mirroring Evil provided me with the impetus 
to begin expressing my transgressive views in my art 
practice36 • 
34 See Kanfer 2002, Kramer 2002, and Rosensaft 2002. Even the 
progressive Jewish monthly Tikkun was outraged by the exhibit, see 
Rosenbaum 2002. 
35 For example, social justice and solidarity movements, feminist 
and queer projects; artistic and cultural projects rooted in a 
rediscovery and revival of Yiddishkayt or Yiddish culture; and 
independent periodicals such as heeb and zeek. On generational 
conflict about Jewish American identity, see Goldberg 2002-a and 
Goldberg 2002-b. 
36 Before working in performance, I used site-specific installation 
and video work to critique the ways in which Holocaust memory is 
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I already discussed my performance with Nazi symbols as a 
pleasurable and transgressive act. Inspired by Mirroring 
Evil, I began to use performance to assert my opposition to 
mainstream Jewish identity, with its emphasis on the 
Holocaust and Israel. Performance evolved from an act of 
transgression, to an act of opposition or resistance. 
Performing the others of my Jewish identity 
My performance practice is centrally concerned with questions 
of selfhood, identity and the Other. As Stratton (2000) 
observes, the Other is a modern phenomena linked to the 
establishment of group identity. The concept of the Other is 
basic to notions of cultural identity, because we Hform our 
sense of self, our identity, in relation to Others over and 
against whom we define ourselves" (Silberstein 1994, p.S). 
In particular, my performance explores notions of otherness 
that operate inside and outside of contemporary North 
American Jewish identity 3? The Nazi and the Palestinian 
invoked to justify aggression against Palestinians. My work was 
influenced by that of Alan Schechner in particular, and often used 
found and documentary footage in combination with scenes from the 
film Schindler's List. My dissenting views about Israeli state 
policies had previously found their voice in community and 
activist activities, including street performance. However this 
represented the first real instance of dissent or transgression in 
my art practice. Note that I also locate my performances as a neo-
Nazi within this transgressive body of work spurred by Mirroring 
Evil. 
3? The work of artists Martha RosIer, Adrian Piper, Coco Fusco and 
Lorna Simpson has substantially influenced my concerns with 
cultural identity and otherness. Not all of these artists work in 
performance. However these artists all assert their identities as 
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suicide bomber are in some ways the penultimate Others of the 
Jew. They wield (or have wielded in the past) destructive 
potential, the possibility of taking Jewish lives. The 
Christian American cheerleader is also Other, albeit in a 
much less physically threatening way: gentile, athletic, 
often blonde, the cheerleader epitomizes the physical 
otherness of the Jew and embodies an unattainable standard of 
gentile beauty, of not IIlooking" Jewish38 • 
I perform these Others. I perform them to transgress what I 
perceive to be the boundaries of essentialist, mainstream 
Jewish North American identity as I experienced them. I 
assert my identity as the other within Jewish identity, by 
becoming - albeit temporarily - the other outside of Jewish 
identity 39. I position myself as an other within Jewish 
identity: I am Jewish, yet I identify otherwise than with 
Israel and the Holocaust. I perform these others to position 
myself outside of mainstream Jewish American identity. 
The construction of self and identity are political acts 
(Kleeblatt 1996). They require a politics of position (Hall 
1990). Performance allows for a radical repositioning of the 
self. Through performance, I position myself in opposition to 
the modes of Jewish identity formation that I experienced. I 
use performance to resist my own Jewish upbringing and 
identity formation. I turn to performance as an act of 
Others, as women and/or as non-white women within dominant, white 
male, American culture. 
38 These standards of beauty have also been associated with the 
Barbie doll; see Lieberman in Kleeblatt (1996), pp.108-114. 
39 These notions of others inside and outside Jewish identity 
derives from Silberstein (1994). 
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resistance. Through performance, I enact a resistant 
sUbjectivity. 
Lorraine Code (1991), writing about positioning oneself in 
relation to the production of knowledge, describes the notion 
of the positioned subject. I position myself in opposition to 
the Jewish knowledge and Jewish history of my parochial 
education. In writing the thesis as I did, I attempted to 
engage a different history of Palestine and Israel than the 
one I was taught growing Up40. In so doing I position myself 
in opposition to that version of Jewish history, as a 
critical and positioned subject. 
I also position myself in opposition to much conventional 
knowledge about Palestinian suicide bombers. In proposing a 
new understanding of the Palestinian istishhadi, I position 
myself in opposition to a majority of the research literature 
on the subject. In so doing I insert myself into the thesis 
as a critical and positioned subject. Performance was central 
to the development of my position in the thesis. The thesis 
40 Notably, of a terra nullus in Palestine awaiting a Jewish return, 
and of the miraculous transformation of that land by the Zionist 
settlers, as described in Chapter 2. That history is encapsulated 
in two tourist photographs that I took when I visited Israel on a 
youth trip, over 20 years ago. The first photo is of old stone 
buildings in the desert, surrounded by sand. The second photo is of 
a modern city, new buildings surrounded by trees and by flowers, 
paved roads. The caption under the first photograph, in my own 
handwriting, reads "Old Jericho". The caption under the second 
photo reads, "New Jericho". These two photos provide a metaphor for 
the Zionist transformation of land in historic Palestine into a 
lush and modern Jewish homeland, and they also provide a metaphor 
for the history of the Zionist project that I was taught. Unbeknown 
to us at the time of our visit to Jericho, we were in the West 
Bank, in Occupied Territory. Looking at these photographs today, 
for me they also represent the elision of Palestinians as well as 
the occupation from my experiences in Israel. 
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would never have been written as it was if not for my 
performance practice. 
264 
Conclusion 
This research examined the Palestinian suicide bomber within 
a larger theoretical framework that analyzed relationships 
between the body and territory - and by extension the body 
and the nation - in historic Palestine, a territory that is 
now home to the state of Israel as well as the occupied West 
Bank and Gaza. Palestinians and Israelis alike feel a 
profound and longstanding attachment to the land in historic 
Palestine: Palestinians to Palestine or Filistin, and 
Israelis to Israel or Eretz Yisrael. Both nations also lay 
claim to this land as national space. Because 
Palestine/Filistin and Israel/Eretz Yisrael occupy the same 
physical or geographical space, this land may be considered 
contested territory. 
However whereas Jews have succeeded in transforming land in 
historic Palestine into an internationally recognized, Jewish 
national territory - the state of Israel, Palestinians have 
so far failed to achieve, or have been denied, a national 
territory or state. Thus only one nation, Israel, has 
succeeded in asserting control over this territory as its 
national territory. 
This research identified territorial separation and 
exclusivity as the cornerstones of Jewish spatial practices 
in historic Palestine from the end of the 19th century 
onward. This study also examined spatial practices used by 
Jews to assert control over Palestinian inhabited territory 
and to wrest it away from Palestinians. My conclusion is that 
beginning with the arrival of the first Zionist settlers to 
historic Palestine, this was achieved primarily through the 
construction of separate and exclusively Jewish settlements 
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inside what in 1948 became the internationally-recognized 
borders of the state of Israel. Since 1967, military 
occupation, combined with the settlement enterprise, have 
enabled Israel to assert control over the whole of the West 
Bank and Gaza. For well over 100 years, settlement 
construction has been used to transform Palestinian inhabited 
land, into land controlled exclusively by Jews. Writing in 
the year 2003, Israeli historian Ilan Troen observes that 
since the arrival of the first chalutzim to Palestine in the 
1880s, Zionists/Israelis built nearly 700 villages, towns and 
cities: 250 of them prior to 1948, and more than 450 of them 
afterward. In so doing they also de-Arabized historic 
Palestine (Masalha 1992, Yiftachel 2006, 2001), destroying 
hundreds of Palestinian Arab villages (Khalidi 1992) and 
erecting Jewish towns, forests and parks in their places 
(Massad 2006, Pappe 2006-a). 
My conclusion is that the Jewish nation building project 
profoundly transformed the land in historic Palestine, and it 
also transformed the European Jewish body there. Through 
efforts to settle and cultivate the land, the Zionist 
settlers to Palestine reconfigured the European diaspora 
Jewish body as a rooted, healthy, strong and powerful body in 
Palestine, later the state of Israel. The Jewish body has 
since the arrival of the first European Zionist settlers to 
Palestine at the end of the 19th century, been produced in a 
mutually constitutive relationship to territory. In contrast, 
the Palestinian body has been produced in a relationship to 
Jewish encroachment on Palestinian inhabited territory, and 
by extension, a desire to reclaim this territory as 
Palestinian national territory. 
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This research examined the Palestinian body in a relationship 
to territorial encroachment by Jews but also, as a locus of 
Palestinian resistance. My conclusion is that as Jewish 
territorial encroachment has continued in Palestine, so too 
has Palestinian resistance, which has always occurred in 
response to encroachment by Jews onto Palestinian inhabited 
lands. This study focused a great deal of attention on the 
Palestinian suicide bomber, considered as a weapon of 
resistance, and as part of a larger historical trajectory of 
Palestinian resistance dating back to the 1920s. This 
research concludes that, like the martyr of the 1920s and 
1930s, the fida'i of the 1960s and 1970s, and the shab of the 
first intifada, the istishhadi is linked to Palestinian 
resistance and to attempts to redeem Palestinian lands from 
Jewish control and occupation. 
Jewish spatial practices in Palestine and in Israel also 
resulted in the spatial reconfiguration of Palestinian 
bodies. Between 1947 and 1949 a majority of Palestinians were 
forcibly uprooted from their lands in what became the state 
of Israel. Since 1967 but especially so since the start of 
the al Aqsa intifada in 2000, Israel has used a combination 
of settlement construction and restrictions on Palestinian 
movement across territory to spatially confine Palestinians 
in the West Bank and Gaza to enclaves there. Here my 
conclusion in that in being subjected to severe restrictions 
on movement, the confined Palestinian body suffers disease, 
imprisonment and violence, and increasingly, death - what I 
considered the corporeal effects of occupation. 
This research devoted particular attention to the Palestinian 
istishhadi, and it did so using a framework that examined a 
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larger history of Jewish control asserted over Palestinian 
territory, and with a focus on Israeli control over the whole 
of the Occupied Territories. It is my conclusion, contra much 
of the research literature consulted, that the Israeli 
occupation provides the primary impetus for Palestinian acts 
of suicide bombing. And, contra a majority of the research 
literature consulted for this study, my conclusion is that 
the istishhadi's act of exploding her/himself is intentional. 
Writing about the martyr in painting, Tina Sherwell (2003) 
observes that through the act of self-sacrifice - the 
spilling of flesh and blood on the land - the martyr becomes 
one with the Palestinian homeland. I return to Weiss' remarks 
(2002-b), about the national territory becoming equivalent to 
the personal body. Here my conclusion is that commemorative 
posters of istishhadi provide an idealized image of the 
Palestinian homeland as a whole one, and of the Palestinian 
nation as strong and powerful one, the same as Israel. They 
also serve as a reminder of the body's destructive potential. 
In the case of the Palestinian istishhadi, the personal body, 
in the commemorative posters at least, becomes equivalent to 
the national territory: it presents an idealized image of the 
desired Palestinian national territory as a strong and 
powerful one, the same as Israel. 
Over the course of 40-plus years of occupation, Israel has 
created in the West Bank and Gaza what Agamben (1998) 
describes as the camp, a permanent spatial arrangement that 
remains under military rule and exists outside the normal 
juridical order, a space that exerts absolute control over 
those confined within it. With the occupation that began in 
1967, Israel has not only transformed Palestinians into 
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ultimate, enemy Others (Peleg 1994), it has transformed them 
into camp inmates, dare I say prisoners. Confined as they are 
to enclaves - to unlivable zones or zones of abjection 
(Butler 1993) - Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza are 
increasingly subject to Israeli sovereign power (Mbembe 
2003), considered as the power over life and death, the power 
to kill. Israeli practices in the Occupied Territories are 
preventing Palestinians from living a normal daily life, and 
they are disproportionately killing large numbers of 
Palestinians (Gordon 2008). 
This research proposed that Palestinians in the West Bank and 
Gaza, by virtue of their spatial confinement, are excluded 
from the domain or space of the subject, producing them as 
non-subjects (Collin 2004, Butler 1993). The thesis theorized 
the performance of Palestinian martyrdom as an act of 
resistance, as well as a type of subject formation in 
response to the occupation and to the constraints it imposes 
on Palestinian sUbjectivity. My conclusion is that through 
performance, the martyr refuses the status of the non-
subject. And through performance, the martyr enacts a 
resistant subjectivity, and one that seeks to put itself on 
par with Israeli subjectivity and with that of the IDF 
soldier in particular. 
While my conclusion is that Jews have succeeded in 
transforming and controlling territory in Palestine and later 
in Israel and the Occupied Territories, the question for me, 
importantly is, At what cost? Palestinian inhabited territory 
in the West Bank is perhaps irrevocably fragmented by the 
Jewish settlements and other construction projects. Gaza's 
political, economic, and agricultural infrastructure, since 
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Operation Cast Lead in particular, has been almost completely 
destroyed. Even Jewish-Israeli society has to some extent 
been internally fragmented by the issue of the occupation and 
the settlements. 
Palestinians continue to be restricted to zones of abjection 
in the West Bank and Gaza, and the spaces within which they 
may assert control over daily life are shrinking, constrained 
by an increasingly deadly occupation. And while Israelis are 
capable of asserting an exponentially greater arnount of 
control over their daily lives, they are still not completely 
secure in their national homeland: Israelis live under the 
threat of missile fire into Israel, from within the zones of 
abjection and from Gaza in particular. 
The Separation Barrier and restrictions on Palestinian 
movement have since 2004 by and large prevented the body of 
the Palestinian suicide bomber from exploding inside Israel. 
Yet Palestinian groups, notably Harnas, continue to target 
Israel, firing Qassarn rockets over barriers and fences into 
Israel. Launched over the shoulder of the Harnas operative, 
the Qassarn rocket becomes a sort of prosthetic. The 
Palestinian body continues to be deployed as a weapon of 
resistance, and it continues to target Israelis, in Israel. 
My conclusion is that until the occupation ends, until 
Palestinians are able to truly assert control over a viable, 
contiguous and sovereign national territory; until 
Palestinians can invent themselves as they desire as national 
subjects in a sovereign national homeland, these conditions 
of violence will persist. So too will the enactment of 
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violent and deadly Israeli and Palestinian subjectivities, as 
embodied, notably, by the IDF soldier and the istishhadi. 
My conclusions derive from scholarly research. They also 
derive from the act of performance. It would have been 
impossible to arrive at these conclusions had I not engaged 
in a sustained process of performance. 
When I began this research I was swayed by literature that 
posited the Palestinian suicide bomber as the product of 
religious fanaticism, personal circumstances, and despair. I 
initially turned to performance in order to substantiate 
these claims about motive. unexpectedly, my performance of 
material under study over a sustained period of time, 
prompted me to radically reconsider the assertions in the 
research literature, together with my own assumptions about 
motive. Performance spurred me to position myself more 
assertively and more critically in response to the research 
literature. It made me realize that I had to expand the scope 
of my research beyond this source material. It was my 
performance that produced a substantial shift in the thesis, 
toward a focus on corporeality, performance and 
intentionality, and later, as a result of scholarly 
investigations, sUbjectivity. Performance inspired these new 
directions in the thesis: this research would never have 
coalesced as it has, without my having engaged in this 
process of performance. 
I performed and re-performed material under consideration in 
the thesis, for two years. I came to understand this process 
as one of responsibility to the Other, through the work of 
Emmanuel Levinas. Levinas (1981), writing about subjectivity, 
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observes that responsibility manifests as putting oneself in 
the place of the other (1981). Through performance, I put 
myself in the place of the Palestinian suicide bomber over an 
extended period of time. I came to understand my performance 
as a type of responsibility to the Palestinian suicide 
bomber: a responsibility to attempt an understanding of their 
actions outside of my preconceived assumptions and outside of 
conventional scholarship on the subject. Accordingly, the 
thesis proposes a new understanding of the Palestinian 
suicide bomber other than a majority of the literature on the 
subject, literature produced within the field of terrorism 
and security studies. 
In so doing I join a growing number of scholars who are 
attempting something similar, that is, to arrive at a new 
understanding of the Palestinian istishhadi. Some have done 
so in the field of anthropology (Hage 2003, Abufarha 2009), 
others in moral philosophy (Asad 2007, Law 2008, Honderich 
2002, 2003), some in postcolonial studies (Mbembe 2003), 
visual culture (Abu Hashhash 2006), Islamic theology 
(Khosrokhavar 2005), media/feminist studies (Hasso 2005, 
Naaman 2007), and memorial practices (Allen 2006-a, Khalili 
2007). I have done so primarily in the field of performance 
studies. It is within this developing body of literature that 
I choose to situate my thesis, and to which I make my 
original research contribution. 
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DVD #1 
Jpegs images on DVD: 
vinebaum 1 
Vinebaum 2 
Vinebaum 3 
Vinebaum 4 
Vinebaum 5 
Vinebaum 6 
Vinebaum 7 
Vinebaum 8 
Self-portrait as neo-Nazi (2004) 
Performance-based, self-portrait image. 
Digital image. 
After Lucia (2006) 
Performance-based, self-portrait image. 
Print size 60 x 96 inches. 
Self-portrait as Palestinian martyr (You've 
come a long way baby) (2004) 
Digital image. 
Performance-based, self-portrait image. 
Patriot Act (2005) 
Performance-based, self-portrait image 
Print size 60 x 102 inches. 
From the diptych Patriot Acts (2006) 
Performance-based, self-portrait image. 
60 x 96 inches. 
From the diptych Patriot Acts (2006) 
Performance-based, self-portrait image. 
60 x 96 inches. 
Patriot Acts (diptych 2006) 
Performance-based, self-portrait images. 
Concrete infinity Gaza Project (2009) 
23 framed texts with photographs, one for 
every day of Operation Cast Lead in Gaza 
(December 27, 2008 - January 18 2009) 
Wall installation, approximately 10 x 4 feet. 
Vinebaum 9 Detail, Concrete infinity Gaza Project 
Text for December 29, 2008 (handwritten log 
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Vinebaum 10 
Vinebaum work 
DVD #2 
Blow Up 
of everything I did that day, with 
photograph) . 
8 x 10 inches. 
Detail, Concrete infinity Gaza Project 
Text for January 14, 2009 (handwritten log of 
everything I did that day, with photograph). 
8 x 10 inches. 
A PowerPoint document containing these 
images. 
A QuickTime version of the video Blow Up 
Also included on a self-playing DVD, see 
below. 
Video, PAL, 2005. 
Video plays automatically in any DVD player 
or on any computer (Mac and/or PC). 
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